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  1. Matthew Ratcliffe (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Depression and the Nature of Empathy. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy:1-12.
    This paper seeks to illuminate the nature of empathy by reflecting upon the phenomenology of depression. I propose that depression involves alteration of an aspect of experience that is seldom reflected upon or discussed, thus making it hard to understand. This alteration involves impairment or loss of a capacity for interpersonal relatedness that mutual empathy depends upon. The sufferer thus feels cut off from other people, and may remark on their indifference, hostility or inability to understand. Drawing upon the example (...)
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  2. Matthew Ratcliffe (2013). Phenomenology, Naturalism and the Sense of Reality. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:67-88.
    Phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty reject the kind of scientific naturalism or that takes empirical science to be epistemologically and metaphysically privileged over all other forms of enquiry. In this paper, I will consider one of their principal complaints against naturalism, that scientific accounts of things are oblivious to a that is presupposed by the intelligibility of science. Focusing mostly upon Husserl's work, I attempt to clarify the nature of this complaint and state it in the form of (...)
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  3. Matthew Ratcliffe (2013). The Contents of Experience. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 353.
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  4. Matthew Ratcliffe (2013). What is It to Lose Hope? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):597-614.
    This paper addresses the phenomenology of hopelessness. I distinguish two broad kinds of predicament that are easily confused: ‘loss of hopes’ and ‘loss of hope’. I argue that not all hope can be characterised as an intentional state of the form ‘I hope that p’. It is possible to lose all hopes of that kind and yet retain another kind of hope. The hope that remains is not an intentional state or a non-intentional bodily feeling. Rather, it is a ‘pre-intentional’ (...)
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  5. Matthew Ratcliffe & S. Varga (2013). Introduction Emotional Experience in Depression. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8):7-8.
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  6. Anthony P. Atkinson & Matthew Ratcliffe (2012). Introduction to the Special Section on “Emotions and Feelings in Psychiatric Illness”. Emotion Review 4 (2):119-121.
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  7. Giovanna Colombetti & Matthew Ratcliffe (2012). Bodily Feeling in Depersonalization: A Phenomenological Account. Emotion Review 4 (2):145-150.
    This paper addresses the phenomenology of bodily feeling in depersonalization disorder. We argue that not all bodily feelings are intentional states that have the body or part of it as their object. We distinguish three broad categories of bodily feeling: noematic feeling, noetic feeling, and existential feeling. Then we show how an appreciation of the differences between them can contribute to an understanding of the depersonalization experience.
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  8. M. Ratcliffe (2012). Varieties of Temporal Experience in Depression. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (2):114-138.
    People with depression often report alterations in their experience of time, a common complaint being that time has slowed down or stopped. In this paper, I argue that depression can involve a range of qualitatively different changes in the structure of temporal experience, some of which I proceed to describe. In addition, I suggest that current diagnostic categories such as "major depression" are insensitive to the differences between these changes. I conclude by briefly considering whether the kinds of temporal experience (...)
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  9. Matthew Ratcliffe (2012). Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy. Inquiry 55 (5):473-495.
    Abstract This paper proposes that adopting a ?phenomenological stance? enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other people's experiences against the backdrop of a shared world. Hence our attempts to appreciate interpersonal differences do not call into question a deeper level of commonality. A phenomenological stance involves suspending our habitual acceptance of that world. It thus allows us to (...)
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  10. Matthew Ratcliffe (2012). What is Touch? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):413 - 432.
    This paper addresses the nature of touch or ?tactual perception?. I argue that touch encompasses a wide range of perceptual achievements, that treating it as a number of separate senses will not work, and that the permissive conception we are left with is so permissive that it is unclear how touch might be distinguished from the other senses. I conclude that no criteria will succeed in individuating touch. Although I do not rule out the possibility that this also applies to (...)
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  11. Matthew Ratcliffe (2011). Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth. Inquiry 53 (6):602-626.
    It is generally maintained that emotions consist of intentional states and /or bodily feelings. This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of guilt in severe depression, in order to illustrate how such conceptions fail to adequately accommodate a way in which some emotional experiences are said to be deeper than others. Many emotions are intentional states. However, I propose that the deepest emotions are not intentional but pre-intentional, meaning that they determine which kinds of intentional state are possible. I go on (...)
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  12. Matthew Ratcliffe (2011). Phenomenology Is Not a Servant of Science. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):33-36.
    According to Louis Sass, Josef Parnas, and Dan Zahavi (2011), the account of current developments in "phenomenological clinical neuroscience" offered by Aaron Mishara (2007) is "not only confusing but highly inaccurate." Their critique is harsh, but I can find nothing to disagree with. Mishara's distinction between "neo-phenomenology" and "existential phenomenology" does not apply to current work in the field; I do not recognize the two camps he describes. Neither do I find it helpful to distinguish two separate historical traditions in (...)
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  13. Matthew Ratcliffe (2011). Stance, Feeling and Phenomenology. Synthese 178 (1):121 - 130.
    This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen's claim that empiricism is a ' stance'. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ' finding oneself in a world'. At least some of van Fraassen's claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ' empirical stance', he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This (...)
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  14. M. Ratcliffe (2010). The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press. 349--371.
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  15. Matthew Ratcliffe (2010). Binary Oppositions in Psychiatry: For or Against? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (3):233-239.
    In their interesting and informative paper ‘From Szasz to Foucault: On the Role of Critical Psychiatry,’ Pat Bracken and Phil Thomas contrast, in a clear and helpful way, some central themes in the works of Thomas Szasz and Michel Foucault. They go on to endorse a form of critical psychiatry inspired by the latter. Szasz’s critique of psychiatry, they explain, is premised on binary oppositions, principally that between ‘mental’ and ‘bodily.’ Szasz begins by assuming the legitimacy of the distinction and (...)
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  16. Matthew Ratcliffe (2009). Belonging to the World Through the Feeling Body. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (2):205-211.
  17. Matthew Ratcliffe (2009). Existential Feeling and Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (2):179-194.
  18. Matthew Ratcliffe (2009). There Are No Folk Psychological Narratives. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
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  19. Matthew Ratcliffe (2009). Understanding Existential Changes in Psychiatric Illness: The Indispensability of Phenomenology. In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oup Oxford.
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  20. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). Das Problem mit dem Problem des Bewusstseins. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):483-494.
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  21. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality. Oxford University Press.
    Emotions and bodily feelings -- Existential feelings -- The phenomenology of touch -- Body and world -- Feeling and belief in the Capgras delusion -- Feelings of deadness and depersonalization -- Existential feeling in schizophrenia -- What William James really said -- Stance, feeling, and belief -- Pathologies of existential feeling.
     
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  22. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). Farewell to Folk Psychology: A Response to Hutto. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):445 – 451.
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  23. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). John Hick the New Frontier of Religion and Science: Religious Experience, Neuroscience and the Transcendent. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Pp. XII+228. £53.00 (Hbk), £17.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0230507700 (Hbk); 0230507719 (Pbk). [REVIEW] Religious Studies 44 (3):353-357.
  24. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). La Question du Problème du Problème de la Conscience. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):483-494.
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  25. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). Review of Mark Okrent, Rational Animals: The Teleological Roots of Intentionality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).
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  26. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). Touch and Situatedness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):299 – 322.
    This paper explores the phenomenology of touch and proposes that the structure of touch serves to cast light on the more general way in which we 'find ourselves in a world'. Recent philosophical work on perception tends to emphasize vision. This, I suggest, motivates the imposition of a distinction between externally directed perception of objects and internally directed perception of one's own body. In contrast, the phenomenology of touch involves neither firm boundaries between body and world nor perception of bodily (...)
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  27. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
    This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate (...)
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  28. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Problem with the Problem of Consciousness. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):483-494.
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  29. Matthew Ratcliffe & Shaun Gallagher (2008). Introduction. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):279 – 280.
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  30. Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) (2007). Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press.
    This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze and question key assumptions about the nature, scope and function of folk psychology.
