Q0 Why this FAQ? Q1 Who believes in many-worlds? Q2 What is many-worlds? Q3 What are the alternatives to many-worlds? Q4 What is a "world"? Q5 What is a measurement? Q6 Why do worlds split? What is decoherence? Q7 When do worlds split? Q8 When does Schrodinger's cat split? Q9 What is sum-over-histories? Q10 What is many-histories? What is the environment basis? Q11 How many worlds are there? Q12 Is many-worlds a local theory? Q13 Is many-worlds a deterministic theory? Q14 (...) Is many-worlds a relativistic theory? What about quantum field theory? What about quantum gravity? Q15 Where are the other worlds? Q16 Is many-worlds (just) an interpretation? Q17 Why don't worlds fuse, as well as split? Do splitting worlds imply irreversible physics? Q18 What retrodictions does many-worlds make? Q19 Do worlds differentiate or split? Q20 What is many-minds? Q21 Does many-worlds violate Ockham's Razor? Q22 Does many-worlds violate conservation of energy? Q23 How do probabilities emerge within many-worlds? Q24 Does many-worlds allow free-will? Q25 Why am I in this world and not another? Why does the universe appear random? Q26 Can wavefunctions collapse? Q27 Is physics linear? Could we ever communicate with the other worlds? Why do I only ever experience one world? Why am I not aware of the world (and myself) splitting? Q28 Can we determine what other worlds there are? Is the form of the Universal Wavefunction knowable? Q29 Who was Everett? Q30 What are the problems with quantum theory? Q31 What is the Copenhagen interpretation? Q32 Does the EPR experiment prohibit locality? What about Bell's Inequality? Q33 Is Everett's relative state formulation the same as many-worlds? Q34 What is a relative state? Q35 Was Everett a "splitter"? Q36 What unique predictions does many-worlds make? Q37 Could we detect other Everett-worlds? Q38 Why quantum gravity? Q39 Is linearity exact? (shrink)
Sequence-space synaesthetes experience some sequences (e.g. numbers, calendar units) as arranged in spatial forms, i.e., spatial patterns in their mind’s eye or even outside their body. Various explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. Here we argue that these spatial forms are continuous with, and share central characteristics with, varieties of non-synaesthetic visuospatial imagery. This includes their dynamic and elaborative nature, their involuntary feel and consistency over time. Drawing from literatures on mental imagery and working memory, we suggest how the (...) initial acquisition and subsequent elaboration of spatial forms could be accounted for in terms of the known developmental trajectory of visuospatial representations. This extends from the formation of image-based representations of verbal material in childhood to the later maturation of dynamic control of imagery. Individual differences in the development of visuospatial style also account for variation in the character of spatial forms, e.g. in terms of distinctions such as visual versus spatial imagery, or ego-centric versus object-based transformations. (shrink)
Reciprocal altruism involves foregoing an immediate benefit for the sake of a greater long-term reward. It follows that individuals who exhibit a stronger preference for future over immediate rewards should be more disposed to engage in reciprocal altruism – in other words, ‘patient’ people should be more cooperative. The present study tested this prediction by investigating whether participants’ contributions in a public-good game correlated with their ‘discount rate’. The hypothesis was supported: patient people are indeed more cooperative. The paper discusses (...) alternative interpretations of this result, and makes some suggestions for future research. (shrink)
According to the Particularist Theory of Events, events are real things that have a spatiotemporal location. I argue that some events do not have a spatial location in the sense required by the theory. These events are ordinary, nonmental events like Smith’s investigating the murder and Carol’s putting her coat on the chair. I discuss the significance of these counterexamples for the theory.
Increasingly the business community is being asked to respond to growing societal concerns about the environment (Gray et al., 1996; O'Donovan, 2002; Raar, 2002; Adams, 2002, 2004; KPMG, 2002). One business response which has been widely researched from a number of aspects has been the development of standalone environmental reports (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Adams et al., 1998; Holland and Foo, 2003; Buhr, 1998; Cormier and Gordon, 2000; Deegan et al., 2000; Milne and Patten, 2002; O'Donovan (...) 2002; Rahaman et al., 2004). However, one key aspect which has not yet been fully investigated is the impact of environmental reporting upon organisational activity (Dillard et al., 2004; Larringa-Gonzalez and Bebbington, 2001; Ball, 2007). Using an institutional theory perspective, this paper provides a framework for the examination of the embedding of environmental reporting structures into organisational processes and culture. Using this outline framework to analyse existing literature, the paper concludes that there are many issues about the impact of environmental reporting which are still unclear and that many of the attributes of the environmental agenda suggest that it could be another management fad. (shrink)
The adaptationist framework is necessary and sufficient for unifying the social and natural sciences. Gintis's “beliefs, preferences, and constraints” (BPC) model compares unfavorably to this framework because it lacks criteria for determining special design, incorrectly assumes that standard evolutionary theory predicts individual rationality maximisation, does not adequately recognize the impact of psychological mechanisms on culture, and is mute on the behavioural implications of intragenomic conflict. (Published Online April 27 2007).
Reciprocity theory (RT) and costly signaling theory (CST) provide different explanations for the high status of pro-community altruists: RT proposes that altruists are positively and negatively sanctioned by others, whereas CST proposes that altruists are attractive to others. Only RT, however, is beset by first- and higher-order free rider problems, which must be solved in order for RT to explain status allocations. In this paper, several solutions to RT’s free rider problems are proposed, and data about status allocations to Ecuadorian (...) Shuar pro-community altruists are analyzed in light of RT and CST. These data confirm that perceived pro-community altruists are indeed high status and suggest that (1) community residents skillfully monitor the altruism of coresidents, (2) residents who engage in opportunities to broadcast desirable qualities are high status only to the extent that they are considered altruistic, and (3) individuals who sanction coresidents based on coresidents’ contributions to the community are themselves relatively high status. To a greater extent than CST, RT straightforwardly predicts all of these results. (shrink)
In recent philosophy of mathematics avariety of writers have presented ``structuralist''views and arguments. There are, however, a number ofsubstantive differences in what their proponents take``structuralism'' to be. In this paper we make explicitthese differences, as well as some underlyingsimilarities and common roots. We thus identifysystematically and in detail, several main variants ofstructuralism, including some not often recognized assuch. As a result the relations between thesevariants, and between the respective problems theyface, become manifest. Throughout our focus is onsemantic and metaphysical issues, (...) including what is orcould be meant by ``structure'' in this connection. (shrink)
Each of the following sentences expresses a strong intuition about physical things: (a) a physical object is a three-dimensional spatial thing; (b) some physical things can, in the strict sense, remain the same thing through minor changes in their parts; (c) if x and y are physical things with the same spatiotemporal location, then x is strictly identical with y; (d) if x is a proper part of an existing physical thing and x occupies an occupiable region of space, then (...) x is itself an existing physical thing. There is a familiar argument that purports to prove that not all of (a)--(d) can be part of our ordinary concept of a physical thing. Its strategy for defending this claim is showing that at least one of (a)--(d) must-be false. The reason it gives for concluding that (a)--(d) are inconsistent is, appropriately, that they give rise to a paradox: according to the argument, (c) commits us to identifying products of a part-loss, yet (a), (b), and (d) yield the result that the products are different things. (shrink)