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  1. Lynsey Wolter (2009). Demonstratives in Philosophy and Linguistics. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):451-468.
    Demonstrative noun phrases (e.g., that guy , this ) are of interest to philosophers of language and semanticists because they are sensitive to demonstrations or speaker intentions. The interpretation of a demonstrative therefore sheds light on the role of the context in natural language semantics. This survey reviews two types of approaches to demonstratives: Kaplan's direct reference treatment of demonstratives and other indexicals, and recent challenges to Kaplan's approach that focus on less obviously context-sensitive uses of demonstratives. The survey then (...)
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    Daphna Heller & Lynsey Wolter (2011). On Identification and Transworld Identity in Natural Language: The Case of -Ever Free Relatives. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (2):169-199.
    An -ever free relative is felicitous only when the speaker doesn’t know, or doesn’t care about, the identity of the entity denoted. In this paper we investigate what it means to identify an entity by examining the non-identification condition on -ever free relatives. Following Dayal (In A. Lawson (Ed.), Proceedings of SALT VII, 1997 ), we analyze -ever free relatives as definites with a modal dimension. We show that the variation in the identity of the entity across the possible worlds (...)
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  3. Lynsey Wolter (2010). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Demonstratives in Philosophy and Linguistics. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):108-111.
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    Daphna Heller & Lynsey Wolter (2013). Beyond Demonstratives: Direct Reference in Perceptually Grounded Descriptions. Journal of Semantics 31 (4):fft012.
    This article discusses two puzzles regarding identity questions: (i) certain definites cannot occur in the post-copular position of identity questions; and (ii) the same definites are the only possible answers to identity questions with post-copular names. We demonstrate that the range of these definites crucially depends on interlocutors' shared assumptions about how entities in the physical surroundings are perceived and categorized. We propose that these definites are directly referential in the sense of Kaplan (1989a,b), and only contribute the referent itself (...)
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