Referring to the session "Science and religion" (Filozofia Nauki 1/2006) - esp. to Jan Wolenski's contribution article "Return to the theory of double truth" - the author presents two ways of interpreting the meaning of religion statements. According to one of them, the statements may be shown to possess some kind of empirical content, due to their definitional connection with empirical terms of everyday language, and, in consequence, may bear logical relations to empirical statements. According to the other way of (...) interpreting religion statements, they appear to be devoid of any empirical content and - s Wolenski claims - cannot be supported or threatened by any empirical data. (shrink)
An answer to the question whether belief is a proper object of moral appraisal is shown to depend on some assumptions concerning the notion of moral judgement and belief. Different categories of morally appraisable objects are discussed and two concepts of belief are distinguished: a feeling of confidence and an act of assertion. It is claimed that an appraisal of beliefs with regard to their rationality has a moral aspect and that moral beliefs are liable to a moral valuation with (...) respect to their moral content. Both kinds of moral valuation are illustrated by the case of the racist view. (shrink)
The approach adopted in the paper is based on the theory known as Montague grammar. Accepting, in general, that theory — especially in its modified version, which is due to Thomason and Kaplan — the author points out certain inadequacy in its treatment of the meaning of some indexical expressions and suggests some modification of its theoretical framework in order to avoid that shortcoming. It is claimed that to do justice to the meaning of so-called indefinite indexicals (such as we, (...) you, now) two kinds of dependence of their semantic values upon the context of use must be taken into account — a semantic (or lexical) and a pragmatic (or extralexical) one. (shrink)
The law of excluded middle is usually considered as intrinsically connected with the realistic standpoint and incompatible with the idealistic position. This is just what Ajdukiewicz claims in his critique of transcendental idealism. The analysis of Ajdukiewicz's argumentation raises the problem of validity of the law of excluded middle for vague (or incomplete) languages. The problem is being solved by differentiating between the logical (or ontological) and the metalogical (or semantical) law of excluded middle: in contrast to the former, the (...) latter is claimed to be invalid for the languages in question, without thereby embracing the idealist position. (shrink)
The model theoretic concept of truth has thus far been applied mainly to mathematical languages and theories. The paper presents an attempt to apply it to languages of empirical theories. Such an application must do justice to some characteristic features of empirical discourse. The paper outlines the main problems which a model theoretic theory of truth for empirical languages is bound to face and suggests some solutions to those problems.
The author discusses various concepts of observation statements, subjecting to closer examination that concept according to which an observation statement is a statement with all terms interpreted directly. The logical analysis of direct interpretation, identified with the so called ostensive definition, results in the conclusion that the denotation of predicates is determined by this procedure in a very slight degree. Consequently, observation statements affirming a predicate so interpreted of objects not identical with the standard objects referred to in the ostensive (...) definition cannot be validated. (shrink)