Search results for 'Lynne Olson' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eric Olson (2001). Book Review. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Lynne Rudder Baker. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):427-430.score: 360.0
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  2. Eric T. Olson (1999). Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):161-166.score: 360.0
  3. Kryste Ferguson, Sandra Masur, Lynne Olson, Julio Ramirez, Elisa Robyn & Karen Schmaling (2007). Enhancing the Culture of Research Ethics on University Campuses. Journal of Academic Ethics 5 (2-4):189-198.score: 240.0
    Institutions create their own internal cultures, including the culture of ethics that pervades scientific research, academic policy, and administrative philosophy. This paper addresses some of the issues involved in institutional enhancement of its culture of research ethics, focused on individual empowerment and strategies that individuals can use to initiate institutional change.
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  4. Lynne E. Olson (2010). Developing a Framework for Assessing Responsible Conduct of Research Education Programs. Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (1):185-200.score: 240.0
    Education in the responsible conduct of research (RCR) in the United States has evolved over the past decade from targeting trainees to including educational efforts aimed at faculty and staff. In addition RCR education has become more focused as federal agencies have moved to recommend specific content and to mandate education in certain areas. RCR education has therefore become a research-compliance issue necessitating the development of policies and the commitment of resources to develop or expand systems for educating faculty and (...)
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  5. Eric Olson, Eric T. Olson Warum Wir Tiere Sind.score: 180.0
    Was sind wir? Wie immer man sich zu dieser Frage stellt, eines scheint offenkundig: Wir sind Tiere, genauer gesagt: menschliche Tiere, Mitglieder der Art Homo sapiens. Dabei mag es überraschen, daß viele Philosophen diese vermeintlich banale Tatsache abstreiten. Plato, Augustinus, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant und Hegel, um nur einige herausragende zu nennen, waren alle der Meinung, wir seien keine Tiere. Es mag zwar sein, daß unsere Körper Tiere sind. Doch sind wir nicht mit unseren Körpern gleichzusetzen. Wir sind etwas (...)
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  6. Mancur Lloyd Olson (2004). Mancur Lloyd Olson. In Gisela Riescher (ed.), Politische Theorie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen. Von Adorno Bis Young. Alfred Kröner Verlag. 369.score: 180.0
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  7. Lynn Worsham & Gary A. Olson (eds.) (2007). The Politics of Possibility: Encountering the Radical Imagination. Paradigm Publishers.score: 120.0
     
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  8. Gary A. Olson & Lynn Worsham (2007). Changing the Subject: Judith Butler's Politics of Radical Resignification. In Lynn Worsham & Gary A. Olson (eds.), The Politics of Possibility: Encountering the Radical Imagination. Paradigm Publishers.score: 100.0
     
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  9. Gary A. Olson & Lynn Worsham (2007). Introduction. In Lynn Worsham & Gary A. Olson (eds.), The Politics of Possibility: Encountering the Radical Imagination. Paradigm Publishers.score: 100.0
     
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  10. Gary A. Olson & Lynn Worsham (2007). Slavoj Žižek: Philosopher, Cultural Critic, and Cyber-Communist. In Lynn Worsham & Gary A. Olson (eds.), The Politics of Possibility: Encountering the Radical Imagination. Paradigm Publishers.score: 100.0
  11. Gary A. Olson & Lynn Worsham (2007). Staging the Politics of Difference: Homi Bhabha's Critical Literacy. In Lynn Worsham & Gary A. Olson (eds.), The Politics of Possibility: Encountering the Radical Imagination. Paradigm Publishers.score: 100.0
     
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  12. Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous (...)
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  13. Eric T. Olson (2007). What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    From the time of Locke, discussions of personal identity have often ignored the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we human people are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. The result of this neglect has been centuries of wild proposals and clashing intuitions. What Are We? is the first general study of this important question. It beings by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as (...)
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  14. Eric Olson, This Review Appeared in Mind 2008.score: 60.0
    This book consists of fifteen new essays and an introduction by Zimmerman. Most of the authors are Christian philosophers in the ‘analytic’ tradition, and the book is of particular interest to readers of that sort; but there is nothing here that will interest only Christians. As the title suggests, all the essays have at least something to do with persons as such, and most deal with metaphysical issues. Beyond that they are pretty disparate. Seven papers are on substance dualism or (...)
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  15. Jonas Olson (2014). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Oup Oxford.score: 60.0
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
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  16. Mitchell M. Olson & Michael A. Raffanti (2006). Leverage Points, Paradigms, and Grounded Action: Intervening in Educational Systems. World Futures 62 (7):533 – 541.score: 60.0
    This article discusses connections between grounded action, leverage points, and paradigm transformation and transcendence. Part one provides background on Meadows' (1999) approach to leverage points as well as the concept of paradigms. Part two argues that grounded action is inherently suited for leverage points analysis and paradigm-based interventions. Part three offers an example of individual paradigm transformation in the educational context vis-à-vis Olson's (2006) grounded theory of driven succeeding. The article concludes with considerations of how the application of grounded (...)
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  17. Jon C. Olson & John Perry (2012). Letters, Notes, & Comments. Journal of Religious Ethics 40 (2):359 - 400.score: 60.0
    Revisionists and traditionalists appeal to Acts 15, welcoming the Gentiles, for analogies directing the church's response to homosexual persons. John Perry has analyzed the major positions. He faults revisionists for inadequate attention to the Jerusalem Decree and faults one traditionalist for using the Decree literally rather than through analogy. I argue that analogical use of the Decree must supplement rather than displace the plain sense. The Decree has been neglected due to assumptions that Paul opposed it, that it expired, or (...)
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  18. Carl Olson (2002). Indian Philosophers and Postmodern Thinkers: Dialogues on the Margins of Culture. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    This work presents a dialogue between classical and contemporary Indian and postmodern thinkers. Juxtaposing the diverse perspectives of Indian philosophers and philosophies, including Buddhism, Sankara, and Radhakrishnan, and western postmodern thinkers such as Lacan and Derrida, Olson addresses topics such as desire, suffering, the self, and identity.
     
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  19. Carl Olson (2000). Zen and the Art of Postmodern Philosophy: Two Paths of Liberation From the Representational Mode of Thinking. State University of New York Press.score: 60.0
    Carl Olson is Professor of Religious Studies at Allegheny College in Pennsylvania. His previous books include The Indian Renouncer and Postmodern Poison: A Cross-Cultural Encounter and The Theology and Philosophy of Eliade: A Search for the Centre.
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  20. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). Review: Eric T. Olson: What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1120-1122.score: 36.0
  21. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). Response to Eric Olson. Abstracta 3 (3):43-45.score: 36.0
  22. Eric Olson (2009). An Argument for Animalism. In John P. Lizza (ed.), Defining the Beginning and End of Life: Readings on Personal Identity and Bioethics. Johns Hopkins University Press.score: 30.0
    The view that we are human animals, "animalism", is deeply unpopular. This paper explains what that claim says and why it is so contentious. It then argues that those who deny it face an awkward choice. They must either deny that there are any human animals, deny that human animals can think, or deny that we are the thinking things located where we are.
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  23. Eric Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. 242.score: 30.0
    One of the main problems of personal identity is supposed to be how we relate to our bodies. A few philosophers endorse what is called a 'bodily criterion of personal identity': they say that we are our bodies, or at any rate that our identity over time consists in the identity of our bodies. Many more deny this--typically on the grounds that we can imagine ourselves coming apart from our bodies. But both sides agree that the bodily criterion is an (...)
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  24. Eric T. Olson (2002). Personal Identity. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.score: 30.0
    Personal identity deals with questions about ourselves qua people (or persons). Many of these questions are familiar ones that occur to everyone at some time: What am I? When did I begin? What will happen to me when I die? Discussions of personal identity go right back to the origins of Western philosophy, and most major figures have had something to say about it. (There is also a rich literature on personal identity in Eastern philosophy, which I am not competent (...)
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  25. Eric T. Olson (2002). What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity? Noûs 36 (4):682-698.score: 30.0
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us (...)
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  26. Eric T. Olson (2004). Animalism and the Corpse Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):265-74.score: 30.0
    The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.
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  27. Kristi A. Olson (2010). The Endowment Tax Puzzle. Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (3):240-271.score: 30.0
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  28. Eric T. Olson (2003). Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328-348.score: 30.0
    Perhaps we should begin with this question: What is the “problem of free will”? Like those other great “problem” phrases that philosophers bandy about, “the mind-body problem,” “the problem of universals,” and “the problem of evil,” this phrase has no clear referent. There are obviously a lot of philosophical problems about free will, but which of them, or which combination of them, is the problem of free will? I will propose an answer to this question, but this proposal can be (...)
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  29. Eric T. Olson (2007). What Are We? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):37-55.score: 30.0
    This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer.
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  30. Eric T. Olson, Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem.score: 30.0
    Animalism is the view that you and I are animals. That is, we are animals in the straightforward sense of having the property of being an animal, or in that each of us is identical to an animal-not merely in the derivative sense of having animal bodies, or of being "constituted by" animals. And by 'animal' I mean an organism of the animal kingdom." Sensible though it may appear, animalism is highly contentious. The most common objection is that it conflicts (...)
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  31. Eric T. Olson (2009). The Rate of Time's Passage. Analysis 69 (1):3-9.score: 30.0
    Many philosophers say that time involves a kind of passage that distinguishes it from space. A traditional objection is that this passage would have to occur at some rate, yet we cannot say what the rate would be. The paper argues that the real problem with time’s passage is different: time would have to pass at one second per second, yet this is not a rate of change. This appears to refute decisively not only the view that time passes, but (...)
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  32. Eric T. Olson (1994). Is Psychology Relevant to Personal Identity? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):173-186.score: 30.0
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  33. Eric T. Olson (1998). There is No Problem of the Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):645-657.score: 30.0
    Because there is no agreed use of the term 'self', or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of "the self" to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of 'self' are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves.
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  34. Eric T. Olson (1995). Human People or Human Animals? Philosophical Studies 80 (2):159-181.score: 30.0
  35. Eric Olson (2009). The Passage of Time. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.score: 30.0
    The prosaic content of these sayings is that events change from future to present and from present to past. Your next birthday is in the future, but with the passage of time it draws nearer and nearer until it is present. 24 hours later it will be in the past, and then lapse forever deeper into history. And things get older: even if they don’t wear out or lose their hair or change in any other way, their chronological age is (...)
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  36. Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson (2009). Expressivism and Moral Certitude. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.score: 30.0
    Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...)
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  37. Eric T. Olson (1997). Was I Ever a Fetus? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.score: 30.0
    The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what (...)
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  38. Eric T. Olson (2006). Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood. Noûs 40 (4):738-752.score: 30.0
    What is a temporal part? Most accounts explain it in terms of timeless parthood: a thing's having a part without temporal qualification. Some find this hard to understand, and thus find the view that persisting things have temporal parts—four-dimensionalism—unintelligible. T. Sider offers to help by defining temporal parthood in terms of a thing's having a part at a time. I argue that no such account can capture the notion of a temporal part that figures in orthodox four-dimensionalism: temporal parts must (...)
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  39. Eric T. Olson (2006). Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):500-503.score: 30.0
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  40. Eric T. Olson (2001). A Compound of Two Substances. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.score: 30.0
    Cartesian or substance dualism is the view that concrete substances come in two basic kinds. There are material things, such as biological organisms. These may be either simple or composed of parts. And there are immaterial things--minds or souls--which are always simple. No material thing depends for its existence on any soul, or vice versa. And only souls can think.
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  41. Eric T. Olson (1996). Composition and Coincidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):374-403.score: 30.0
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  42. Eric T. Olson (2006). Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self, by John Perry. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):434–437.score: 30.0
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  43. Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.score: 30.0
    According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why such (...)
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  44. Eric Olson (2002). Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’. Philosophical Topics 30 (1):189-207.score: 30.0
    In this essay I explore the idea that the solution to some important problems of personal identity lies in the philosophy of language: more precisely in the nature of first-person reference. I will argue that the “linguistic solution” is at best partly successful.
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  45. Jonas Olson (2009). The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Utilitas 21 (2):225-232.score: 30.0
    The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me.
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  46. Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson (2007). Brentano and the Buck-Passers. Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.score: 30.0
    According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind of (...)
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  47. Jonas Olson (2010). The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It. Ratio 23 (1):87-101.score: 30.0
    Cognitivism is the view that the primary function of moral judgements is to express beliefs that purport to say how things are; expressivism is the contrasting view that their primary function is to express some desire-like state of mind. I shall consider what I call the freshman objection to expressivism. It is pretty uncontroversial that this objection rests on simple misunderstandings. There are nevertheless interesting metaethical lessons to learn from the fact that the freshman objection is prevalent among undergraduates and (...)
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  48. Eric T. Olson (2001). Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):337-355.score: 30.0
    It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological, and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with.
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