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Lydia McGrew [20]Lydia M. McGrew [1]
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  1. Lydia McGrew (forthcoming). On Not Counting the Cost: Ad Hocness and Disconfirmation. Acta Analytica:1-15.
    I offer an account of ad hocness that explains why the adoption of an ad hoc auxiliary is accompanied by the disconfirmation of a hypothesis H. H must be conjoined with an auxiliary (or set of auxiliaries) a′, which is improbable antecedently given H, while ~H does not have this disability. This account renders it unnecessary to require, for identifying (bad) ad hocness, that either a′ or H have a posterior probability less than or equal to 0.5; there are also (...)
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  2. Lydia McGrew (2014). Jeffrey Conditioning, Rigidity, and the Defeasible Red Jelly Bean. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):569-582.
    Jonathan Weisberg has argued that Jeffrey Conditioning is inherently “anti-holistic” By this he means, inter alia, that JC does not allow us to take proper account of after-the-fact defeaters for our beliefs. His central example concerns the discovery that the lighting in a room is red-tinted and the relationship of that discovery to the belief that a jelly bean in the room is red. Weisberg’s argument that the rigidity required for JC blocks the defeating role of the red-tinted light rests (...)
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  3. Lydia McGrew (2013). Historical Inquiry. In Charles Taliaferro Victoria Harrison & Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Theism.
    Two different types of objections to the historical investigation of miracles imply that such investigation is inappropriate or can never lead to rational belief that a historical miracle has occurred. The first objection concerns the alleged chasm between the rational realm of history and the realm of faith. The second objection alleges that God is, or would be if he existed, too much unlike ourselves for us reasonably to use Divine action as an explanatory hypothesis. Both objections involve a tacit (...)
     
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  4. Lydia McGrew (2013). Tall Tales and Testimony to the Miraculous. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):39-55.
    In the debate over testimony to miracles, a common Humean move is to emphasize the prior improbability of miracles as the most important epistemic factor. Robert Fogelin uses the example of Henry, who tells multiple tall tales about meeting celebrities, to argue that low prior probabilities alone can render testimony unbelievable, with obvious implications for testimony to miracles. A detailed Bayesian analysis of Henry’s stories shows instead that the fact that Henry tells multiple stories about events that occurred independently if (...)
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  5. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2012). The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the Miraculous. In Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford.
    The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representing numerous epistemically relevant details in the unique situation in which (...)
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  6. Lydia McGrew (2010). Probability Kinematics and Probability Dynamics. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:89-105.
    Richard Jeffrey developed the formula for probability kinematics with the intent that it would show that strong foundations are epistemologically unnecessary. But the reasons that support strong foundationalism are considerations of dynamics rather than kinematics. The strong foundationalist is concerned with the origin of epistemic force; showing how epistemic force is propagated therefore cannot undermine his position. The weakness of personalism is evident in the difficulty the personalist has in giving a principled answer to the question of when the conditions (...)
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  7. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2009). The Argument From Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. In William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Blackwell Pub. 593--662.
  8. Lydia McGrew & Timothy McGrew (2008). Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support. Erkenntnis 68 (1):55 - 77.
    The phenomenon of mutual support presents a specific challenge to the foundationalist epistemologist: Is it possible to model mutual support accurately without using circles of evidential support? We argue that the appearance of loops of support arises from a failure to distinguish different synchronic lines of evidential force. The ban on loops should be clarified to exclude loops within any such line, and basing should be understood as taking place within lines of evidence. Uncertain propositions involved in mutual support relations (...)
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  9. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2007). Internalism and Epistemology : The Architecture of Reason. In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Routledge.
    Internalism and Epistemology is a powerful articulation and defense of a classical answer to an enduring question: What is the nature of rational belief? In opposition to prevailing philosophical fashion, the book argues that epistemic externalism leads, not just to skepticism, but to epistemic nihilism - the denial of the very possibility of justification. And it defends a subtle and sophisticated internalism against criticisms that have widely but mistakenly been thought to be decisive. Beginning with an internalist response to the (...)
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  10. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2006). On the Historical Argument: A Rejoinder to Plantinga. Philosophia Christi 8 (1):23-38.
     
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  11. Lydia McGrew (2005). Likelihoods, Multiple Universes, and Epistemic Context. Philosophia Christi 7 (2):475 - 481.
    Both advocates and opponents of the fine-tuning argument treat multiple universes with a selection effect as a legitimate hypothesis to explain the life-permitting values of the constants in our universe. I argue that, except where there is specific relevant prior information, the occurrence of multiple instances of a low-likelihood causal process should not be treated as an alternative hypothesis to a higher-likelihood causal process. Since an ’ad hoc’ hypothesis can be invented to give high likelihood to any evidence, we must (...)
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  12. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2005). A Response to Robin Collins and Alexander R. Pruss. Philosophia Christi 7 (2005).
     
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  13. Lydia McGrew (2004). Testability, Likelihoods, and Design. Philo 7 (1):5-21.
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  14. Timothy McGrew, Lydia McGrew & and Eric Vestrup (2001). Probabilities and the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Sceptical View. Mind 110 (440):1027-1038.
    Proponents of the Fine-Tuning Argument frequently assume that the narrowness of the life-friendly range of fundamental physical constants implies a low probability for the origin of the universe ‘by chance’. We cast this argument in a more rigorous form than is customary and conclude that the narrow intervals do not yield a probability at all because the resulting measure function is non-normalizable. We then consider various attempts to circumvent this problem and argue that they fail.
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  15. Timothy McGrew, Lydia McGrew & Eric Vestrup (2001). Probabilities and the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Sceptical View. Mind 110 (440):1027 - 1037.
    Proponents of the Fine-Tuning Argument frequently assume that the narrowness of the life-friendly range of fundamental physical constants implies a low probability for the origin of the universe 'by chance'. We cast this argument in a more rigorous form than is customary and conclude that the narrow intervals do not yield a probability at all because the resulting measure function is non-normalizable. We then consider various attempts to circumvent this problem and argue that they fail.
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  16. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2000). Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:47-66.
    John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that “justifies” is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general transitive. They respond to attempted counterexamples to transitivity brought by Watkins and (...)
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  17. Timothy & Lydia McGrew (2000). What's Wrong with Epistemic Circularity. Dialogue 39 (02):219-.
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  18. Lydia McGrew (1998). Psychology for Armchair Philosophers. Idealistic Studies 28 (3):145-155.
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  19. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (1998). Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:239-256.
    On the “Russellian” solution to the Gettier problem, every Gettier case involves the implicit or explicit use of a false premise on the part of the subject. We distinguish between two senses of “justification” ---“legitimation” and “justification proper.” The former does not require true premises, but the latter does. We then argue that in Gettier cases the subject possesses “legitimation” but not “justification proper,” and we respond to many attempted counterexamples, including several variants of the Nogot scenario, a case involving (...)
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  20. Lydia McGrew (1997). Reason, Rhetoric and the Price of Linguistic Revision. Public Affairs Quarterly 11 (3):255-279.
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  21. Lydia M. McGrew & Timothy J. McGrew (1997). Level Connections in Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):85 - 94.
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