Online research in philosophy

It is often thought that Hegel’s social philosophy is straightforwardly hostile toward liberal ideals. In this article, I contend that many such suspicions can be dispelled through a more nuanced engagement with his rhetorical and argumentative strategies. To tackle such a broad topic in this space, I focus on the shortcomings of a rights-based individualism within the Philosophy of Right — where Hegel describes civil society as a ‘semblance’ [Schein] of a rational polity. Although such passages might suggest the collectivism (...) that has long haunted his legacy, I propose that he is offering something rather more normatively attractive. More specifically, I argue that his grammar of recognition disinters the suppressed social conditions for those rights (and the individuality they protect) that are often misrecognized as foundational by liberal theorists. (shrink)

This article intervenes in recent debates surrounding Adorno’s contribution to critical social theory. Where it is something of a commonplace to argue that Adorno pessimistically withdraws from political concerns, the article argues for a more productive set of normative contributions – based within his utopian gestures towards a ‘difference without fear’. At stake is not only a more sensitive approach to Adorno’s texts, but the broader normative question of difference and its political meaning.