Most people think that it is possible, if not common, for us to do things that we know are better left undone. But in a famous passage of Plato’s Protagoras (351b-358e) Socrates argues otherwise. His conclusion, roughly put, is that we are capable of acting incorrectly only if (and only when) we fail to recognize that we are acting incorrectly. If he is right about this, then we could never do anything we knew was better left undone, since our having (...) this knowledge would always be sufficient to prevent us from making any such practical mistakes. So either most people are wrong about the power of knowledge over action, or the argument Socrates gives us in the Protagoras — which I will call the Knowledge Argument — is unsound. (shrink)
It often seems obvious to us that our pleasures can justify our actions. If I ask you why you’re reading right now instead of dancing, and if your answer is that reading, unlike dancing, is just something you like to do, then (all else equal) your answer seems perfectly sufficient. To demand that you specify some further end you have in enjoying yourself would seem unreasonable if not bizarre. As Elizabeth Anscombe observes, “‘It’s pleasant’ is an adequate answer to ‘What’s (...) the good of it?’ or ‘What do you want that for?’ I.e. the chain of ‘Why’s’ comes to an end with this answer.” (Anscombe 1957/1999, 77) And from this observation alone it is natural to infer—as Plato’s Academic colleague Eudoxus apparently does—that your taking pleasure in something gives you a special, non-derivative reason to pursue that thing. Consider the following argument, attributed by Aristotle to Eudoxus in book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)
Most of us — philosophers and non-philosophers alike — accept that at least some pleasures are appropriate targets of ethical criticism. Even hedonists typically concede that there’s something bad about taking pleasure in certain states or events, such as the undeserved suffering of other people.1 So it’s not particularly surprising to find that Plato, the first philosopher to deal with this issue in any significant detail, holds a similar view. In three of his most celebrated dialogues — the Gorgias, the (...) Phaedo, and the Republic — he gives lengthy arguments to the effect that part of what it is to be virtuous is to be pleased by the right sort of thing in the right sort of way.2 In the Philebus, however, he takes this idea in a dramatic new direction. He has Socrates insist, with great fanfare, that pleasures are to be criticized in precisely the same way that beliefs are (36c-42c). Indeed, he has Socrates go so far as to say that pleasures, like beliefs, are bad just insofar as, and just because, they are false (40e9-10).3 This claim — which I will call the Grounding Thesis — is liable to strike most of us, at least initially, as misguided if not unintelligible. Even those who accept that pleasures and pains can be bearers of ethical value are not inclined to accept that the ethical value in question here is, or is grounded in, any sort of semantic or representational value.4 Nor are they likely to accept that it is useful (or even possible) to assign such values to.. (shrink)
In recent times, ‘just war’ discourse has become unfortunately associated, in the minds of some, with the idea of the forcible promotion or imposition of democracy as a legitimate just cause. It would thus be understandable if supporters of just war theory were to disavow any particular linkage of its tenets with the democratic ideal. However, while certainly not endorsing the stated cause, this article contends that the theory in its most plausible and attractive form does exhibit certain biases towards (...) the ideal, in both jus ad bellum and jus post bellum. If these biases fall short of shackling the theory to claims such as ‘only democracies can fight just wars’, they may nevertheless place taxing justificatory burdens on a non-democracy's claim to have a war-waging right and on non-democratic conceptions of the just peace that should ideally follow a just war. (shrink)
Near the beginning of the Cratylus (385e-387d) Plato's Socrates argues, against his friend Hermogenes, that the standards of correctness for our use of names in speech are in no way up to us. Yet this conclusion should strike us, at least initially, as bizarre. After all, how could it not be up to us whether to call our children by the names of our parents, or whether to call dogs “dogs“? My aim in this paper will be to show that, (...) although Plato's argument does not succeed in establishing this apparently bizarre conclusion, it may well succeed in establishing an equally momentous conclusion: that the standards of correctness for our use of concepts in thought are in no way up to us. (shrink)
Abstract Recently, strong arguments have been offered for the inclusion of jus post bellum in just war theory. If this addition is indeed justified, it is plain that, due to the variety in types of post-conflict situation, the content of jus post bellum will necessarily vary. One instance when it looks as if it should become "extended" in its scope, ranging well beyond (for example) issues of "just peace terms," is when occupation of a defeated enemy is necessary. In this (...) situation, this article argues that an engagement by jus post bellum with the morality of post-conflict reconstruction is unavoidable. However, the resulting extension of jus post bellum 's stipulations threatens to generate conflict with another tenet that it would surely wish to endorse with respect to "just occupation," namely, that sovereignty or self-determination should be restored to the occupied people as soon as is reasonably possible. Hence, the action-guiding objective of the theory could become significantly problematized. The article concludes by considering whether this problem supports the claim that the addition of jus post bellum to just war theory is actually more problematic than its supporters have realized. (shrink)
