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  1. Mark Mercer (2010). In Defence of Believing Wishfully. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):211-224.
    To believe a proposition wishfully is to believe it because one wants to believe it, and not because one has evidence or reason that it is true. Is it wise to be open to believing wishfully? After criticising one popular argument that we ought be closed to believing wishfully, I develop an argument that being closed to believing wishfully is to labour under a debilitating prejudice. As a rule, then, we ought to be open to believing wishfully. I find one (...)
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  2. L. Obolensky, T. Clark, G. Matthew & M. Mercer (2010). A Patient and Relative Centred Evaluation of Treatment Escalation Plans: A Replacement for the Do-Not-Resuscitate Process. Journal of Medical Ethics 36 (9):518-520.
    The Treatment Escalation Plan (TEP) was introduced into our trust in an attempt to improve patient involvement and experience of their treatment in hospital and to embrace and clarify a wider remit of treatment options than the Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order currently offers. Our experience suggests that the patient and family are rarely engaged in DNR discussions. This is acutely relevant considering that the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) now obliges these discussions to take place. The TEP is a form (...)
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  3. Mark Mercer (2007). Folk Psychology's Epistemic Credentials. Facta Philosophica 9 (1):37-53.
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  4. Mark Mercer (2006). Metaphor and Sentence Meaning. Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):3-22.
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  5. Mark Mercer (2001). In Defence of Weak Psychological Egoism. Erkenntnis 55 (2):217-237.
    Weak psychological egoism is the doctrine that anything an agent does intentionally, that agent does at least expecting thereby to realize one of her self-regarding ends. (Strong psychological egoism, by contrast, is the doctrine that agents act always intending thereby to realize a self-regarding end.) Though weak psychological egoism is a doctrine ultimately answerable to empirical evidence, we presently have excellent a priori reasons for accepting it and attempting to construct psychological theories that include it as an organizing principle. These (...)
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  6. Laura A. Siminoff & Mary Beth Mercer (2001). Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Consent for Organ Donation. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10 (4):377-386.
    Medical advances in transplantation techniques have driven an exponential increase in the demand for transplantable organs. Unfortunately, policy efforts to bolster the organ supply have been less than effective, failing to provide a stopgap for ever-increasing numbers of patients who await organ transplantation. The number of registrations on waiting lists exceeded 65,245 in early 1999, a 325% increase over the 20,000 that existed 11 years earlier in 1988. Regrettably, more than 4,000 patients die each year while awaiting transplantation.
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  7. Mark Mercer (1999). Grounds of Liberal Tolerance. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):319-334.
  8. Mark Mercer (1998). Psychological Egoism and Its Critics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):557-576.
    I will present what I think is the best argument for the version of psychological egoism under consideration here, and explain why I think even that argument fails to go much distance toward establishing it. It turns out, though, I will caution, that defeating that argument means only that we are right to reject psychological egoism as extremely implausible; it does not entitle us to claim to have shown the thesis itself to be either confused and senseless or false. However, (...)
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  9. Mark Douglas Mercer (1993). On a Pragmatic Argument Against Pragmatism in Ethics. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):163-173.
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  10. C. J. L. Talmage & Mark Mercer (1991). Meaning Holism and Interpretability. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (July):301-15.
    The authors argue that while meaning holism makes massive error possible, it does not, as Donald Davidson fears, threaten interpretability. Thus they hold, in opposition to Davidson, that meaning holism need not be constrained by an account of meaning according to which in the methodologically most basic cases the content of a belief is given by the cause of that belief. What ensures interpretability, they maintain, is not that speakers' beliefs are in the main true, but rather that beliefs have (...)
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  11. Catherine Jl Talmage & Mark Mercer (1991). Noun Phrases, Quantifiers, and Generic Names, EJ LOWE Frege and Russell Have Taught Us That Indefinite and Plural Noun Phrases in Natural Language Often Function as Quantifier Expressions Rather Than as Referring Expressions, Despite Possessing Many Syntactical Simi-Larities with Names. But It Can Be Shown That in Some of Their Most Im. Philosophy 66 (257).
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  12. Mark Mercer (1990). Constructive Philosophy. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):130-131.
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  13. Mark Mercer (1990). The Construction of Reality. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):82-82.
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