Search results for 'Lynne Levitan' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tracey L. Kahan, Stephen LaBerge, Lynne Levitan & Philip Zimbardo (1997). Similarities and Differences Between Dreaming and Waking Cognition: An Exploratory Study. Consciousness and Cognition 6 (1):132-147.score: 120.0
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  2. J. Levitan, M. Lewkowicz & Y. Ashkenazy (1997). Enhancement of Decoherence by Chaotic-Like Behavior. Foundations of Physics 27 (2):203-214.score: 30.0
    We demonstrate by use of a simple one-dimensional model of a square barrier imbedded in an infinite potential well that decoherence is enhanced by chaotic-like behavior. We, moreover, show that the transition h→0 is singular. Finally it is argued that the time scale on which decoherence occurs depends, on the degree of complexity of the underlying quantum mechanical system, i.e., more complex systems decohere relatively faster than less complex ones.
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  3. Maya U. Shankar, Carmel A. Levitan & Charles Spence (2010). Grape Expectations: The Role of Cognitive Influences in Color–Flavor Interactions. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):380-390.score: 30.0
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  4. S. LaBerge, L. Levitan & W. C. Dement (1986). Lucid Dreaming: Physiological Correlates of Consciousness During Rem Sleep. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7:251-258.score: 30.0
  5. L. A. I. Lynne (2006). Philosophy and Philosophical Reasoning in the Zhuangzi: Dealing with Plurality. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33 (3):365–374.score: 30.0
  6. P. Tolbert Leslie, A. Oland Lynne, C. Christensen Thomas & R. Goriely Anita (2003). Neuronal and Glial Morphology in Olfactory Systems: Significance for Information-Processing and Underlying Developmental Mechanisms. Brain and Mind 4 (1).score: 30.0
    The shapes of neurons and glial cells dictate many important aspects of their functions. In olfactory systems, certain architectural features are characteristics of these two cell types across a wide variety of species. The accumulated evidence suggests that these common features may play fundamental roles in olfactoryinformation processing. For instance, the primary olfactory neuropil in most vertebrate and invertebrate olfactory systems is organized into discrete modules called glomeruli. Inside each glomerulus, sensory axons and CNS neurons branch and synapse in patterns (...)
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  7. William Levitan (2003). Apuleius: Rhetorical Works (Review). American Journal of Philology 124 (1):156-160.score: 30.0
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  8. Avi Levitan (2008). Ḥayim Nitsḥiyim: Ben Etiḳah le-Ḳognitsyah. Karmel.score: 30.0
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  9. Gary Lynne (1984). Commentary. Agriculture and Human Values 1 (3):10-14.score: 30.0
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  10. Lee Levitan (1975). Tests of the Rescorla-Wagner Model of Pavlovian Conditioning. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 6 (3):265-268.score: 20.0
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  11. Rudder Baker Lynne (2007). Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection. Religious Studies 43 (3).score: 20.0
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  12. D. Piementel & Lois Levitan (1986). Pesticides: Amounts Applied and Amounts Reaching Pests. Bioscience 36 (2):86-91.score: 20.0
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  13. D. Pimentel & L. Levitan (1986). Pesticide Pollution of Water, Soil, Air, and Biota. Bioscience 36:86-91.score: 20.0
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  14. James T. Turner Jr (forthcoming). No Explanation of Persons, No Explanation of Resurrection: On Lynne Baker's Constitution View and the Resurrection of Human Persons. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-21.score: 18.0
    I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I press objections against her constitution view in the following ways: First, I critique an analogy she draws between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view [‘Constitution Problems’ (CP)], (...)
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  15. Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.) (2001). Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.score: 15.0
     
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  16. Dean Zimmerman (2002). The Constitution of Persons By Bodies: A Critique of Lynne Rudder Baker's Theory of Material Constitution. Philosophical Topics 30 (1):295-338.score: 9.0
  17. Christopher Buford (2009). Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity. Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209.score: 9.0
    Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding personal (...)
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  18. Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen (2010). Surviving Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123-139.score: 9.0
    In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies . We argue that these (...)
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  19. Robert A. Wilson (2005). Persons, Social Agency, and Constitution. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):49-69.score: 9.0
    In her recent book Persons and Bodies1, Lynne Rudder Baker has defended what she calls the constitution view of persons. On this view, persons are constituted by their bodies, where “constitution” is a ubiquitous, general metaphysical relation distinct from more familiar relations, such as identity and part-whole composition.
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  20. Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). Are Beliefs Brain States? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. CSLI Publications (Stanford).score: 9.0
    During the past couple of decades, philosophy of mind--with its siblings, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science--has been one of the most exciting areas of philosophy. Yet, in that time, I have come to think that there is a deep flaw in the basic conception of its object of study--a deep flaw in its conception of the so-called propositional attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention. Taking belief as the fundamental propositional attitude, scientifically-minded philosophers hold that beliefs, if there are any, (...)
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  21. Jens Johansson (2009). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism – Lynne Rudder Baker. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):365-368.score: 9.0
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  22. Charlotte Witt (2008). Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).score: 9.0
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  23. Eric T. Olson (1999). Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):161-166.score: 9.0
  24. Anthony J. Rudd (2005). Narrative, Expression and Mental Substance. Inquiry 48 (5):413-435.score: 9.0
    This paper starts from the debate between proponents of a neo-Lockean psychological continuity view of personal identity, and defenders of the idea that we are simple mental substances. Each party has valid criticisms of the other; the impasse in the debate is traced to the Lockean assumption that substance is only externally related to its attributes. This suggests the possibility that we could develop a better account of mental substance if we thought of it as having an internal relation to (...)
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  25. Eric Olson (2001). Book Review. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Lynne Rudder Baker. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):427-430.score: 9.0
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  26. Michael C. Rea (2002). Lynne Baker on Material Constitution. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):607–614.score: 9.0
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  27. Theodore Sider (2002). Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):45-48.score: 9.0
    Locke’s view that continuants are numerically distinct from their constituting hunks of matter is popular enough to be called the “standard account”.1 It was given its definitive contemporary statement by David Wiggins in Sameness and Substance2, and has been defended by many since. Baker’s interesting book contributes new arguments for this view, a new definition of ‘constitution’, and a sustained application to persons and human animals. Much of what she says develops this view in new and important ways. But in (...)
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  28. A. Beckerman (2001). The Real Reason for the Standard View. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.score: 9.0
    According to Lynne Baker, there are three main arguments for the.
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  29. Edward Greetis (2011). Dissociative Identity: An Objection to Baker's Constitution Theory. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 26 (4):329-341.score: 9.0
    One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially . In response to this problem, Lynne Rudder Baker espouses a psychological criterion, that is, she claims that persons are essentially psychological. Baker’s theory purports to bypass the problems of other psychological theories such as Dissociative Identity Disorder and the problem of individuating persons synchronically. I argue that the theory’s treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder leads to untenable results, is invalid, and consequently fails to (...)
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  30. Derk Pereboom (2013). Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne Baker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):753-764.score: 9.0
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  31. Marta Campdelacreu (2013). Do We Need Two Notions of Constitution? Philosophia 41 (2):503-519.score: 9.0
    Traditionally, constitutionalists have offered just one notion of constitution to analyse the relation that an object, such as a statue or a chain, bears to the object/s from which it is made: let us say, a piece of marble in the first case or a piece of metal in the second. Robert Wilson proposes to differentiate two notions of constitution and, in this way, to offer constitutionalists a more varied range of metaphysical tools. To justify the introduction of the difference, (...)
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  32. Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). Practical Realism Defended: Replies to Critics. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. CSLI Publications (Stanford).score: 9.0
    The topics that I shall consider are these: (1) Causal Explanatoriness of the Attitudes (Dretske, Elugardo); (2) The “Brain-Explain” Thesis and Metaphysical Constraints on Explanation (Antony, Elugardo); (3) Causal Powers of Beliefs (Meyering); (4) Microreduction (Beckermann); (5) Non-Emergent, Non-Reductive Materialism (Antony); (6) The Master Argument Against the Standard View (Dretske, Antony, Elugardo); (7) Practical Realism Extended (Meijers); (8) Alternative to Both the Standard View and Practical Realism (Newen).
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  33. Roberta De Monticelli (2008). Subjectivity and Essential Individuality: A Dialogue with Peter Van Inwagen and Lynne Baker. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):225-242.score: 9.0
    Each person is perceived by others and by herself as an individual in a very strong sense, namely as a unique individual. Moreover, this supposed uniqueness is commonly thought of as linked with another character that we tend to attribute to persons (as opposed to stones or chairs and even non-human animals): a kind of depth, hidden to sensory perception, yet in some measure accessible to other means of knowledge. I propose a theory of strong or essential individuality. This theory (...)
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  34. Anita Avramides (1989). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism Lynne Rudder Baker Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. 190. $19.95 (U.S.), $9.95 (U.S.) Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 28 (04):693-.score: 9.0
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  35. Christopher S. Hill (1997). Lynne Rudder Baker, Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Noûs 31 (1):132–142.score: 9.0
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  36. Hilary Kornblith (1998). Book Review:Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind Lynne Rudder Baker. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 65 (2):377-.score: 9.0
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  37. Daniel C. Dennett (forthcoming). Artifactual Selves: A Response to Lynne Rudder Baker. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-4.score: 9.0
    Baker’s critique of my view of the self as a fiction captures some of its points well but misses the possibility of a theorist’s fiction, like the Equator or a center of gravity, which is not an illusion, but rather an abstraction, like dollars, poems, and software—made of no material but dependent on material vehicles. It is an artifact of our everyday effort to make sense of our own (and others’) complex activities by postulating a single central source of meaning, (...)
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  38. Michael C. Rea (2002). Review: Lynne Baker on Material Constitution. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):607 - 614.score: 9.0
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  39. Thomas L. Carson (1991). Happiness, by Lynne McFall. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):938-942.score: 9.0
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  40. Roberta Monticelli (2008). Subjectivity and Essential Individuality: A Dialogue with Peter Van Inwagen and Lynne Baker. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):225-242.score: 9.0
    Each person is perceived by others and by herself as an individual in a very strong sense, namely as a unique individual. Moreover, this supposed uniqueness is commonly thought of as linked with another character that we tend to attribute\nto persons (as opposed to stones or chairs and even non-human animals): a kind of depth, hidden to sensory perception, yet in some measure accessible to other means of knowledge. I propose a theory of strong or essential individuality. This theory is (...)
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  41. Jonas Gonçalves Coelho (2012). Externalismo social: Mente, pensamento E linguagem. Trans/Form/Ação 35 (1):167-192.score: 9.0
    Meu objetivo é mostrar que as teses externalistas “os significados não estão na cabeça” e “os pensamentos não estão na cabeça” não implicam, necessariamente, a tese mais radical “a mente não está na cabeça”. Trato dessa questão no âmbito do Externalismo Social de Tyler Burge e Lynne Baker, argumentando que a importância que esses pensadores atribuem à linguagem nas questões relativas à mente não significa, como uma leitura apressada poderia sugerir, a redução da mente à linguagem e, muito menos, (...)
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  42. Chris Darke (2003). Letter From London, on Chris Petit, Abbas Kiarostami, Lynne Ramsay, Iain Sinclair, J. G. Ballard, and Surveillance Cinema. Film-Philosophy 7 (1).score: 9.0
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  43. Gail Fine (1996). Book Review. Substance and Separation in Aristotle. Lynne Spellman. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 105 (4):527-30.score: 9.0
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  44. Penelope Mackie (1997). Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind By Baker Lynne Rudder Cambridge University Press, 1995, Xi + 246 Pp., £12.95 & £37.50. ISBN 0 521 42190 X; 0 521 42053 9. [REVIEW] Philosophy 72 (279):143-.score: 9.0
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  45. Bernard Reginster (2007). Social Externalism and Solipsism: Remarks on Lynne Baker's “First-Person Externalism”. The Modern Schoolman 84 (2-3):171-184.score: 9.0
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  46. Gary Wedeking (2002). Critical Notice of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):267-290.score: 9.0
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  47. Shannon Winnubst (2011). On the Historicity of the Archive: A Counter-Memory for Lynne Huffer's Mad for Foucault. Philosophia 1 (2):215-225.score: 9.0
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  48. Hoyt N. Duggan (2002). C. David Benson and Lynne S. Blanchfield, The Manuscripts of “Piers Plowman”: The B-Version. Woodbridge, Eng., and Rochester, NY: Boydell and Brewer, 1997. Pp. Ix, 339; 18 Black-and-White Facsimiles, Tables, and Charts. $108. [REVIEW] Speculum 77 (3):870-872.score: 9.0
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  49. Alan E. H. Emery (1973). Textbook of Human Genetics. By M. Levitan and A. Montagu. Pp. 922 + Xiv. (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971.) Price £5·00. [REVIEW] Journal of Biosocial Science 5 (1):137-138.score: 9.0
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