8 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Luke Robinson (Southern Methodist University)
  1. Luke Robinson (forthcoming). Forthcoming)'Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions.'. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Luke Robinson (2014). Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34.
  3. Luke Robinson (2013). A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation. Noûs 47 (2):203-228.
    I address a question in moral metaphysics: How are conflicts between moral obligations possible? I begin by explaining why we cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question simply by positing that such conflicts are conflicts between rules, principles, or reasons. I then develop and defend the “Dispositional Account,” which posits that conflicts between moral obligations are conflicts between the manifestations of obligating dispositions (obligating powers, capacities, etc.), just as conflicts between physical forces are conflicts between the manifestations of (certain) (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Luke Robinson (2013). Moral Absolutes. In Hugh LaFollette, John Deigh & Sarah Stroud (eds.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The term “moral absolute” refers to many different ideas. In contemporary moral philosophy, it most commonly refers to the idea of a moral prohibition or rule that holds without exception. Less commonly, it refers to the idea of a moral rule or standard that applies to all moral agents, rather than only to members of a particular society or culture or only to particular individuals (e.g., those who accept it). The present topic is moral absolutes in the first of these (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Luke Robinson (2012). Exploring Alternatives to the Simple Model: Is There an Atomistic Option? In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 2. Oxford University Press.
    The simple model maintains that morally relevant factors combine in a simple, additive way, like weights on a scale. Although intuitive and familiar, this model entails that certain plausible views about particular cases and how morally relevant factors combine and interact therein are false. Shelly Kagan suggests that we could accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting either of two assumptions the simple model makes: that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Luke Robinson (2011). Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.
    What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Luke Robinson (2008). Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (3):1-22.
    What are moral principles? The assumption underlying much of the generalism–particularism debate in ethics is that they are (or would be) moral laws: generalizations or some special class thereof, such as explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations. I argue that this law conception of moral principles is mistaken. For moral principles do at least three things that moral laws cannot do, at least not in their own right: explain certain phenomena, provide particular kinds of support for counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, “necessary (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Luke Robinson (2006). Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism. Mind 115 (458):331-360.
    Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of states of affairs, etc.) and because general moral facts (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation