27 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Luca Ferrero (University of California, Riverside)
  1.  55
    Luca Ferrero, Inescapability Revisited.
    According to constitutivism, the objective authority of practical reason is to be grounded in the constitutive features of agency. In this paper, I offer a brief survey of the basic structure of constitutive argument about objectivity and consider how constitutivism might dispel the worry that it can only ground a *conditional* kind of authority. In response to Enoch's original shmagency challenge, in the past I argued that the inescapability of agency shows that we should not be worried by challenges that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  43
    Luca Ferrero, Intending, Acting, and Doing.
    I argue that intending and acting belong to the same genus: intending is a kind of doing continuous in structure with intentional acting. Future-directed intending is not a truly separate phenomenon from either the intending in action or the acting itself. Ultimately, all intentions are in action, or better still, in extended courses of action. I show how the intuitive distinction between intending and acting is based on modeling the two phenomena on the extreme and limiting cases of an otherwise (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Luca Ferrero (2015). Pro-Tempore Disjunctive Intentions. In Roman Altshuler & MIchael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and The Philosophy of Action. Routledge
    I investigate the structure of pro-tempore disjunctive intentions: intentions directed at two or more eventually incompatible goals that are nonetheless kept open for the time being, while the agent is waiting to acquire more information to determine which option is better. These intentions are the basic tool for balancing, in our planning agency, rigidity and flexibility, stability and responsiveness to changing circumstances. They are a pervasive feature of intentional diachronic agency and contribute to secure dynamic consistency in our plans. I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  84
    Luca Ferrero (2015). Agency, Scarcity, and Mortality. Journal of Ethics 19 (3):349-378.
    It is often argued, most recently by Samuel Scheffler, that we should reconcile with our mortality as constitutive of our existence: as essential to its temporal structure, to the nature of deliberation, and to our basic motivations and values. Against this reconciliatory strategy, I argue that there is a kind of immortal existence that is coherently conceivable and potentially desirable. First, I argue against the claim that our existence has a temporal structure with a trajectory that necessarily culminates in an (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  45
    Luca Ferrero (2014). Diachronic Structural Rationality. Inquiry 57 (3):311-336.
    In this paper I investigate whether there are genuine and irreducible pressures of diachronic rationality grounded on the structure of the subject rather than on substantive considerations, such as pragmatic ones. I argue that structural pressures of diachronic rationality have a limited scope. The most important pressure only tells against arbitrary interference with the mechanisms for the retention of attitudes over time. I then argue that in the practical case, a substantial account in terms of the agent's temporal identity appears (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  6.  78
    Luca Ferrero (2012). Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):144-164.
    In this paper, I discuss whether there are genuinely *diachronic* constraints of practical rationality, that is, pressures on combinations of practical attitudes over time, which are not reducible to mere synchronic rational pressures. Michael Bratman has recently argued that there is at least one such diachronic rational constraint that governs the stability of intentions over time. *Pace* Bratman, I argue that there are no genuinely diachronic constraints on intentions that meet the stringent desiderata set by him. But I show that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  7.  92
    Luca Ferrero (2013). Intention. In E. Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), A Companion to Donald Davidson. Wiley-Blackwell 75-89.
    This chapter presents Davidson’s account of intentional action and intention. Davidson initially discusses intentional action in relation to the explanation and the ontology of action. His earlier view equates acting intentionally with being caused to act by a pair of appropriately related mental states (a pro-attitude and an instrumental belief) and denies the existence of intentions as distinct mental states. Later, in his account of weakness of will, Davidson offers a more complex account of practical deliberation in terms of evaluative (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  53
    Luca Ferrero (2015). Ludwig on Conditional Intentions. Methode 4 (6):61-74.
    In this paper, I discuss Ludwig's systematic and illuminating account of conditional intentions, with particular reference to my own view (presented in "Conditional Intentions", Noûs, 2009). In contrast to Ludwig, I argue that we should prefer a formal characterization of conditional intentions rather than a more substantial one in terms of reasons for action (although the conditions that qualify an intention bear on the reasonableness and justifiability of the intention). I then defend a partially different taxonomy of the conditions that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  74
    Luca Ferrero (2006). Three Ways of Spilling Ink Tomorrow. In E. Baccarini & S. Prijic-Samarzija (eds.), Rationality in Belief and Action. Rijeka 95-127.
    There are three ways to control our future conduct: by causing it, by manipulating our future selves, or by taking future-directed decisions. I show that the standard accounts of future-directed decisions fail to do justice to their distinctive contribution in intentional diachronic agency. The standard accounts can be divided in two categories: First, those that conflate the operation of decisions with that of devices for either physical constraint or manipulative self-management. Second, accounts that, although they acknowledge the non-manipulative nature of (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10.  59
    Luca Ferrero (2013). Can I Only Intend My Own Actions? In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Action and Responsibility. Oxford University Press (1) 70-94.
    In this paper, I argue against the popular philosophical thesis---aka the ‘own action condition’---that an agent can only intend one’s own actions. I argue that the own action condition does not hold for any executive attitude, intentions included. The proper object of intentions is propositional rather than agential (‘I intend that so-and-so be the case’ rather than ‘I intend to do such-and-such’). I show that, although there are some essential de se components in intending, they do not restrict the content (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Luca Ferrero (2009). Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:303-333.
