115 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Mark T. Nelson [53]Michael Nelson [20]Michael P. Nelson [15]Mark Nelson [6]
Marie Nelson [5]Michelle R. Nelson [3]M. Nelson [2]M. K. Nelson [1]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also:
Profile: Mark T. Nelson (Westmont College, University of Leeds)
Profile: Monica Nelson (King's College London)
Profile: Mollie Nelson (University of Queensland)
Profile: Morgan Nelson
Profile: Mandela nelson
  1.  51
    Mark T. Nelson (2004). Review: Ethical Formation. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (449):189-192.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  26
    Mark T. Nelson (2015). What the Utilitarian Cannot Think. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):717-729.
    I argue that utilitarianism cannot accommodate a basic sort of moral judgment that many people want to make. I raise a real-life example of shockingly bad behavior and ask what can the utilitarian say about it. I concede that the utilitarian can say that this behavior caused pain to the victim; that pain is bad; that the agent’s behavior was impermissible; even that the agent’s treatment of the victim was vicious. However, there is still one thing the utilitarian cannot say, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. S. Keller & M. Nelson (2001). Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):333 – 345.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4.  65
    Mark T. Nelson (2010). We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties. Mind 119 (473):83-102.
    In ethics, it is commonly supposed that we have both positive duties and negative duties, things we ought to do and things we ought not to do. Given the many parallels between ethics and epistemology, we might suppose that the same is true in epistemology, and that we have both positive epistemic duties and negative epistemic duties. I argue that this is false; that is, that we have negative epistemic duties, but no positive ones. There are things that we ought (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  5. Michael Nelson & Edward N. Zalta (2012). A Defense of Contingent Logical Truths. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):153-162.
    A formula is a contingent logical truth when it is true in every model M but, for some model M , false at some world of M . We argue that there are such truths, given the logic of actuality. Our argument turns on defending Tarski’s definition of truth and logical truth, extended so as to apply to modal languages with an actuality operator. We argue that this extension is the philosophically proper account of validity. We counter recent arguments to (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Michael Nelson (2002). Descriptivism Defended. Noûs 36 (3):408–435.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  7. J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson (1998). The Great New Wilderness Debate.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  8. Mark T. Nelson (1998). Bertrand Russell's Defence of the Cosmological Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):87-100.
    According to the cosmological argument, there must be a self-existent being, because, if every being were a dependent being, we would lack an explanation of the fact that there are any dependent beings at all, rather than nothing. This argument faces an important, but little-noticed objection: If self-existent beings may exist, why may not also self-explanatory facts also exist? And if self-explanatory facts may exist, why may not the fact that there are any dependent beings be a self-explanatory fact? And (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  69
    Mark T. Nelson (2006). Moral Realism and Program Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):417 – 428.
    Alexander Miller has recently considered an ingenious extension of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit's account of 'program explanation' as a way of defending non-reductive naturalist versions of moral realism against Harman's explanatory criticism. Despite the ingenuity of this extension, Miller concludes that program explanation cannot help such moral realists in their attempt to defend moral properties. Specifically, he argues that such moral program explanations are dispensable from an epistemically unlimited point of view. I show that Miller's argument for this negative (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10. Mark T. Nelson (1996). The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Moral Argument. Religious Studies 32 (1):15-26.
    The Clarke/Rowe version of the Cosmological Argument is sound only if the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is true, but many philosophers, including Rowe, think that there is not adequate evidence for the principle of sufficient reason. I argue that there may be indirect evidence for PSR on the grounds that if we do not accept it, we lose our best justification for an important principle of metaethics, namely, the Principle of Universalizability. To show this, I argue that all the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  16
    Mark Nelson (2007). More Bad News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):203-216.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  12.  36
    Michael Nelson (2014). Contingently Existing Propositions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):776-803.
    (2013). Contingently existing propositions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 776-803.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  29
    Michael P. Nelson (2008). On Doing Helpful Philosophy. Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (4):611-614.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  56
    Mark T. Nelson (2010). Y and Z Are Not Off the Hook: The Survival Lottery Made Fairer. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (4):396-401.
    In this article I show that the argument in John Harris's famous "Survival Lottery" paper cannot be right. Even if we grant Harris's assumptions—of the justifiability of such a lottery, the correctness of maximizing consequentialism, the indistinguishability between killing and letting die, the practical and political feasibility of such a scheme—the argument still will not yield the conclusion that Harris wants. On his own terms, the medically needy should be less favored (and more vulnerable to being killed), than Harris suggests.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  4
    John H. Dreher, Can There Be Brute, Contingent Moral Facts, David Braun, Attitude Ascriptions, Mark Crimmins, Thing Talk Moonlighting & Michael Nelson (2002). Selected Papers Presented in 2001 at the 75th Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association Edited By: Laurie Shrage. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 108:339-340.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16.  17
    Mark T. Nelson (1991). Utilitarian Eschatology. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4):339-47.
    Traditional utilitarianism, when applied, implies a surprising prediction about the future, viz., that all experience of pleasure and pain must end once and for all, or infinitely dwindle. Not only is this implication surprising, it should render utilitarianism unacceptable to persons who hold any of the following theses: that evaluative propositions may not imply descriptive, factual propositions; that evaluative propositions may not imply contingent factual propositions about the future; that there will always exist beings who experience pleasure or pain.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  17.  15
    Michael Nelson (2011). Default Compatibilism and Narrativity. Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):35-45.
    I discuss two claims defended in Fischer’s recent work. The first is the default status of compatibilism. This is part of a conception of our agency and moral responsibility as being independent of the truth or the falsity of the thesis of determinism. I try to further bolster Fischer’s arguments in favor of this position. The second is Fischer’s defense of the narrative conception of moral responsibility, according to which the value of self-expression supports and explicates the value of being (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18.  69
    Michael Nelson & Edward N. Zalta (2009). Bennett and “Proxy Actualism”. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):277-292.
    Karen Bennett has recently argued that the views articulated by Linsky and Zalta (Philos Perspect 8:431–458, 1994) and (Philos Stud 84:283–294, 1996) and Plantinga (The nature of necessity, 1974) are not consistent with the thesis of actualism, according to which everything is actual. We present and critique her arguments. We first investigate the conceptual framework she develops to interpret the target theories. As part of this effort, we question her definition of ‘proxy actualism’. We then discuss her main arguments that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19.  34
    Mark T. Nelson (2011). The Contingency Cosmological Argument. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  38
    Michael Nelson (2005). The Problem of Puzzling Pairs. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):319 - 350.
  21.  53
    Michael Nelson, Existence. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  22.  23
    Mark T. Nelson (1991). The Morality of a Free Market for Transplant Organs. Public Affairs Quarterly 5 (1):63-79.
    There is a world-wide shortage of kidneys for transplantation. Many people will have to endure lengthy and unpleasant dialysis treatments, or die before an organ becomes available. Given this chronic shortage, some doctors and health economists have proposed offering financial incentives to potential donors to increase the supply of transplantable organs. In this paper, I explore objections to the practice of buying and selling organs from the point of view 1) justice, 2) beneficence and 3) Commodification. Regarding objection to the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  36
    Michael Nelson (2002). Puzzling Pairs. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):109 - 119.
    Propositional attitude ascribing sentences seem to give rise to failures of substitution. Is this phenomena best accounted for semantically, by constructing a semantics for propositional attitude ascribing sentences that invalidates the Substitution Principle, or pragmatically? In this paper I argue against semantic accounts of such phenomena. I argue that any semantic theory that respects all our apparent substitution failure intuitions will entail that the noun-phrase position outside the scope of the attitude verb is not open to substitution salva veritate, which (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  24.  28
    Mark T. Nelson (2002). What Justification Could Not Be. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):265 – 281.
    I begin by asking the meta-epistemological question, 'What is justification?', analogous to the meta-ethical question, 'What is rightness?' I introduce the possibility of non-cognitivist, naturalist, non-naturalist, and eliminativist answers in meta-epistemology,corresponding to those in meta-ethics. I devote special attention to the naturalistic hypothesis that epistemic justification is identical to probability, showing its antecedent plausibility. I argue that despite this plausibility, justification cannot be identical with probability, under the standard interpretation of the probability calculus, for the simple reason that justification can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25. Michael Nelson (2008). Frege and the Paradox of Analysis. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):159 - 181.
    In an unpublished manuscript of 1914 titled ‘Logic in mathematics’, Gottlob Frege offered a rich account of the paradox of analysis. I argue that Frege there claims that the explicandum and explicans of a successful analysis express the same sense and that he furthermore appreciated that this requires that one cannot conclude that two sentences differ in sense simply because it is possible for a (minimally) competent speaker to accept one without accepting the other. I claim that this is shown (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Michael Nelson (2009). The Contingency of Existence. In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. Oxford University Press
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  1
    Mark Nelson & Elaine Sternberg (1996). Just Business. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):554.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  28.  88
    Mark T. Nelson (2007). More Bad News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):203-216.
    Are there good arguments from Is to Ought? Toomas Karmo has claimed that there are trivially valid arguments from Is to Ought, but no sound ones. I call into question some key elements of Karmo’s argument for the “logical autonomy of ethics”, and show that attempts to use it as part of an overall case for moral skepticism would be self-defeating.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  71
    Mark T. Nelson (1999). Morally Serious Critics of Moral Intuitions. Ratio 12 (1):54–79.
    I characterise moral intuitionism as the methodological claim that one may legitimately appeal to moral judgments in the course of moral reasoning even when those judgments are not supported by inference from other judgments. I describe two patterns of criticism of this method: ‘morally unserious’ criticisms, which hold that ‘morality is bunk’, so appeals to moral intuitions are bunk as well; and ‘morally serious’ criticisms, which hold that morality is not bunk, but that appeals to moral intuition are nonetheless misguided. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30.  36
    Mark T. Nelson (2003). Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments? Argumentation 17 (1):35-42.
    Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson (2004). American Indian Environmental Ethics an Ojibwa Case Study.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  9
    Michael P. Nelson (2004). The World and the Wild. Environmental Ethics 26 (1):107-110.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  23
    Mark T. Nelson (1995). Is It Always Fallacious to Derive Values From Facts? Argumentation 9 (4):553-562.
    Charles Pigden has argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden’s argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic, and does not rely on controversial assumptions about Aristotelian biology or 'institutional facts.'.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  53
    Michael Nelson (2007). Review: Ways an Actualist Might Be. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):455 - 471.
    I discuss Stalnaker's views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and the Barcan formulas.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  70
    Mark T. Nelson (2009). A Problem for Conservatism. Analysis 69 (4):620-630.
    I present a problem for a prominent kind of conservatism, viz., the combination of traditional moral & religious values, patriotic nationalism, and libertarian capitalism. The problem is that these elements sometimes conflict. In particular, I show how libertarian capitalism and patriotic nationalism conflict via a scenario in which the thing that libertarian capitalists love – unregulated market activity – threatens what American patriots love – a strong, independent America. Unrestricted libertarian rights to buy and sell land would permit the sale (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  31
    J. L. A. Garcia & Mark T. Nelson (1994). The Problem of Endless Joy: Is Infinite Utility Too Much for Utilitarianism? Utilitas 6 (02):183-.
    What if human joy (more technically, utility) went on endlessly? Suppose, for example, that each human generation were followed by another, or that the Western religions are right when they teach that each human being lives eternally after death. If any such possibility is true in the actual world, then an agent might sometimes be so situated that more than one course of action would produce an infinite amount of utility (or of disutility, or of both). Deciding whether to have (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  21
    Michael P. Nelson (1996). Holists and Fascists and Paper Tigers...Oh My! Ethics and the Environment 1 (2):103 - 117.
    Over and over, philosophers have claimed that environmental holism in general, and Leopold's Land Ethic in particular, ought to be rejected on the basis that it has fascistic implications. I argue that the land Ethic is not tantamount to environmental fascism because Leopold's moral theory accounts for the moral standing of the individual as well as "the land," a holistic ethic better protects and defends the individual in the long-run, and the term "fascism" is misapplied in this case.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38.  6
    Mark Nelson, Tony L. Burgess, Abigail Alling, Norberto Alvarez-Romo, William F. Dempster, Roy L. Walford & John P. Allen (1993). Using a Closed Ecological System to Study Earth's Biosphere. BioScience 43 (4):225-236.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39.  15
    Michael P. Nelson (1996). Rethinking Wilderness. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 3 (2):6-9.
    The “received” concept of wilderness as a place apart from and untouched by humans is five-times flawed: it is not universalizable, it is ethnocentric, it is ecologically naive, it separates humans from nature, and its referent is nonexistent. The received view of wilderness leads to dilemmas and unpalatable consequences, including the loss of designated wilderness areas by political and legislative authorities. What is needed is a more flexible notion of wilderness. Suggestions are made for a revised concept of wilderness.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40.  5
    Mark T. Nelson (1995). Redeeming the Time. The Personalist Forum 11 (1):17-32.
    I borrow an idea from the fiction of C. S. Lewis that future outcomes may affect the value of past events. I then defend this idea via the concept of a “temporal whole”, and show its promise as a partial theodicy and its resonance with both Christian theism and a robust personalism.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  14
    Mark T. Nelson (1998). An Aristotelian Business Ethics? Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (1):89–104.
    Elaine Sternberg's Just Business is one of the first book-length Aristotelian treatments of business ethics. It is Aristotelian in the sense that Sternberg begins by defining the nature of business in order to identify its end, and, thence, normative principles to regulate it. According to Sternberg, the nature of business is 'the selling of goods or services in order to maximise long-term owner value', therefore all business behaviour must be evaluated with reference to the maximisation of long-term owner value, constrained (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42.  42
    Mark T. Nelson (1991). Intuitionism and Subjectivism. Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):115-121.
    I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuitionism collapse into “subjectivism”, i.e., that they make truth in ethical theory depend on what people believe. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.M. Hare and Peter Singer.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  20
    Mark T. Nelson (2013). Non-Contradiction: Oh Yeah and so What? Think 12 (34):87-91.
  44.  21
    Mark T. Nelson (1990). Intuitionism and Conservatism. Metaphilosophy 21 (3):282-293.
    I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuition make ethical theory politically and noetically conservative. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.B. Brandt, R.M. Hare and Richard Miller.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. R. Jutte, M. Eklof & M. C. Nelson (2002). Historical Aspects of Unconventional Medicine: Approaches, Concepts, Case Studies. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 23 (3/4):551-551.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46.  7
    Michael P. Nelson & John A. Vucetich (2013). Wilderness, Value Of. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  10
    Mark T. Nelson (1993). Promises and Material Conditionals. Teaching Philosophy 16 (2):155-156.
    Some beginning logic students find it hard to understand why a material conditional is true when its antecedent is false. I draw an analogy between conditional statements and conditional promises (especially between true conditional statements and unbroken conditional promises) that makes this point of logic less counter-intuitive.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  8
    Justin Stebbing, Rachaei Jones, Alan Winston, Mark Nelson, Stefan Mauss, Guenther Schmutz, Jonathan A. Winston, David M. Margolis, Alan D. Tice & Judith Feinberg (2005). Featured Reports. Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 2 (7).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  5
    Mark T. Nelson (2014). Epistemic Value, Edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard. Mind 123 (490):609-612.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  22
    Mark T. Nelson (1991). Naturalistic Ethics and the Argument From Evil. Faith and Philosophy 8 (3):368-379.
    Philosophical naturalism is a cluster of views and impulses typically taken to include atheism, physicalism, radical empiricism or naturalized epistemology, and some sort of relativism, subjectivism or nihilism about morality. I argue that a problem arises when the naturalist offers the argument from evil for atheism. Since the argument from evil is a moral argument, it cannot be effectively deployed by anyone who holds the denatured ethical theories that the naturalist typically holds. In the context of these naturalistic ethical theories, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 115