In his provocative definition of bullshit as “indifference to the truth”, Harry Frankfurt contentiously states that democracy is particularly prone to this deformity of discourse because of “the widespread conviction that it is the responsibility of a citizen in a democracy to have opinions about everything, or at least everything that pertains to the conduct of his country’s affairs.” I provide an exposition of this claim that Frankfurt does not himself give and I contend that he has identified an important (...) problem with democratic deliberation. This is an argument about, not against, democracy and it is one which gives pause over the sanguine assumptions of much radical, “deliberative” democratic theory that this phenomenon will not be significantly present in an enhanced democracy. A suggestionabout the responsibilities of political philosophers in helping a democratic citizenry to tackle the problem is floated for future elaboration. (shrink)
Most readers of ancient Greek psychology will agree that the Philebus is where we find Platos best attempt to theorize about bodily pain.1 But they will probably also agree that the account he develops there has no real chance of being true, and so should not have much appeal to us today at least insofar as we are philosophers rather than historians. Its this second conviction that I want to challenge in what follows. More specifically, I want to argue (...) for two connected claims about the merits of Platos account: first, that despite its flaws which are significant it is stronger and more subtle than most commentators have yet realized; and second, that it anticipates in interesting ways a view that has become both increasingly popular and increasingly controversial in the last couple of decades: the view that pains like beliefs, desires, hopes, and fears are mental states with representational content. I will call this view representationalism. (shrink)
In the Philebus Plato argues that every rational human being, given the choice, will prefer a life that is moderately thoughtful and moderately pleasant to a life that is utterly thoughtless or utterly pleasureless. is is true, he thinks, even if the thoughtless life at issue is intensely pleasant and the pleasureless life at issue is intensely thoughtful. Evidently Plato wants this argument to show that neither pleasure nor thought, taken by itself, is sufficient to make a life choiceworthy for (...) us. But there is some disagreement among commentators about whether or not he also wants the argument to show why. Is the argument designed to establish that we should reject thoughtless and pleasureless lives because some pleasures and some thoughts are final goods? Or is it silent on this issue? Many interpreters take the first option, claiming that Plato uses the argument to attack both the hedonist view that only pleasures are final goods and the intellectualist view that only thoughts are final goods. My aim in this paper is to show that the second option is at least as attractive as the first, both exegetically and philosophically. (shrink)
This article discusses, principally from an English perspective, globalisation, global citizenship and two forms of education relevant to those developments (global education and citizenship education). We describe what citizenship has meant inside one nation state and ask what citizenship means, and could mean, in a globalising world. By comparing the natures of citizenship education and global education, as experienced principally in England during, approximately, the last three decades, we seek to develop a clearer understanding of what has been done and (...) what might be done in the future in order to develop education for global citizenship. We suggest that up to this point there have been significant differences between the characterisations that have been developed for global education and citizenship education. These differences are revealed through an examination of three areas: focus and origins; the attitude of the government and significant others; and the adoption of pedagogical approaches. We suggest that it would be useful to look beyond old barriers that have separated citizenship education and global education and to form a new global citizenship education. Their separation has in the past only perpetuated the old understandings of citizenship and constructed a constrained view of global education. (shrink)
The legal risks associated with health research involving human subjects have been highlighted recently by a number of lawsuits launched against those involved in conducting and evaluating the research. Some of these cases have been fully addressed by the legal system, resulting in judgments that provide some guidance. The vast majority of cases have either settled before going to trial, or have not yet been addressed by the courts, leaving us to wonder what might have been and what guidance future (...) cases may bring. What is striking about the lawsuits that have been commenced is the broad range of individuals/institutions that are named as defendants and the broad range of allegations that are made. The research community should take this early experience as a warning and should reflect carefully on practices where research involving human subjects is concerned. (shrink)
Recruiting patients into clinical research is essential for the advancement of medical knowledge. However, when the physician undertaking the care of the patient is also responsible for recruitment into clinical research, a situation arises of an inter-role breach of confidentiality which is distinguishable from other conflicts of interest. Such discord arises as the physician utilizes confidential information obtained within the therapeutic relationship beyond its primary objective, and safeguards ought to be observed in order to avert this important, and generally overlooked, (...) problem. The moral worth of the pledge of confidentiality is based not on its innate value but on its being a promise on which subsequent interactions and disclosures are founded. Within the patient-doctor interaction, confidentiality is an important facet of the promised fidelity and, as such, a loose interpretation of the notion threatens the essence of the relationship, and any violation thereof requires compelling moral justification. To avoid conflict, patients' confidential information ought not be used for the purpose of recruitment, which needs to be undertaken through general education and non-directed appeals, and a preliminary consent to be approached for research should be obtained from the patient prior to her being identified as a suitable research subject. Securing this prior consent would avoid one source of potential, albeit unintended, coercion. (shrink)
Medicine, as Byron Good argues, reconstitutes thehuman body of our daily experience as a medical body,unfamiliar outside medicine. This reconstitution can be seen intwo ways: (i) as a salutary reminder of the extent to which thereality even of the human body is constructed; and (ii) as anarena for what Stephen Toulmin distinguishes as theintersection of natural science and history, in which many ofphilosophy''s traditional (and traditionally abstract) questionsare given concrete and urgent form.This paper begins by examining a number of dualities (...) between themedical body and the body familiar in daily experience. Toulmin''s epistemological analysis of clinical medicine ascombining both universal and existential knowledge is thenconsidered. Their expression, in terms of attention,respectively, to natural science and to personal history, isexplored through the epistemological contrasts between themedical body and the familiar body, noting the traditionalphilosophical questions which they in turn illustrate. (shrink)
This set reprints a wide range of key articles exploring the role of feminists in the development of post-Enlightenment thought. Including groundbreaking work from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, with pieces by Sandra Harding, Julia Kristeva, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Elizabeth Spelman, and other internationally-esteemed scholars, the collection features an original introduction and comprehensive index, making this an invaluable resource for women's studies students in a wide range of subject areas. For a full listing of contents, visit www.routledge-ny.com and type the (...) isbn into the search engine. (shrink)
Many bioethics questions are resistant to journalistic exploration on account of their inherently philosophical dimensions. Such dimensions are ill-suited to what we may term the internal goods (in MacIntyre's sense) of the newspapers and mass media generally, which constrain newspaper coverage to an abbreviated form of narrative that, whilst not in itself objectionable, is nonetheless inimical to the conduct of philosophical reflection. The internal goods of academic bioethics, by contrast, include attention to philosophical questions inherent in bioethical issues and value-enquiry. (...) The danger for bioethics is that its agenda for reflective enquiry will, if dictated by this abbreviated narrative, be distorted in terms of both range and priorities, to the inevitable neglect of questions having a philosophical dimension to them. This danger can be avoided by a constructive partnership between the media and academic bioethics. The success of this partnership relies on four suggested provisos, for the meeting of which both journalists and academics bear responsibility. (shrink)
This book offers a clear and coherent guide to contemporary feminism for students of women's studies, gender studies, sociology, social theory and literary ...
Rousseau's political thought has been accredited with major influence upon subsequent radical democratic thinking, but in fact its contradictions and obscurities render the real import of its legacy deeply ambiguous. This article aims to identify its central message through clarification of the Social Contract's presuppositions and prescriptions, interpreted in the light of his other writings. Although the modernity of his thought is evident in the priority he gives to individual freedom, Rousseau's disturbing novelty lies in his belief that this can (...) only be reconciled with the interests of political community when people are, by contemporary standards, severely underdeveloped in their individuality. For him, modern socialization irreversibly blocks this reconciliation and compounds the oppression of individuals by distorting their authentic identities. Thus, Rousseau ought to be seen as offering nothing but a critique of any aspiration to salvage genuine liberty in society now. The article urges a redefinition of his contribution to political thought and depicts him as an early articulator of powerful challenges to the main aims of contractarian and democratic theory, which the latter is still unwisely apt to ignore. (shrink)
The Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction hypothesis, proposed as an explanation of the Michelson-Morley result, fails to account for the Kennedy-Thorndike result. Hence, Grünbaum argues, the hypothesis has been falsified. However, the contraction hypothesis as formulated by Lorentz is false for the very fundamental reason that it entails a contradiction, namely, the consequence that light waves must have a variable velocity along what by definition is taken to be a rest length. Furthermore, the attempt to resolve this contradiction by coupling the Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction (...) with the hypothesis that clock rates are a function of velocity, is open to a sound, methodological objection. The Michelson-Morley result is fully satisfied, provided only that the lengths of the interferometer arms, in the longitudinal and transverse positions, are thought to be related to one another in a certain ratio, and this ratio may be interpreted as a contraction in both arms. Since this twofold contraction hypothesis suffices to explain both the Michelson-Morley and the Kennedy-Thorndike results, and since it entails no contradiction, there is no need to correct both the length of rods and the rate of clocks. Therefore, the combined clock-rod hypothesis, and with it the Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction hypothesis, must be rejected. (shrink)
