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  1. M. A. Roberts (2014). Temkin's Essentially Comparative View, Wrongful Life and the Mere Addition Paradox. Analysis 74 (2):306-326.
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  2. M. A. Roberts (2009). What is the Wrong of Wrongful Disability? From Chance to Choice to Harms to Persons. Law and Philosophy 28 (1):1 - 57.
    The issue of wrongful disability arises when parents face the choice whether to produce a child whose life will be unavoidably flawed by a serious disease or disorder (Down syndrome, for example, or Huntington’s disease) yet clearly worth living. The authors of From Chance to Choice claim, with certain restrictions, that the choice to produce such a child is morally wrong. They then argue that an intuitive moral approach––a “person-affecting” approach that pins wrongdoing to the harming of some existing or (...)
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  3. M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.) (2009). Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag.
    This collection of essays investigates the obligations we have in respect of future persons, from our own future offspring to distant future generations.
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  4. M. A. Roberts (2007). Review: Future People: A Moderate Consequentialist Account of Our Obligations to Future Generations. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (463):770-775.
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  5. M. A. Roberts (2007). The Non-Identity Fallacy: Harm, Probability and Another Look at Parfit's Depletion Example. Utilitas 19 (3):267-311.
    The non-identity problem is really a collection of problems having distinct logical features. For that reason, non-identity problems can be typed. This article focuses on just one type of non-identity problem, the problem, which includes Derek Parfit's depletion example and many others. The can't-expect-better problem uses an assessment about the low probability of any particular person's coming into existence to reason that an earlier wrong act does not harm that person. This article argues that that line of reasoning is unusually (...)
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  6. M. A. Roberts (2006). Supernumerary Pregnancy, Collective Harm, and Two Forms of the Nonidentity Problem. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (4):776-792.
  7. M. A. Roberts (2002). A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person‐Based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem. Ethics 112 (2):315-350.
  8. M. A. Roberts (1996). Human Cloning: A Case of No Harm Done? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 21 (5):537-554.
    Some have objected to the laboratory cloning of human preembryos on the grounds that the procedure would violate the dignity of and respect owed to human preembryos. Others have argued that human cloning ought be permitted if it will predictably benefit, or at least not burden, individuals who are, unlike the human preembryo, clearly entitled to our respect and concern. Taking this latter position, the legal theorist John A. Robertson has argued that, since cloning does not harm anyone who is (...)
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