17 found
Sort by:
See also:
  1. Michael Pelczar (2010). Must an Appearance of Succession Involve a Succession of Appearances? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):49-63.
    It is argued that a subject who has an experience as of succession can have this experience at a time, or over a period of time, during which there occurs in him no succession of conscious mental states at all. Various metaphysical implications of this conclusion are explored. One premise of the main argument is that every experience is an experience as of succession. This implies that we cannot understand phenomenal temporality as a relation among experiences, but only as a (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Michael Pelczar (2010). Presentism, Eternalism, and Phenomenal Change. Synthese 176 (2):275 - 290.
    Normally, when we notice a change taking place, our conscious experience has a corresponding quality of phenomenal change. Here it is argued that one's experience can have this quality at or during a time when there is no change in which phenomenal properties one instantiates. This undermines a number of otherwise forceful arguments against leading metaphysical theories of change, but also requires these theories to construe change as a secondary quality, akin to color.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Michael Pelczar (2009). Content Internalism About Indexical Thought. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):95 - 104.
    Properly understood, content internalism is the thesis that any difference between the representational contents of two individuals' mental states reduces to a difference in those individuals' intrinsic properties. Some of the strongest arguments against internalism turn on the possibility for two "doppelgangers" –- perfect physical and phenomenal duplicates -– to differ with respect to the contents of those of their mental states that they can express using terms such as "I," "here," and "now." In this paper, I grant the stated (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Michael Pelczar (2009). The Knowledge Argument, the Open Question Argument, and the Moral Problem. Synthese 171 (1):25 - 45.
    Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Michael Pelczar (2008). Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):145-160.
    After drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism—numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience)—we argue that Descartes is a numericaldualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes’ views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Michael Pelczar (2008). On an Argument for Functional Invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3):373-377.
    The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Cecilia Wee & Michael Pelczar (2008). Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):145-160.
    After drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism -- numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience) -- we argue that Descartes is a numerical dualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes' views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Michael W. Pelczar (2007). Forms and Objects of Thought. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.
    It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Michael Pelczar (2006). Words Without Meaning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):480-483.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Michael W. Pelczar (2005). Enlightening the Fully Informed. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):29-56.
    This paper develops a response to the knowledge argument against physicalism. The response is both austere, in that it does not concede the existence of non-physical information (much less non-physical facts), and natural, in that it acknowledges the alethic character of phenomenal knowledge and learning. I argue that such a response has all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of existing objections to the knowledge argument. Throughout, the goal is to develop a response that is polemically effective in addition (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. E. Corazza, H. Douglas, J. L. Dowell, J. Franklin, A. S. Gillies, S. C. Goldberg, D. K. Heikes, C. Liu, C. Ortiz Hill & M. W. Pelczar (2004). Cling, AD, 101. Synthese 137 (477).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Michael W. Pelczar (2004). Focal Complexity in Aristotle and Wittgenstein. History of Philosophy Quarterly 21 (2):131 - 150.
  13. Michael W. Pelczar (2004). The Indispensability of Farbung. Synthese 138 (1):49 - 77.
    I offer a theory of propositional attitudeascriptions that reconciles a number of independently plausiblesemantic principles. At the heart of the theory lies the claim thatpsychological verbs (such as ``to believe'' and ``to doubt'') vary incontent indexically. After defending this claim and explaining how itrenders the aforementioned principles mutually compatible, I arguethat my account is superior to currently popular hidden indexicaltheories of attitude ascription. To conclude I indicate a number oframifications that the proposed theory has for issues in epistemology,philosophy of mind, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. M. W. Pelczar (2001). Names as Tokens and Names as Tools. Synthese 128 (1-2):133 - 155.
    After presenting a variety of arguments in support of the idea that ordinary names are indexical, I respond to John Perry's recent arguments against the indexicality of names. I conclude by indicating some connections between the theory of names defended here and Wittgenstein's observations on naming, and suggest that the latter may have been misconstrued in the literature.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Michael Pelczar (2000). Wittgensteinian Semantics. Noûs 34 (4):483–516.
    Wittgenstein emphasizes two points concerning his notion of family resemblance. One is that the use of a family resemblance expression resists characterization by certain kinds of rules; the other is that due to the prevalence of family resemblance in the philosophical lexicon, philosophical inquiry must in many cases proceed differently from how it traditionally has. This paper develops an interpretation of family resemblance that seeks to do justice to these claims. I argue that what is characteristic about family resemblance expressions (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. M. Pelczar & J. Rainsbury (1998). The Indexical Character of Names. Synthese 114 (2):293-317.
    Indexicals are unique among expressions in that they depend for their literal content upon extra-semantic features of the contexts in which they are uttered. Taking this peculiarity of indexicals into account yields solutions to variants of Frege's Puzzle involving objects of attitude-bearing of an indexical nature. If names are indexicals, then the classical versions of Frege's Puzzle can be solved in the same way. Taking names to be indexicals also yields solutions to tougher, more recently-discovered puzzles such as Kripke's well-known (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Michael W. Pelczar (1996). Discussion. Philosophical Investigations 19 (2):159-163.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation