204 found
Sort by:
  1. William G. Lycan, Davidson's “Method of Truth” in Metaphysics.
    Davidson made a strikingly distinctive and valuable contribution to the practice of ontology. It was a species of argument for the existence of things of one kind or another. It was inspired by Quine’s doctrine that “To be is to be the value of a bound variable,” but it combined that with Davidson’s own apparently antiQuinean views on semantics and logical form in natural language. Roughly: Suppose truth-conditional analysis of certain English sentences assigns them logical forms containing characteristic quantifiers, and (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. William Lycan, Mind, Brain, and Consciousness.
    Written work Four short papers (@ 1000 words) during the semester, due on September 21, October 12, November 9, and December 7. There will be some exercises along the way, required but ungraded. I am required to give a final examination, but its weight will be up to you individually.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. William Lycan, On a Defense of the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning.
    1.Competition between philosophical theories of linguistic meaning is sometimes specious. For example, suppose Ned believes that an utterance’s meaning is its truth-condition, while Ted insists that the utterance’s meaning is constituted by the speaker’s communicative intentions à la Grice.Here one wants to distinguish explananda:What Ned is after is really the utterance’s (“timeless”) sentence-meaning; Ted is focusing on speaker-meaning, which is not the same, and the two theories are perfectly compatible, indeed mutually complementary, accounts of distinct phenomena.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. William Lycan, The Puzzle of Regretted Parenthood.
    A friend of mine whom I’ll call “Barry” has a four-year-old son, Seth. Barry treasures Seth and loves him very much. But their family circumstances are pretty bad, and Seth is having a very rough childhood. At the time Seth was conceived, Barry had had no reason to suppose that the circumstances would turn out as they have, but: There has since been a very nasty divorce; there are protracted custody disputes, geographical dislocations, and severe financial difficulties; the boy has (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. William G. Lycan, A Simple Point About an Alleged Objection to Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.
    For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. William G. Lycan, The Other Ways of Paradox.
    For Quine, a paradox is an apparently successful argument having as its conclusion a statement or proposition that seems obviously false or absurd. That conclusion he calls the proposition of the paradox in question. What is paradoxical is of course that if the argument is indeed successful as it seems to be, its conclusion must be true. On this view, to resolve the paradox is (1) to show either that (and why) despite appearances the conclusion is true after all, or (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. William G. Lycan & David M. Rosenthal (forthcoming). Editor's booknotes. Cogito.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. William G. Lycan (2014). The Intentionality of Smell. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan (2014). Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP. Analysis 74 (3):363-370.
  10. William Lycan (2013). An Irenic Idea About Metaphor. Philosophy 88 (01):5-32.
    It is no surprise that 20th-century noncognitivism about metaphor began with the Logical Positivists. Prosecuting their verification theory of meaning, the Positivists disdained figurative language entirely. Although some metaphorical sentences are empirically verifiable or falsifiable on their literal readings (Bette Midler can be directly observed not to have wings, much less wings with anyone being the wind beneath them, and it is easily checked that many real men do eat quiche), some are not so (“How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. William G. Lycan (2013). On Two Main Themes in Gutting's What Philosophers Know. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):112-120.
    This paper addresses each of two of Gutting's three main contentions: that like anyone else, philosophers are entitled to begin with what they find obvious and that philosophy has produced a distinctive body of knowledge. I emphatically agree with the first contention and expand on it, defending a stronger claim. The second contention I dispute, in spirit if not in letter, on each of several grounds.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. William G. Lycan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press. 293-305.
    Lycan (1985, 1988) defended a “Principle of Credulity”: “Accept at the outset each of those things that seem to be true” (1988, p. 165). Though that takes the form of a rule rather than a thesis, it does not seem very different from Huemer’s (2001, 2006, 2007) doctrine of phenomenal conservatism (PC): “If it seems to S that p , then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p ” (2007, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. William G. Lycan (2012). A Truth Predicate in the Object Language. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
    The semantic paradoxes arise when the range of the quantifiers in the object language is too generous in certain ways. But it is not really clear how unfair to Urdu or to Hindi it would be to view the range of their quantifiers as insufficient to yield an explicit definition of ‗true-in-Urdu‘ or ‗true-in- Hindi‘. Or, to put the matter in another, if not more serious, way, there may in the nature of the case always be something we grasp in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. William G. Lycan (2012). Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):201-215.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. William G. Lycan (2012). Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again). Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.
    An explanatory coherence theory of justification is sketched and then defended against a number of recent objections: conservatism and relativism; wild and crazy beliefs; reliability; warranted necessary falsehoods; basing; distant, unknown coherences; Sosa's “self- and present-abstracts”; and Bayesian impossibility results.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. W. G. Lycan (2010). What, Exactly, is a Paradox? Analysis 70 (4):615-622.
    No categories
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. William G. Lycan (2010). And the Role of Intuitions. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. William G. Lycan (2010). Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. W. G. Lycan (2009). Higher-Order Representation Theories of Consciousness. In Bayne Tim, Cleeremans Axel & Wilken Patrick (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 346--350.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
    Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind?body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. William G. Lycan (2009). Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson's Defense of Conceptual Analysis. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
  23. William Lycan (2008). Phenomenal Intentionalities. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):233 - 252.
    There is now a considerable literature that goes under the heading of “phenomenal intentionality.” But it features a number of distinct issues. What they have in common is the claim that intentionality bears a closer relation to phenomenology than had previously been recognized. There is a basic thesis, which is controversial, and there are further arguments attempting to draw more exciting morals from the basic thesis. My purpose in this paper is to survey these issues, see what may be at (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. William G. Lycan (2008). Jay Frank Rosenberg, 1942-2008. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 82 (2):164 - 166.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. William G. Lycan & Jesse J. Prinz (eds.) (2008). Mind and Cognition: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub. Ltd.
    First published in 1990, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. William G. Lycan (2007). Moore's Antiskeptical Strategies. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. William G. Lycan (2007). Phenomenality Without Access? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):515-516.
    Block holds that there can be and even awareness of the phenomenology, without cognitive access by the subject. The subject may have an experience and be aware of the experience, yet neither notice it nor attend to it. How that is possible is far from clear. I invite Block to explain this very fine distinction.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. William G. Lycan (2007). Recent Naturalistic Dualisms. In E. Meyers, R. Styers & A. Lange (eds.), Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and the Contemporary World. Brill Academic Publishers.
    This paper is about a certain family of philosophical positions on the mind-body problem. The positions are dualist, but only in a minimal sense of that term employed by philosophers: according to the positions in question, mental entities are immaterial and distinct from all physical things.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. William G. Lycan (2007). Review: Stalnaker on Zombies. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):473 - 479.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. William G. Lycan (2007). Stalnaker on Zombies. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):473-479.
  31. W. G. Lycan (2006). Resisting ?-Ism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):65-71.
    Professor Strawson's paper is refreshing in content as well as refreshingly intemperate. It is salutary to be reminded that even the Type Identity Theory does not entail physicalism as that doctrine is usually understood (since c-fiber firings are not by definition purely physical). And it's fun to consider versions of panpsychism. I can see why Strawson finds his position hard to classify (p. 7), and I sympathize. In my title I have cast my own vote for '?-ism' on the grounds (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. William Lycan (2006). Conditional-Assertion Theories of Conditionals. In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press. 148--164.
    Now under what circumstances is a conditional true? Even to raise this question is to depart from everyday attitudes. An affirmation of the form ‘if p then q’ is commonly felt less as an affirmation of a conditional than as a conditional affirmation of the consequent…. If, after we have made such an affirmation, the antecedent turns out true, then we consider ourselves committed to the consequent, and are ready to acknowledge error if it proves false. If on the other (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. William Lycan (2006). The Meaning of “Water”: An Unsolved Problem. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):184-199.
    WATER. …I. The liquid of which seas, lakes, and rivers are composed, and which falls as rain and issues from springs. When pure, it is transparent, colourless (except as seen in large quantity, when it has a blue tint), tasteless, and inodorous. --Oxford English Dictionary …the fact that an English speaker in 1750 might have called XYZ ‘water,’ whereas he or his successors would not have called XYZ water in 1800 or 1850 does not mean that the ‘meaning’ of ‘water’ (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. William G. Lycan (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell. 189-201.
  35. William G. Lycan (2006). Enactive Intentionality. Psyche 12 (3).
    Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. William G. Lycan (2006). Names. In Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell Pub.. 255--273.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. William G. Lycan (2006). On the Gettier Problem Problem. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. 148--168.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. William G. Lycan (2006). Berger on Fictional Names. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):650 - 655.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. D. Baron, C. Horisk & W. G. Lycan (2005). Postscript to '€˜Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions'. In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. W. G. Lycan (2005). Review: A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. [REVIEW] Mind 114 (453):116-119.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. William G. Lycan (2005). A Particularly Compelling Refutation of Eliminative Materialism. In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oup. 197.
    The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. William G. Lycan (2005). Critical Study: Joseph Levine's Purple Haze. Inquiry 48 (5):448 – 463.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. William G. Lycan (2005). The Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):745-748.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. William G. Lycan (2004). The Superiority of Hop to HOT. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. 93–114.
    What is consciousness?—to coin a question. According to “higher-order representation” (HOR) theories of consciousness, a mental state or event is a conscious state or event just in case it (itself) is the intentional object of one of the subject’s mental representations. That may sound odd, perhaps crazy. In fact, because of the richly diverse uses of the word “conscious” in contemporary philosophy of mind, it is bound to sound odd to many people. So I must begin by specifying what I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. W. Lycan (2003). Critical Notice of David Papineau, Thinking About Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):587-596.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. William G. Lycan (2003). Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. William G. Lycan (2003). Chomsky on the Mind - Body Problem. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 11--28.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. William G. Lycan (2003). David Papineau, Thinking About Consciousness , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, Pp. 280, £25 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):587 – 596.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. William G. Lycan (2003). Free Will and the Burden of Proof. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 107-122.
    (3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defense of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyze such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into event-causation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven’t done this, and if all the same (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. William G. Lycan (2003). Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 384.
    Someday there will be no more articles written about the.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 204