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Profile: Luca Malatesti (University of Rijeka (Croatia))
  1. Luca Malatesti, Externalism and the Knowledge of Mental States.
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  2. Luca Malatesti (2014). Psychopathy and Failures of Ordinary Doing. Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2):1138-1152.
    One of the philosophical discussions stimulated by the recent scientific study of psychopathy concerns the mental illness status of this construct. This paper contributes to this debate by recommending a way of approaching the problem at issue. By relying on and integrating the seminal work of the philosopher of psychiatry Bill Fulford, I argue that a mental illness is a harmful unified construct that involves failures of ordinary doing. Central to the present proposal is the idea that the notion of (...)
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  3. Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (2014). Defending Psychopathy: An Argument From Values and Moral Responsibility. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (1):7-16.
    How psychopaths and their capacity for moral action are viewed is not only philosophically interesting but is also important and relevant for policy. The philosophical discussion of psychopathy has focussed upon the psychological faculties that are prerequisites for moral responsibility and empirical findings regarding psychopathy that are relevant to philosophical accounts of moral understanding and motivation. However, there are legitimate worries about whether psychopathy is a robust scientific construct, and there are risks attached to reifying psychopathy or other psychiatric constructs. (...)
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  4. Luca Malatesti (2013). Joško Žanić, Značenje, Stvarnost I Konceptualna Struktura: Ogled o Temeljima Semantike I Njihovim Ontološkim Implikacijama. [REVIEW] Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):337-340.
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  5. Luca Malatesti (2013). Zombies, the Uniformity of Nature, and Contingent Physicalism: A Sympathetic Response to Boran Berčić. Prolegomena 12 (2):245-259.
    Boran Berčić, in the second volume of his recent book "Filozofija" , offers two responses to David Chalmers’s conceivability or modal argument against physicalism. This latter argument aims at showing that zombies, our physical duplicates who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible, given that they are conceivable. Berčić’s first response is based on the principle of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain type will always cause effects of the same type. His second response is based on (...)
     
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  6. Luca Malatesti (2012). Boran Berčić, Filozofija. Prolegomena 11 (2):310-314.
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  7. Luca Malatesti (2012). The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    There is widespread debate in contemporary philosophy of mind over the place of conscious experiences in the natural world – where the latter is taken to be broadly as described and explained by such sciences as physics, chemistry and biology; while conscious experiences encompass pains, bodily sensations, perceptions, feelings and moods. Many philosophers and scientists, who endorse physicalism or materialism, maintain that these mental states can be completely described and explained in natural terms. Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very (...)
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  8. Luca Malatesti (2011). Thinking about phenomenal concepts. Synthesis Philosophica 26 (2):391-402.
    Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument and different conceivability arguments, advanced by Saul Kripke, David Chalmers and Joseph Levine, conclude that consciousness involves non-physical properties or properties that cannot be reductively accounted for in physical terms. Some physicalists have replied to these objections by means of different versions of the phenomenal concept strategy. David Chalmers has responded with the master argument, a reasoning that, if successful, would undermine any reasonable version of the phenomenal concept strategy. In this paper, I argue that the (...)
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  9. Luca Malatesti (2011). Review of Bortolotti, L., Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):93-96.
    Bortolotti's book offers a significant and successful example of the emerging “new” analytic philosophy of psychiatry. Methodologically, it exemplifies a fruitful two-way interaction between philosophy and empirical investigation. Empirical results from cognitive sciences and clinical research are used to constrain philosophical assumptions about beliefs and delusions. Rigorous philosophical argumentation is employed to clarify and adjudicate theoretical interpretations of empirical data concerning the nature of delusion. This work is surely an obligatory reading for those seriously interested in delusions, beliefs and, more (...)
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  10. Lisa Bortolotti & Luca Malatesti (2010). Conceptual Challenges in the Characterisation and Explanation of Psychiatric Phenomena. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):5-10.
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  11. Luca Malatesti (2010). Moral Understanding in the Psychopath. Synthesis Philosophica 24 (2):337-348.
    A pressing and difficult practical problem concerns the general issue of the right social response to offenders classified as having antisocial personality disorder. This paper approaches this general problem by focusing, from a philosophical perspective, on the still relevant but more approachable question whether psychopathic offenders are morally responsible. In particular, I investigate whether psychopaths possess moral understanding. A plausible way to approach the last question requires a satisfactory philosophical interpretation of the empirical evidence that appears to show that psychopaths (...)
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  12. Luca Malatesti (2010). Moralno razumijevanje kod psihopata. Synthesis Philosophica 24 (2):337-348.
    Gorući i težak praktički problem vezan je uz opće pitanje ispravnog društvenog odgovora na prijestupnike klasificirane kao osobe s antisocijalnim poremećajem ličnosti. Članak prilazi ovom općem problemu fokusirajući se, iz filozofske perspektive, na još uvijek važno ali lakše dohvatljivo pitanje jesu li psihopatski prijestupnici moralno odgovorni. Posebno se istražuje imaju li psihopati mogućnost moralnog razumijevanja. Vjerodostojni pristup posljednjem pitanju zahtijeva zadovoljavajuću filozofsku interpretaciju empirijskog dokaza koji pokazuje da psihopati ne uspijevaju naći razliku između konvencionalnih i moralnih normi. Preciznije, uzet ću (...)
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  13. Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (2010). Conclusions: Psychopathy and Responsibility, a Rejoinder. In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa. 319.
    The philosophical contributes in the volume offer several considerations for the conclusion that psychopaths offenders should not be considered morally responsible for their crimes. We situate this conclusion within wider philosophical debates and indicate relevant directions of further research.
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  14. Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (2010). Defending PCL-R. In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oup Oxford.
    In this chapter we argue that Robert Hare's psychopathy checklist revised (PCL-R) offers a construct of psychopathy that is valid enough for philosophical investigations of the moral and legal responsibility of psychopathic offenders.
     
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  15. Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.) (2010). Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa.
    Psychopaths have emotional and rational impairments that can be expressed in persistent criminal behaviour. UK and US law has not traditionally excused disordered individuals for their crimes citing these impairments as a cause for their criminal behaviour. Until now, the discussion of whether psychopaths are morally responsible for their behaviour has usually taken place in the realm of philosophy. However, in recent years, this debate has been informed by scientific and psychiatric advancements, fundamentally so with the development of Robert Hare's (...)
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  16. John McMillan & Luca Malatesti (2010). Introduction: Interfacing Law, Philosophy and Psychiatry. In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oup Oxford.
  17. Luca Malatesti (2009). Moral Understanding in the Psychopath. Synthesis Philosophica 24 (2):337-348.
    A pressing and difficult practical problem concerns the general issue of the right social response to offenders classified as having antisocial personality disorder. This paper approaches this general problem by focusing, from a philosophical perspective, on the still relevant but more approachable question whether psychopathic offenders are morally responsible. In particular, I investigate whether psychopaths possess moral understanding. A plausible way to approach the last question requires a satisfactory philosophical interpretation of the empirical evidence that appears to show that psychopaths (...)
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  18. Luca Malatesti (2008). Mary's Scientific Knowledge. Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.
    Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument (KA) aims to prove, by means of a thought experiment concerning the hypothetical scientist Mary, that conscious experiences have non-physical properties, called qualia. Mary has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision without having had any colour experience. The central intuition in the KA is that, by seeing colours, Mary will learn what it is like to have colour experiences. Therefore, her scientific knowledge is incomplete, and conscious experiences have qualia. In this paper I consider (...)
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  19. Luca Malatesti (2008). Phenomenal Ways of Thinking. Teorema 27 (3):149-166.
    Certain conceivable situations figure as premises in arguments for the conclusion that conscious experiences have nonphysical properties or qualia. Frank Jackson's knowledge argument considers the hypothetical scientist Mary, who despite having complete scientific knowledge of colour vision, supposedly lacks knowledge of qualia. Both Saul Kripke's and David Chalmers' modal arguments involve zombies, conceivable creatures physically identical to us who lack qualia. Several physicalists have replied to all these objections by endorsing the phenomenal concept reply. Without trying to undermine this reply (...)
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  20. Luca Malatesti (2004). Knowing What It is Like and Knowing How. In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. 55--119.
    Physicalism in philosophy of mind is the doctrine that mental states and processes, if they are something, are physical states and processes. Notoriously, Frank Jackson has attacked physicalism with the knowledge argument. This paper does not consider whether the knowledge argument is successful. Instead, the author argues that the ability reply to the knowledge argument fails. The central assumption of this objection is that Mary, by having colour experiences, acquires a set of abilities rather than new beliefs as required by (...)
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  21. Luca Malatesti (2004). The Knowledge Argument. Dissertation, University of Stirling
    Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very influential piece of reasoning that seeks to show that colour experiences constitute an insoluble problem for science. This argument is based on a thought experiment concerning Mary. She is a vision scientist who has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision but has never had colour experiences. According to Jackson, upon seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires new knowledge that escapes her complete scientific knowledge. He concludes that there are facts concerning colour experiences (...)
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  22. Luca Malatesti, Forum on Peter, Carruthers. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Forum 2 SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.
    A book symposium on Peter, Carruthers. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Contents: Author's précis Colin Allen, Evolving Phenomenal Consciousness - Carruthers's reply. José Luis Bermúdez, Commentary - Carruthers's reply - Reply to Carruthers: Properties, first-order representationalism and reinforcement. Joseph Levine, Commentary - Carruthers's reply. William Seager, Dispositions and Consciousness - Carruthers's reply.
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  23. Luca Malatesti (1999). Mental Properties, Functionalism and Reductionism. Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (1).
     
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  24. Luca Malatesti (1997). Mind-Body Idendity, Propriety Objection And Events. Anthropology and Philosophy 2 (1):69-85.
     
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