Online research in philosophy

We study a modal system ¯T, that extends the classical (prepositional) modal system T and whose language is provided with modal operators M inn (nN) to be interpreted, in the usual kripkean semantics, as there are more than n accessible worlds such that.... We find reasonable axioms for ¯T and we prove for it completeness, compactness and decidability theorems.

The chapters in this book reflect these different forms of interaction in an effort to clarify issues and debates concerning some traditional cognitive ...

in M. Marraffa, M. De Caro and F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 37-49. PDF.

The Common Anatomy Reference Ontology (CARO) is being developed to facilitate interoperability between existing anatomy ontologies for different species, and will provide a template for building new anatomy ontologies. CARO has a structural axis of classification based on the top-level nodes of the Foundational Model of Anatomy. CARO will complement the developmental process sub-ontology of the GO Biological Process ontology, using it to ensure the coherent treatment of developmental stages, and to provide a common framework for the (...) model organism communities to classify developmental structures. Definitions for the types and relationships are being generated by a consortium of investigators from diverse backgrounds to ensure applicability to all organisms. CARO will support the coordination of cross-species ontologies at all levels of anatomical granularity by cross-referencing types within the cell type ontology (CL) and the Gene Ontology (GO) Cellular Component ontology. A complete cross-species CARO could be utilized in other ontologies for cross-product generation. (shrink)

It is argued that the standard story of human action, as it is standardly naturalistically understood, should be rejected. Rather than seeking an agent amidst the workings of the mind (as in Velleman's "What Happens When Someone Acts"), we need to recognize an agent’s place in the world she inhabits. And in order to do so we have to resist the naturalistic assumptions of the standard causal story.