    Constitutivism argues that the source of the categorical force of the norms of rationality and morality lies in the constitutive features of agency. A systematic failure to be guided by these norms would amount to a loss or lack of agency. Since we cannot but be agents, we cannot but be unconditionally guided by these norms. The constitutivist strategy has been challenged by David Enoch. He argues that our participation in agency is optional and thus cannot be a source of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  12.  54
    Luca Ferrero (1993). La Teoria dell'Identita Personale di Parfit e l'Utilitarismo. Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 9:161-196.
  13.  55
    Luca Ferrero (2015). Katsafanas, Paul.Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 267. $75.00. [REVIEW] Ethics 125 (3):883-888.
  14. Luca Ferrero (2009). What Good Is a Diachronic Will? Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403 - 430.
    There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent's capacity to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive view of the diachronic will: the rationale for (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15. Luca Ferrero (2009). Conditional Intentions. Noûs 43 (4):700 - 741.
    In this paper, I will discuss the various ways in which intentions can be said to be conditional, with particular attention to the internal conditions on the intentions’ content. I will first consider what it takes to carry out a conditional intention. I will then discuss how the distinctive norms of intention apply to conditional intentions and whether conditional intentions are a weaker sort of commitments than the unconditional ones. This discussion will lead to the idea of what I call (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  16. Luca Ferrero (2010). Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (2):1-23.
    It is often argued that future-directed decisions are effective at shaping our future conduct because they give rise, at the time of action, to a decisive reason to act as originally decided. In this paper, I argue that standard accounts of decision-based reasons are unsatisfactory. For they focus either on tie-breaking scenarios or cases of self-directed distal manipulation. I argue that future-directed decisions are better understood as tools for the non-manipulative, intrapersonal division of deliberative labor over time. A future-directed decision (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  17. Luca Ferrero, The Difference Principle: Incentives or Equality?
    1.1.1 In a recent series of papers, G.A. Cohen has presented an egalitarian interpretation of the Difference Principle (hereafter, DP).1 According to this principle—first introduced by Rawls in A Theory of Justice2—inequalities in the distribution of primary goods3 are legitimate only to the extent that they maximize the prospects of the least advantaged members of society. Cohen argues that, once it is properly applied, DP does not legitimate any departure from equality. According to him, the distribution that maximizes the prospects (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  43
    Luca Ferrero (2010). Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (2):1-23.
    It is often argued that future-directed decisions are effective at shaping our future conduct because they give rise, at the time of action, to a decisive reason to act as originally decided. In this paper, I argue that standard accounts of decision-based reasons are unsatisfactory. For they focus either on tie-breaking scenarios or cases of self-directed distal manipulation. I argue that future-directed decisions are better understood as tools for the non-manipulative, intrapersonal division of deliberative labor over time. A future-directed decision (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  19. Luca Ferrero (2009). Action. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell 137-151.
  20. Luca Ferrero (2003). An Elusive Challenge to the Authorship Account: Commentary on Lawlor's "Elusive Reasons". Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):565 – 577.
    Lawlor argues that social psychological studies present a challenge to the authorship account of first-person authority. Taking the deliberative stance does not guarantee that self- ascriptions are authoritative, for self-ascriptions might be based on elusive reasons and thus lack agential authority (i.e. they are no guide to the subject's future conduct). I argue that Lawlor's challenge is not successful. I claim that we can make sense of the nature and importance of agential authority only within the framework of the authorship (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21.  59
    Luca Ferrero (2012). Willing, Wanting, Waiting by Richard Holton. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):443-457.
    In his book Willing, Wanting, Waiting Holton defends a comprehensive view of the will. His central claims are: that we have a capacity of choice, independent of judgment about what is best to do, that resistance to temptation requires a special kind of intentions, resolutions, and the exercise of an executive capacity, willpower, there is a distinction between weakness of will and akrasia. I argue that Holton is right about these claims, but I raise a few concerns: I am unclear (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Luca Ferrero (2006). Recensione: Telmo Pievani, Introduzione Alla Filosofia Della Biologia. [REVIEW] 2R 2:1-11.
    Il volume di Pievani costituisce la più estesa ed aggiornata presentazione in lingua italiana del dibattito filosofico sulla biologia evoluzionistica. Il libro non presuppone alcuna conoscenza specialistica né in filosofia né in biologia, e perciò può essere letto con profitto anche dai non specialisti (un occasionale ricorso ad un dizionario di biologia può essere utile per la definizione di alcuni termini tecnici). Per il suo carattere introduttivo, si presta ad essere utilizzato come testo nei corsi universitari di filosofia della biologia (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  3
    Luca Ferrero (2009). What Good is a Diachronic Will? Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403-430.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  31
    Luca Ferrero (2005). The Will: Interpersonal Bargaining Versus Intrapersonal Prediction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):654-655.
    Ainslie is correct in arguing that the force of commitments partly depends on the predictive role of present action, but this claim can be supported independently of the analogy with interpersonal bargaining. No matter whether we conceive of the parties involved in the bargaining as interests or transient selves, the picture of the will as a competitive interaction among these parties is unconvincing.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Luca Ferrero (2009). Constitutivism and the Schmagency Challenge. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. OUP Oxford
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Luca Ferrero (1995). Il Principio di Differenza: Incentivi o Uguaglianza? Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 1:47-63.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  65
    Luca Ferrero (2002). Making Up One's Self: Agency, Commitments and Identity. Dissertation, Harvard University
    In this work, I investigate the nature of the alleged binding force of decisions and commitments on future conduct. Contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, decisions and commitments are not means for the control of future conduct. Future-directed commitments do not constrain future action by either imposing causal restraints, or modifying the future situation of choice, or providing a reason to act as originally decided. According to my theory commitments determine the agent's conduct only if renewed at the time of action. The (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography