According to the legend, Bishop Wilberforce (``Soapy Sam'') at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in Oxford on Saturday, June 30th, 1860, turned to Thomas Huxley, and asked him ``Is it on your grandfather's or your grandmother's side that you claim descent from a monkey''; whereupon Huxley delivered a devastating rebuke, thereby establishing the primacy of scientific truth over ecclesiastical obscurantism. Although the legend is historically untrue in almost every detail, its persistence suggests that (...) it may nonetheless be true in some deeper, mythical, sense. To explore this possibility the British Academy has invited Dr Janet Browne to be a neo-Huxley confronting Mr J.R. Lucas, as a neo-Wilberforce, with each reconsidering their earlier arguments.. (shrink)
The Conceptual Roots of Mathematics is a comprehensive study of the foundation of mathematics. Lucas, one of the most distinguished Oxford scholars, covers a vast amount of ground in the philosophy of mathematics, showing us that it is actually at the heart of the study of epistemology and metaphysics.
Lucas, Brian Review(s) of: Religious confession privilege and the common law, by Keith Thompson (Leiden: Matinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), pp.395, 135.00.
Hello Mr John Lucas, I go to school in Perth in Western Australia. In the subject mathematics at my school, we were given a project to research a given mathematician and write a report on them. I was given you. I have to incorporate some information about the mathematical times in which you live and to attempt to include details of the contribution that you made to the field of mathematics. I also have to include a short biography (...) of your life. If it is alright with you, would you be able to give me a brief biography of your life (e.g. date of birth, schooling, where you lived) and a very brief summary of the contributions you have made to the field of mathematics. If it is possible, even the mathematical times in which we live. I hope this is not too much trouble and if you could, would you be able to e-mail it to me as soon as possible please since we don't have long to finish the project. Please e-mail it back to me on my dad's address above. I hope this is not a bother to you. Remember, I am only a high school student and I might not understand all that you hopefully send. Thankyou very much. (shrink)
Dear Mr. Lucas, I was wondering if you had come across Query 44 of George Berkeley's ``Analyst: A discourse addressed to an infidel mathematician"?. It reads: ``Whether the difference between a mere computer and a man of science be not that one computes on principles clearly conceived and by rules evidently demonstrated, whereas the other [i.e a man] doth not?" Not bad for 1734!
Lucas, Brian This article deals with the role of the Episcopal Conference in the area of social communications and the tensions that arise with respect to the respective roles of the diocesan bishop and the Episcopal Conference, including lay heads of ecclesial agencies, in presenting 'the face of the Church' in the public forum. The article is divided into two sections: i)The Church as 'visible institution' and the ecclesiological and juridical foundations for identifying those who represent it in the (...) public forum; ii) The Episcopal Conference as an expression of episcopal collegiality and a voice in the communications market place.=. (shrink)
Lucas, Brian Review(s) of: The price of freedom: Edmund Rice educational leader, by Denis McLaughlin, East Kew: David Lovell Publishing, 2007, pp.397, $45.00.
There was once a leak from Hebdomadal Council. The Assessor told her husband, who told my wife, who told me that Monday afternoon had been spent discussing what Lucas would say if various courses of action were adopted, leading to the conclusion that it would be best to do nothing. I was flattered, but a bit surprised. The tide of philosophical scepticism had ebbed, and it was generally allowed that a reasonable way of discovering what someone would say (...) was to ask him. Dick Southwood did: he would quiz me in Common Room – sometimes ending "Thank you for letting me bounce these ideas off you" – and had reliable information about how one member of Congregation would react to various proposals. And not only me: he was a listening Vice-Chancellor, who used to bike from Wellington Square to Merton for lunch, greeting many as he passed them, and ready to stop if occasion warranted it. Of course, there are many other leaks. I remember once attending a meeting in the Town Hall to argue for cycle tracks, and someone coming up to me, and saying, "You’re having a tussle with Council, aren’t you? I think you ought to see the minutes of their latest meeting"; the next day there was a copy in my pigeon hole, giving me just the ammunition I needed. What members of Congregation tend the forget is the existence – the other side of the green baize door, so to speak – of a corps of bedells.. (shrink)
Meet the God Who Is Greater Than Your Biggest Questions. The Bible never shies away from seeming contradictions. We are told both to resist our enemies and to love them, and that our all-knowing God can sometimes forget. Unable to reconcile such biblical paradoxes, some people abandon Christianity, while others pretend that the seeming contradictions don’t exist–preferring to believe in an uncomplicated, easy-to-comprehend God. Yet countless others are hungry for new insight into the God behind the Bible’s mysterious paradoxes. Responding (...) to this spiritual hunger, James Lucas delves into the mysteries of Scripture, demonstrating that biblical “contradictions” are actually exquisite paradoxes that enlarge our understanding of God. With this book as your guide, you can embrace the paradoxes of Scripture and pursue honest answers to your hardest questions. The study of biblical paradox leads to greater devotion to the majestic God who makes himself known even while he surpasses human understanding. Today, you can begin Knowing the Unknowable God. (shrink)
Lucas, Brian Review(s) of: Pope benedict XVI and the sexual abuse crisis - working for reform and renewal, Gregory Erlandson and Matthew Bunson, (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor Publishing Division, 2010), pb, pp.207.
Responsibility is a key concept in our moral, social and political thinking, but is not itself properly understood. In this book J R Lucas elucidates it in terms of answerability - the obligation to answer the question 'Why did you do it?' He develops this account to include negative responsiblity - 'Why did you not do something about it?' - and share responsibility, which together yield the rationale of political responsibility. In disentangling these two strands of argument, he points (...) out potential conflicts between them within our ideal of responsible government. He exposes the flaws in consequentialism generally, and the utilitarian theory of punishment in particular, and argues for the insights of retributive theories but without the vindictiveness. He devotes separate chapters to rewards, money and personal relations, outlines the fundamental principles of business and professional ethics, and finally touches on those issues that go beyond responsibility altogether. (shrink)
Goedel's theorem states that in any consistent system which is strong enough to produce simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved-in-the-system, but which we can see to be true. Essentially, we consider the formula which says, in effect, "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system". If this formula were provable-in-the-system, we should have a contradiction: for if it were provablein-the-system, then it would not be unprovable-in-the-system, so that "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system" would be false: equally, if it were provable-in-the-system, then it (...) would not be false, but would be true, since in any consistent system nothing false can be provedin-the-system, but only truths. So the formula "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system" is not provable-in-the-system, but unprovablein-the-system. Further, if the formula "This formula is unprovablein- the-system" is unprovable-in-the-system, then it is true that that formula is unprovable-in-the-system, that is, "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system" is true. Goedel's theorem must apply to cybernetical machines, because it is of the essence of being a machine, that it should be a concrete instantiation of a formal system. It follows that given any machine which is consistent and capable of doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula which it is incapable of producing as being true---i.e., the formula is unprovable-in-the-system-but which we can see to be true. It follows that no machine can be a complete or adequate model of the mind, that minds are essentially different from machines. (shrink)
The views of Redhead ([2004]) are defended against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). The importance of informal rigour is canvassed, and the argument for the a priori nature of induction is explained. The significance of Gödel's theorem is again rehearsed.
In 1931 Kurt Gödel proved two theorems about the completeness and consistency of first-order arithmetic. Their implications for philosophy are profound. Many fashionable tenets are shown to be untenable: many traditional intuitions are vindicated by incontrovertible arguments.
Plato was politically incorrect---gloriously incorrect: hard to ignore and difficult to refute. Read An Engagement with Plato's Republic to argue with him or against him, for contemporary orthodoxies or against them. ``Plato was the first feminist. Women were the same as men, only not so good.''.
Thus far the logic out of which mathematics has developed has been First-order Predicate Calculus with Identity, that is the logic of the sentential functors, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, etc., together with identity and the existential and universal quotifiers restricted to quotify- ing only over individuals, and not anything else, such as qualities or quotities themselves. Some philosophers—among them Quine— have held that this, First-order Logic, as it is often called, con- stitutes the whole of logic. But that is a (...) mistake. It leaves out Second-order Logic, which we need if we are to characterize the natural numbers precisely, and pays scant attention to the logic of relations, especially transitive relations, which is the key to much of modern mathematics. Quine’s argument for restricting logic to First-order Logice was based on the grounds that only First- order logical theories display “Law and Order” and himself regards modal logic as belonging with witchcraft and superstition.1 Pred- icates are ontologically more suspect than individuals, and have a different logic, which is liable to give rise to paradox and inconsis- tency. Moreover, Second-order Logic lacks the completeness that First-order Logice has, which provides a pleasing parallel between syntactic and semantic notions, and argues for the analyticity of deductive logic. (shrink)
I have no quarrel with the first two sentences: but the third, though charitable and courteous, is quite untrue. Although there are criticisms which can be levelled against the Gödelian argument, most of the critics have not read either of my, or either of Penrose's, expositions carefully, and seek to refute arguments we never put forward, or else propose as a fatal objection one that had already been considered and countered in our expositions of the argument. Hence my title. The (...) Gödelian Argument uses Gödel's theorem to show that minds cannot be explained in purely mechanist terms. It has been put forward, in different forms, by Gödel himself, by Penrose, and by me. (shrink)
It might be the case that absence of constraint is the relevant sense of ' freedom' when we are discussing the freedom of the will, but it needs arguing for. ...
The argument is a dialectical one. It is not a direct proof that the mind is something more than a machine, but a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanism that may be put forward. If the mechanist maintains any specific thesis, I show that [146] a contradiction ensues. But only if. It depends on the mechanist making the first move and putting forward his claim for inspection. I do not think Benacerraf has quite taken the point. He (...) criticizes me both for "failing to notice" that my ability to show that the Gödel sentence of a formal system is true "depends very much on how he is given. (shrink)
The ontological argument has run for a long time, regularly refuted, regularly re-appearing in a new form. Something can be learnt from its longevity. Its proponents must be on to something, or it would not have survived its many refutations. But equally, it must have been much misformulated, or it would not have seemed evidently fallacious to its many critics. Perhaps it does express a deep philosophical intimation. Certainly it has been taken to prove more than it really can establish. (...) Like many other philosophical arguments it has suffered by being made out to be more rigorous than in the nature of the case it can be. For some philosophers addressing some questions it may have been decisive in leading them to adopt one of the few options open to them: but it is quite inconclusive for others, with different presuppositions or different problems, and cannot be reduced into a valid proof cogent for all comers and compelling them to accept the conclusion it claims to demonstrate. (shrink)
MANY thinkers deny the possibility of businessmen having responsibilities or ethical obligations. A businessman has no alternative, in view of the competition of the market-place, to do anything other than buy at the cheapest and sell at the dearest price he can. In any case, it would be irrational-if, indeed, it were possible-not to do so. Admittedly, there is a framework of law within which he has to operate, but that is all, and so long as he keeps the law (...) he is free to maximise his profits without being constrained by any moral or social considerations, or any further sense of responsibility for what he does. (shrink)
Introductions should introduce, but sometimes lead to engagements. That is our aim. We want to make Plato’s Republic more easily read by modern readers, but do not want to do only that. For philosophy is like poetry, and cannot be learned second-hand. I can learn all sorts of facts about a poem, but unless I have entered into the poet’s experience, if only in my imagination, it remains dead. Similarly, I shall not see the point of text-book analyses of philosophical (...) doctrines unless I have felt the force of the arguments that led the philosopher to propose them, and have some sense of the objections he encountered and the way he sought to surmount them. That is why we still need to read Plato and Aristotle, as we do Homer and Sophocles, in a way that we do not, save as a historical exercise, read ancient textbooks of medicine or mechanical construction. (shrink)
The Unity of Science is often thought to be reductionist, but this is because we fail to distinguish questions from answers. The questions asked by different sciences are different---the biologist is interested in different topics from the physicist, and seeks different explanations---but the answers are not peculiar to each particular science, and can range over the whole of scientific knowledge. The biologist is interested in organisms--- concept unknown to physics---but explains physiological processes in terms of chemistry, not a mysterious vital (...) force. The replacement of Laplacian determinism by quantum mechanics further erodes the tendency towards reductionism. The answers given in different explanations are not subsumed under one complete theory; and quantum mechanics does not have a concept of haecceitas, "this-i-ness" which would make its entities the fundamental constituents of everything. (shrink)
: Kathryn Paxton George's recent publication, Animal, Vegetable, or Woman? (2000), is the culmination of more than a decade's work and encompasses standard and original arguments against the feminist-vegetarian connection. This paper demonstrates that George's key arguments are deeply flawed, antithetical to basic feminist commitments, and beg the question against fundamental aspects of the debate. Those who do not accept the feminist-vegetarian connection should rethink their position or offer a non-question-begging defense of it.
Principle 2 of the 2005 Mental Capacity Act (MCA) requires that decision-making capacity should be assumed, unless there is conclusive evidence, on a balance of probabilities, to the contrary (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005). In his article “The Paradox of the Assessment of Capacity Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005,” Ajit Shah (2011) raises the concern that the new Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS), introduced through the Mental Health Act (Department of Health 2007), conflict with this principle (henceforth, the principle (...) of presumed capacity) because, in practice, they will encourage the routine assessment of capacity even in the absence of any positive evidence of diminished capacity .. (shrink)
But still, I had heard it. It must have been in the New English Bible and the New English E 'o)# f&# Bible is sound on scholarship, so there must be good manuscript authority for s..
We can imagine a human operator playing a game of one-upmanship against a programmed computer. If the program is Fn, the human operator can print the theorem Gn, which the programmed computer, or, if you prefer, the program, would never print, if it is consistent. This is true for each whole number n, but the victory is a hollow one since a second computer, loaded with program C, could put the human operator out of a job.... It is useless for (...) the `mentalist' to argue that any given program can always be improves since the process for improving programs can presumably be programmed also; certainly this can be done if the mentalist describes how the improvement is to be made. If he does give such a description, then he has not made a case. (shrink)
PROFESSOR LEWIS 1 and Professor Coder 2 criticize my use of Gödel's theorem to refute Mechanism. 3 Their criticisms are valuable. In order to meet them I need to show more clearly both what the tactic of my argument is at one crucial point and the general aim of the whole manoeuvre.
based on a list which I distributed at the Turing Conference in Brighton some years ago, with some further additions. In the Proceedings, Machines and Thought, ed. Peter Millican and Andy Clark, Oxford, 1996, Robin Gandy gives a much earlier reference: Emil L. Post, `Absolutely Unsolvable Problems and Relatively Undecidable Propositions—Account of an Anticipation’, in Martin Davis, (ed.), The Undecidable (New York: Raven Press, 1965), pp.340-435, esp. pp.417-24. Chalmers gives a more up-to-date list in his bibliography—which used to be (...) http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/papers/chalmers.biblio.4.html but has now moved to Arizona: click here for pursuing his references I am grateful to various correspondents who have helped me to up-date the list given here, and welcome further items. (shrink)
John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism engages our interest and sympathy because it is flawed. It reflects the crisis in Mill’s life, when he lost his faith. He had been brought up by his father in the straitest tenets of utilitarianism, but had had nervous breakdown in early adult life from emotional ill-nourishment. Utilitarianism might work as a guide for the well-governing of India by James Mill and his colleagues, but gave little sustenance to the aspiring spirit of the Romantic Movement. It (...) treats people as units, not individuals. It takes no account of the “projects” that people pursue, as Bernard Williams.. (shrink)
At the end of each chapter there are places to click on which will take you to the next chapter, to the contents, or to this (the Home) page. In the Contents clicking on a chapter number will take you to that chapter.
Although the use of military force for humanitarian ends seems utterly divorced from the use of such force to combat terrorism, both uses answer to similar descriptions. Both appear to encourage nations that are not necessarily themselves under attack to set aside the reigning conventions of national sovereignty and territorial integrity for the overriding purposes of international law enforcement and protection of vulnerable noncombatants. Both involve offensive rather than purely defensive uses of military force. Both answer to criteria of justification (...) that can be derived more readily from the normative moral principles of the classical just war tradition than from purely descriptive revisions of the 'legalist paradigm' in international relations, because the latter is deeply wedded by precedent to notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and a purely defensive use of military force. Most significantly, the justification for both kinds of military action depends essentially upon a notion of 'the international community' that is inchoate and urgently in need of rigorous reformulation. In this paper, I attempt to formulate criteria for the justifiable use of military force for these non-defensive purposes, with attention to the nuances of internationalism that several of the resulting criteria entail. Challenges to the de facto role of the United Nations as the sole authoritative representative of this community, and alternatives to its authority in legitimating the use of military force for purposes of international law enforcement, are considered. (shrink)
Meta-analytic findings have suggested that individual differences are relatively weaker predictors of academic dishonesty than are situational factors. A robust literature on deviance correlates and workplace integrity testing, however, demonstrates that individual difference variables can be relatively strong predictors of a range of counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). To the extent that academic cheating represents a kind of counterproductive behavior in the work role of "student", employment-type integrity measures should be strong predictors of academic dishonesty. Our results with a college student (...) sample showed that integrity test scores were moderate to strong correlates of self-reported academic cheating and that these relationships persisted even after controlling for a variety of measurement concerns such as item format similarity, concurrent assessment, and socially desirable responding. Implications for institutional honor codes and the broader relations between educational and workplace dishonesty are discussed. (shrink)
My sights in this paper are trained on facts. Most people think that they know what facts are; that while their friends often, and themselves occasionally, are ignorant of the facts, at least they know what sort of things facts are---they can recognise a fact when they see it. Facts, in the popular philosophy of today, are good, simple souls; there is no guile in them, nor any room for subjective bias, and once we have made ourselves acquainted with them, (...) we have reached the beginning and summit of all wisdom. (shrink)
The issue is obscured by the fact that the word `space' can be used in four different ways. It can be used, first, as a term of pure mathematics, as when mathematicians talk of an `n-dimensional phase-space', an `n-dimensional vector-space', a `three-dimensional projective space' or a `twodimensional Riemannian space'. In this sense the word `space' means the totality of the abstract entities-the `points'-implicitly defined by the axioms. There is no doubt that there exist, iii this sense, non-Euclidean spaces, because all (...) that is claimed by such an assertion is that sets of non-Euclidean axioms constitute possible implicit definitions of abstract entities, that is to say that some sets of non-Euclidean axioms are consistent. If Kant or any other philosopher had denied this, he would have been wrong; but Kant himself took care not to deny it, 2 and there is little reason to suppose that any philosopher concerned about space has been using the word in this, the pure mathematician's, sense. (shrink)
This article interprets the state of "subjection," which Foucault took to be characteristicof the modern subject of power/knowledge, as an abiding psychic dispositionanalogous to Heidegger's "inauthentic self-understanding." Theauthor begins by arguing, against prevailing orthodoxy, that in Discipline andPunish, Foucault is already centrally concerned with the power effects of formsof psychic self-relation. He then argues that the psychic state of subjectionshould not be understood as a constellation of ideas, beliefs, or other "representations"but along de-essentialized Heideggerian/Aristotelian lines as a "habit"of the soul—the (...) effect of training and technology rather than ideology. Key Words: ethics • subjectification • panopticism • technology • understanding. (shrink)
x13.1 Pervasive Pressures „here —re m—ny intelle™tu—l pressures tow—rds redu™tionismF ‡e —re heirs of ™l—ssi™—l ™orpus™ul—ri—nismD —nd —re often unwilling m—teri—lists under our skinF „here —re —rguments from the su™™ess of s™ien™e —nd for the unity of s™ien™eD —nd for the unity of the world in whi™h we —nd s™ientists oper—teF „hese give rise to dierent redu™tionist thesesD whi™h —re usu—lly ™onfusedD (...) —nd reinfor™e one —notherD ˜ut need to ˜e distinguishedD —nd de—lt with sep—r—telyF.. (shrink)
The goal of this essay is to illustrate how Ebrahim Moosa's method of “contrapuntal reading” can be applied fruitfully to the Sunni hadith literature. My case study is the set of penalties (hudud) for illicit sex, which include flogging, stoning, and banishment. I propose a fresh reading of these sacred texts that brings to the fore the ethical dimension of Prophet Muhammad's conduct, especially his strong reluctance to apply these measures. I conclude by identifying four ethical problems that the stoning (...) penalty raises and suggest how the hadith literature can be read to argue against the validity of this specific punishment. (shrink)
The teaching of philosophy to the young has long been a matter of dispute. In my own University of Oxford we never allow an undergraduate to study philosophy alone, but insist that if he wants to read philosophy he must also read something else, arguing that it is good for the young to be kept sane, and after having been stuffed with nonsense in one tutorial to go and be brought down to earth again in the other; and to learn (...) that in spite of metaphysical doubts about the reality of the past, it is none the less possible to work out the causes of the Peloponnesian War, and that Berkeleyan doubts about the existence of fields leave working physicists profoundly unworried. We look with unenthusiasm at the former Moral Sciences Tripos in The Other Place, where they read nothing but philosophy, and simply go round in circles following one another's entailments, unfertilised and unstimulated by any experience of any other subject. No wonder, we think, that our graduates prove themselves to be such wise men of the world that they are deemed worthy to hold important positions in the Civil Service, the Press, the Benches, and in Parliament. Cambridge sees it differently, and notes that while Oxford has been very good at producing non-philosophers, it has produced no school like that of the Cambridge Platonists, nor any individuals to equal Moore, Russell, or Wittgenstein; and concludes that pure philosophy, unsullied by any extraneous subject, is the proper study for those who wish to philosophize well. (shrink)
External validity refers to the generalization of research findings, either from a sample to a larger population or to settings and populations other than those studied. While definitions vary, discussions generally agree that experiments are lower in external validity than other methodological approaches. Further, external validity is widely treated as an issue to be addressed through methodological procedures. When testing theories, all measures are indirect indicators of theoretical constructs, and no methodological procedures taken alone can produce external validity. External validity (...) can be assessed through determining (1) the extent to which empirical measures accurately reflect theoretical constructs, (2) whether the research setting conforms to the scope of the theory under test, (3) our confidence that findings will repeat under identical conditions, (4) whether findings support the theory being tested, and (5) the confirmatory status of the theory under test. In these ways, external validity is foremost a theoretical issue and can only be addressed by an examination of the interplay between theory and methods. (shrink)
A section I had written for my Principles of Politics, but decided not to use. I recently dug it out for an American friend. I publish it here, in case it is of use to anyone else.
When Charles Dodgson died in 1898, my father succeeded to his rooms, which had been cleared, rather rapidly, by the College. Among the items that had been disposed of were some tiles which had surrounded the fireplace, and which were evidently the inspiration for "The Hunting of the Snark". My father bought them back from a second-hand shop, and they have been in Christ Church ever since.
x10.1 Locality Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation was always open to the complaint that it involved \Action at a Distance", contrary to the Principle of Locality. But it was very well established empirically, and had to be accepted. Similarly in contemporary quantum me- chanics we seem to have correlations between measurements that defy the Principle of Locality, but have to be accepted none the less.1 Although locality is a characteristic mark of causal con- nexion, it is not, as Hume supposed,2 (...) an essential one. Nor is it merely a uniformity we have found to hold for the most part|else we should feel little compunction in accepting that in some cases it happened not to hold. It is clearly an a priori principle, though not an absolutely necessary one. (shrink)
Plato began it. After thinking about the nature of argument he concluded that the correct way of reasoning was the axiomatic way, and formulated the programme of axiomatization that Eudoxus and Euclid subsequently carried out. Since then the axiomatic method has been firmly established, not only as the method for mathematics, but as a paradigm to which all other disciplines should strive to be assimilated; and in this present century not only has axiomatization been carried through as completely as it (...) can be, but the most determined efforts have been made to wish hypotheticodeductive schemata on to biology, economics, and even history. (shrink)
Two questions are distinguished: how to program a machine so that it behaves in a manner that would lead us to ascribe consciousness to it; and what is involved in saying that something is conscious. The distinction can be seen in cases where anaesthetics have failed to work on patients temporarily paralysed.
Henrich et al. propose that humans are genetically equipped with learning mechanisms that enable them to acquire the preferences and beliefs related to economic prosocial behaviors. In addition to their cross-cultural data, they cite developmental evidence in support of this theory. We challenge Henrich et al.'s interpretation of the developmental data in a discussion of recent work which suggests that preferences for altruism and fairness may have an innate basis.
The stock of natural law has risen in recent years. It is partly due to growing dissatisfaction with the elucidations offered by the legal positivists, and partly because sceptical arguments have lost their edge. In the heyday of logical positivism it was easy to say ``I don't understand what you mean by `right' . . .'' and break off discussion without more ado; but, as the bounds of unintelligibility increased and came to encompass almost the whole of human knowledge, an (...) inability to understand became not so much a boast as a confession. Many people may still be unclear about the metaphysical foundations of the moral sciences; but we are disinclined to doubt that they are serious disciplines, or to think that they need to be, or even could be, reconstructed without any moral element. Moreover, the events of this century have begun to penetrate the academic consciousness. Having witnessed the terrible tyrannies of the Nazis, the Communists and the Third World, we find it difficult to divorce our thinking about law from our thinking about morals. Although 'duty' is still an unfashionable word, people are constantly talking about the rights that are being denied them and the wrongs being inflicted on them. And these rights claimed and wrongs resented are grounded not on some existing legal enactment or a one-time social contract, but on the nature of man and the nature of the state, and are therefore, although very different from their mediaeval articulation, arguments of natural law. (shrink)
IT is ungenerous to pick holes in The Concept of Law. It is a great work. Its clarity is luminous, and its argument sustained and convincing. Hart is eminently successful in rescuing the concept of law from the Legal Realists, the Positivists, and the Formalists, who attempt to straitjacket it within schemata which are too narrow or too vague to give an adequate elucidation of it. But sometimes Hart is not carried along by his arguments as far as he should. (...) He makes too many concessions to his opponents, and his own account of the law is, in consequence, too formalist, in spite of having himself adduced cogent considerations elsewhere for rejecting the purely formalist line of argument. The rule of recognition, although important, is not fundamental. We should, rather, see law as a social phenomenon, to be distinguished from other social phenomena, but intelligible only in a social context, and not-as lawyers are too ready to suppose-an autonomous discipline which can be explained and understood entirely in its own terms. (shrink)
The legend of the encounter between Wilberforce and Huxley is well established. Almost every scientist knows, and every viewer of the BBC's recent programme on Darwin was shown,* how Samuel Wilberforce, bishop of Oxford, attempted to pour scorn on Darwin's Origin of Species at a meeting of the British Association in Oxford on 30 June 1860, and had the tables turned on him by T. H. Huxley. In this memorable encounter Huxley's simple scientific sincerity humbled the prelatical insolence and clerical (...) obscurantism of Soapy Sam; the pretension of the Church to dictate to scientists the conclusions they were allowed to reach were, for good and all, decisively defeated; the autonomy of science was established in Britain and the Western world; the claim of plain unvarnished truth on men's allegiance was vindicated, however unwelcome its implications for human vanity might be; and the flood tide of Victorian faith in all its fulsomeness was turned to an ebb, which has continued to our present day and will only end when religion and superstition have been finally eliminated from the minds of all enlightened men. Even churchmen concede that it was a disastrous defeat.1 Only Owen Chadwick strikes a note of caution, observing that the account given of the incident in Wilberforce's biography seems hardly consistent with an overwhelming defeat, and maintaining that the received account must be a largely legendary creation of a later date. (shrink)
Whatever good or ill it did to Guy Fawkes, his resuscitation at the hands of Bernard Williams has, by any utilitarian reckoning, been a Good Thing. A casual glance at the literature that has accumulated over the past thirty five years leaves no doubt that the topic has been reduplicated many times over, to the great enjoyment of undergraduates, who have been able to write science fiction under the guise of essays in the Philosophy of Mind, and of dons, who (...) in an age of cvs and Assessments, have been able to notch up page after page of counter-replies to replies to rebuttals of previous papers, not to mention an often welcome tally of references in the citation index. But the actual arguments adduced by Williams can be turned to support a much more traditional view of the self, as a necessarily unique agent whose individuality is established by his capacity for autonomous action. (shrink)
x8.1 `Real' The word `real' has many senses, and has been much misunderstood in consequence. It was, along with other philosophical terms, such as quality, quantity, entity, identity, essence and substance, coined by the Schoolmen in the Middle Ages|realis, reale from the Latin res, a thing|to mark the distinction between what really existed and what mere existed in intellectu, in the mind; and the word still carries connotations of thinginess, which can confuse our thinking about reality in the present age.
x2.1 Non-contradiction One can think wrong. The fact that after much thought one has reached a conclusion is no guarantee that the conclusion reached is right. Only a very opinionated man would refuse to concede the possibility of error, and once the admission of fallibility is made, the problem of justifying one's beliefs becomes acute. So we formulate our reasons as best we can. But even when formulated, they may fail to convince. Only if people are willing to be reasonable (...) can they be reasoned with. None so obdurate as those who will not listen to reason, and with them at least it is better to save one's breath than to attempt to convince them. You just cannot argue with people who will not be argued with. With them we can only let them go their way, as did Socrates; E 1&# (ea chairein). (shrink)
These are the working notes of the workshop on Model-based and Qualitative Reasoning in Biomedicine, which was held during the European Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, AIME’03, on 19th October, 2003, in Protaras, Cyprus. The workshop brought together various researchers involved in the development and use of model-based and qualitative reasoning methods in tackling biomedical problems. Much of the biomedical knowledge is essentially model-based, as it is the understanding of the structure and function of biomedical systems that researchers wish (...) to achieve, and this is best done by developing models of these systems. In situations where it may not be appropriate or possible to use quantitative methods, researchers use qualitative approaches. Depending on the biomedical problem concerned, such descriptions may involve causal, temporal and spatial knowledge, possibly of an uncertain nature. Also in the medical management of disorders in patients, qualitative and model-based approaches are being used. For example, systems used for diagnosing disease rely on explicit models of normal or abnormal structure and behaviour (often referred to as ’first-principles models’) of the underlying disease process. Qualitative knowledge plays a role in the modelling of disease and treatment processes, including the handling of the uncertainty involved in these processes. Hence, there is little doubt that model-based and qualitative methods fit the biomedical domain really well. However, one of the problems with research in the biomedical field is that researchers applying model-based and qualitative-reasoning methods are often closely linked to their application field, such as, for example, cell biology or clinical medicine, and find it difficult to keep in contact with colleagues doing similar research, but working in a different biomedical application field. This is even more difficult if the techniques used are also different. For example, researchers involved in Bayesian network research and researchers using qualitative simulation methods hardly exchange views and ideas, despite the fact that their methods have in common that they emphasise representing qualitative biomedical knowledge. It was the aim of this workshop to bring together researchers along the entire spectrum of the biomedical field, from health-care research and clinical medicine to human biology, using a variety of methods and techniques, from (qualitative) Bayesian networks and symbolic machine learning, to qualitative simulation.. (shrink)
"Ich liebe dich 3" the swains in mountain valleys of Austria inscribe on their presents to those to whom they plight their troth. The pun is a rare one in German. Only in remote valleys does the word for `three' rhyme with joy; and the word for `true' is usually..
Abstract Quantum mechanics has seemed to defy all attempts to construe it realistically, but antirealism, like the many?worlds hypothesis, is even more difficult to accept. In order to give a realist construal of quantum mechanics, we need first to distinguish the objective and rational aspect of reality from the paradigmatic thing?like aspects of having determinate physical properties: quantum?mechanical entities may be real in the former sense though not in the latter. Anti?realist arguments are based on the difficulty of giving an (...) account of quantum?mechanical collapse and the apparent superluminal velocities involved. Objections to superluminal velocities on the score of the special theory of relativity are found not to be conclusive, and the price?there being some preferred frame of reference?to be acceptable. A sketch of a probabilistic account of quantum?mechanical collapse is offered, which makes the difference between the macro? and the micro?world a matter of degree rather than kind. If that, or some other, account proved acceptable, we could be quantum?mechanical realists, though quantum?mechanical reality would be very different from that of material objects in hardware shops. (shrink)
In Britain I have had many occasions to speak at public Inquiries, nearly always against some proposal to build a new road in some locality I live in or like. I have often had thoughts about how very bad the British system is, and how much better these question are considered and decided elsewhere, and in thinking about the matter have been led to ponder the nature of the decision being reached, and the proper principles which ought to govern the (...) decision procedure. (shrink)
We investigate sequent calculi for the weak modal (propositional) system reduced to the equivalence rule and extensions of it up to the full Kripke system containing monotonicity, conjunction and necessitation rules. The calculi have cut elimination and we concentrate on the inversion of rules to give in each case an effective procedure which for every sequent either furnishes a proof or a finite countermodel of it. Applications to the cardinality of countermodels, the inversion of rules and the derivability of Löb (...) rules are given. (shrink)
One of the great virtues of Oxford is that most of its members are not academics, nor ever supposed that they sould be. They come to Oxford for three or four years and then go on their way to other occupations in "the service of God in Church and State". It is not that they were not good enough to become dons: it is simply that they had other fish to fry, and would rather be a barrister, a Member of (...) Parliament, a schoolmaster or a clergyman, and would not be tempted from their chosen vocation by any offer of a Fellowship or a life of ease and scholarship. The benefits of this are great. To have left Oxford of one's own accord and not on account of having failed to get an award or a post is to part from a friend with no sense of having been rejected. The Civil Servant who goes down with a first in Greats has no sense that he did not make it at Oxford, no need to shake its dust off his shoes because Oxford did not offer him a job, and in consequence he can easily look back on four golden years of widening horizons, untarnished by some final disappointment. And in general our alumni can feel warmly to their alma mater, because their going was of their choosing, and not because they were rudely pushed out of the nest. (shrink)
