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  1.  12
    M. J. Cresswell (1985). Structured Meanings. MIT Press.
    Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.
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  2.  3
    M. J. Cresswell (1973). Logics and Languages. London,Methuen [Distributed in the U.S.A. By Harper & Row.
  3. M. J. Cresswell (1991). Entities and Indicies. Kluwer.
     
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  4.  24
    M. J. Cresswell (2013). Predicate Metric Tense Logic for 'Now' and 'Then'. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):1-24.
    In a number of publications A.N. Prior considered the use of what he called ‘metric tense logic’. This is a tense logic in which the past and future operators P and F have an index representing a temporal distance, so that Pnα means that α was true n -much ago, and Fn α means that α will be true n -much hence. The paper investigates the use of metric predicate tense logic in formalising phenomena ormally treated by such devices as (...)
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  5.  89
    M. J. Cresswell (1975). Hyperintensional Logic. Studia Logica 34 (1):25 - 38.
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  6.  76
    M. J. Cresswell (2006). Now is the Time. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):311 – 332.
    The aim of this paper is to consider some logical aspects of the debate between the view that the present is the only 'real' time, and the view that the present is not in any way metaphysically privileged. In particular I shall set out a language of first-order predicate tense logic with a now predicate, and a first order (extensional) language with an abstraction operator, in such a way that each language can be shewn to be exactly translatable into the (...)
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  7. M. J. Cresswell (2010). The Modal Predicate Logic of Real Time. Logique Et Analyse 209:3-7.
     
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  8.  70
    M. J. Cresswell (2010). Temporal Reference in Linear Tense Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):173 - 200.
    The paper introduces a first-order theory in the language of predicate tense logic which contains a single simple axiom. It is shewn that this theory enables times to be referred to and sentences involving ‘now’ and ‘then’ to be formalised. The paper then compares this way of increasing the expressive capacity of predicate tense logic with other mechanisms, and indicates how to generalise the results to other modal and tense systems.
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  9.  95
    M. J. Cresswell (2002). Why Propositions Have No Structure. Noûs 36 (4):643–662.
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  10.  33
    M. J. Cresswell & A. A. Rini (2010). Are Contingent Facts a Myth? Analysis 70 (3):424-431.
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  11.  69
    M. J. Cresswell (1972). The World is Everything That is the Case. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):1 – 13.
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  12.  61
    M. J. Cresswell (1975). What is Aristotle's Theory of Universals? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):238 – 247.
  13.  30
    M. J. Cresswell (2014). Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):332-338.
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  14.  18
    M. J. Cresswell (2004). Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28 – 41.
    David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart . I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the (...)
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  15.  16
    M. J. Cresswell (1970). Classical intensional logics. Theoria 36 (3):347-372.
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  16.  29
    M. J. Cresswell (2002). Static Semantics for Dynamic Discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):545-571.
  17.  36
    M. J. Cresswell (1978). Prepositions and Points of View. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (1):1 - 41.
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  18. M. J. Cresswell (1976). Formal Philosophy, Selected Papers of Richard Montague. Philosophia 6 (1):193-207.
  19.  32
    M. J. Cresswell (1971). Essence and Existence in Plato and Aristotle. Theoria 37 (2):91-113.
    Truth of x (independently of any description of x) that it is f. A property f which holds of x but is not per se of x is said to hold per accidens of x. The essence of an individual is the sum of its per se properties. We can formulate the following: doctrine a: concrete individuals do not have essences though abstract entities do. Doctrine b: concrete individuals have essences but they do not individuate, whereas abstract entities have essences (...)
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  20.  8
    M. J. Cresswell & John C. Bigelow (1978). Review. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (3):289-295.
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  21.  19
    M. J. Cresswell (1972). Intensional Logics and Logical Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1):2 - 15.
  22.  25
    M. J. Cresswell (2004). Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28 – 41.
    David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart . I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the (...)
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  23.  31
    M. J. Cresswell (1988). Necessity and Contingency. Studia Logica 47 (2):145 - 149.
    The paper considers the question of when the operator L of necessity in modal logic can be expressed in terms of the operator meaning it is non-contingent that.
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  24.  0
    M. J. Cresswell (1991). Structured Meanings: The Semantics of Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Review 100 (3):476-479.
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  25. M. J. Cresswell (2007). The Prior Future. Logique Et Analyse 199:289-302.
     
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  26.  22
    M. J. Cresswell (1980). Quotational Theories of Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (1):17 - 40.
  27. M. J. Cresswell (1997). Some Incompletable Modal Predicate Logics. Logique Et Analyse 160 (1997):321-334.
     
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  28.  33
    M. J. Cresswell (1995). Incompleteness and the Barcan Formula. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4):379 - 403.
    A (normal) system of propositional modal logic is said to be complete iff it is characterized by a class of (Kripke) frames. When we move to modal predicate logic the question of completeness can again be raised. It is not hard to prove that if a predicate modal logic is complete then it is characterized by the class of all frames for the propositional logic on which it is based. Nor is it hard to prove that if a propositional modal (...)
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  29.  45
    M. J. Cresswell (1986). Why Objects Exist but Events Occur. Studia Logica 45 (4):371 - 375.
    I distinguish between sentences like(1) Last Thursday we drove from Wellington to Waikanae and (2) Last Thursday my copy of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax remained on my bookshelf. Sentence (2) has the subinterval property. If it is true at an interval t it is true at every subinterval of t. (1) lacks this property. (1) reports an event. (2) reports a state. Events do not have the subinterval property but states do have it, and so do objects. If (...)
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  30.  13
    M. J. Cresswell (1977). Categorial Languages. Studia Logica 36 (4):257 - 269.
  31.  59
    M. J. Cresswell (2006). Arabic Numerals in Propositional Attitude Sentences. Analysis 66 (289):92–93.
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  32.  8
    M. J. Cresswell (1966). Functions of Propositions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (4):545-560.
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  33.  9
    M. J. Cresswell (1975). Participation in Plato'sparmenides. Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):163-171.
  34.  11
    M. J. Cresswell (1975). Identity and Intensional Objects. Philosophia 5 (1-2):47-68.
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  35.  40
    M. J. Cresswell (2010). Abstract Entities in the Causal Order. Theoria 76 (3):249-265.
    This article discusses the argument we cannot have knowledge of abstract entities because they are not part of the causal order. The claim of this article is that the argument fails because of equivocation. Assume that the “causal order” is concerned with contingent facts involving time and space. Even if the existence of abstract entities is not contingent and does not involve time or space it does not follow that no truths about abstract entities are contingent or involve time or (...)
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  36.  52
    M. J. Cresswell (2004). Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28 – 41.
    David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart . I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the (...)
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  37.  46
    M. J. Cresswell (2003). Logical Form and Language. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):283 – 284.
    Book Information Logical Form and Language. Edited by G. Preyer and G. Peter. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. x + 512. Hardback, £55. Paperback, £19.99.
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  38.  24
    M. J. Cresswell (1967). Professor Bradley's Avowals. Mind 76 (301):121-122.
  39.  32
    M. J. Cresswell (1971). Plato's Theory of Causality: Phaedo 95-106. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):244 – 249.
  40.  7
    G. E. Hughes & M. J. Cresswell (1975). Omnitemporal Logic and Converging Time. Theoria 41 (1):11-34.
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  41. M. J. Cresswell (1970). Note on the Interpretation of S0. 5. Logique Et Analyse 13:376-378.
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  42.  39
    M. J. Cresswell (1990). Modality and Mellor's Mctaggart. Studia Logica 49 (2):163 - 170.
    This paper explores a modal analogue of Hugh Mellor''s version of McTaggart''s argument against the reality of tense. I show that if Mellor''s argument succeeds in showing that the present moment cannot be any more real than any other moment then it also shows that the actual world cannot be any more real than any other possible world.
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  43.  10
    M. J. Cresswell (1972). Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato? Philosophical Quarterly 22 (87):149-154.
  44. M. J. Cresswell (1967). Propositional Identity. Logique Et Analyse 40:283-291.
     
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  45.  30
    M. J. Cresswell (1967). Note on a System of Åqvist. Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (1):58-60.
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  46.  35
    M. J. Cresswell (2008). Does Every Proposition Have a Unique Contradictory? Analysis 68 (298):112–114.
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  47.  4
    M. J. Cresswell (1972). Second‐Order Intensional Logic. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 18 (19‐20):297-320.
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  48.  6
    M. J. Cresswell (2004). Possibility Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic. Australasian Journal of Logic 2:11-29.
    The paper investigates interpretations of propositional and firstorder logic in which validity is defined in terms of partial indices; sometimes called possibilities but here understood as non-empty subsets of a set W of possible worlds. Truth at a set of worlds is understood to be truth at every world in the set. If all subsets of W are permitted the logic so determined is classical first-order predicate logic. Restricting allowable subsets and then imposing certain closure conditions provides a modelling for (...)
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  49.  9
    M. J. Cresswell (1967). The Interpretation of Some Lewis Systems of Modal Logic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):198 – 206.
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  50.  10
    M. J. Cresswell (2012). Mathematical Entities in the Divided Line. Review of Metaphysics 66 (1):89-104.
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