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  31. Matthew Ratcliffe (2007). From Folk Psychology to Commonsense. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. 223--243.
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  32. Matthew Ratcliffe (2007). Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book proposes a series of interconnected arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves the use of a 'folk' or 'commonsense' psychology. Ratcliffe suggests that folk psychology, construed as the attribution of internal mental states in order to predict and explain behaviour, is a theoretically motivated and misleading abstraction from social life. He draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology to offer an alternative account that emphasizes patterned interactions between people in shared social situations.
     
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  33. Matthew Ratcliffe (2007). Reconstructing the Cognitive World by Michael Wheeler Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2005. Pp. XI + 340. £22.95. Philosophy 82 (1):190-195.
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  34. Matthew Ratcliffe (2007). What is a Feeling of Unfamiliarity? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (1):43-49.
  35. Michael Beaton, J. Bricklin, Louis C. Charland, JCW Edwards, Ilya B. Farber, Bill Faw, Rocco J. Gennaro, C. Kaernbach, C. M. H. Nunn, Jaak Panksepp, Jesse J. Prinz, Matthew Ratcliffe, Jacob J. Ross, S. Murray, Henry P. Stapp & Douglas F. Watt (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means - Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
     
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  36. Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) (2006). Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers.
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  37. Matthew Ratcliffe (2006). "Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
    This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity (...)
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  38. Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary Psychology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):47-63.
    This article draws out an epistemological tension implicit in Cosmides and Tooby's conception of evolutionary psychology. Cosmides and Tooby think of the mind as a collection of functionally individuated, domain-specific modules. Although they do not explicitly deny the existence of domain-general processes, it will be shown that their methodology commits them to the assumption that only domain-specific cognitive processes are capable of producing useful outputs. The resultant view limits the scope of biologically possible cognitive accomplishments and these limitations, it will (...)
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  39. Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). Folk Psychology and the Biological Basis of Intersubjectivity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80 (56):18-.
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  40. Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). The Feeling of Being. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):43-60.
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  41. Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). William James on Emotion and Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
    William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition and affect, James (...)
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  42. S. A. J. Stuart & M. Ratcliffe (2005). Metaphysics. Philosophical Books 46 (1):83-86.
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  43. Hannah Bartholomew, Jonathan Osborne & Mary Ratcliffe (2004). Teaching Students “Ideas‐About‐Science”: Five Dimensions of Effective Practice. Science Education 88 (5):655-682.
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  44. Matthew Ratcliffe (2004). How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):179-184.
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  45. Matthew Ratcliffe (2004). Interpreting Delusions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.
    This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of (...)
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  46. Matthew Ratcliffe (2004). Realism, Biologism and 'the Background'. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):149 – 166.
    John Searle claims that intentional states require a set of non-intentional background capacities in order to function. He insists that this 'Background' should be construed naturalistically, in terms of the causal properties of biological brains. This paper examines the relationship between Searle's conception of the Background and his commitment to biological naturalism. It is first observed that the arguments Searle ventures in support of the Background's existence do not entail a naturalistic interpretation. Searle's claim that external realism is part of (...)
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  47. Lynda Thomas, Mark Ratcliffe & Benjy Thomasson (2004). Can Object (Instance) Diagrams Help First Year Students Understand Program Behaviour? In A. Blackwell, K. Marriott & A. Shimojima (eds.), Diagrammatic Representation and Inference. Springer. 368--371.
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  48. Mary Ratcliffe (2003). Science Education for Citizenship: Teaching Socio-Scientific Issues. Open University Press.
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  49. Matthew Ratcliffe (2003). Paul Sheldon Davies,Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Function. A Bradford Book. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001; Peter McLaughlin,What Functions Explain: Functional Explanation and Self-Reproducing Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Del Ratzsch,Nature, Design, and Science: The Status of Design in Natural Science. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. [REVIEW] Metascience 12 (3):312-321.
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  50. Matthew Ratcliffe (2003). Paul Sheldon Davies,. A Bradford Book. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001; Peter McLaughlin,. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Del Ratzsch,. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. [REVIEW] Metascience 12 (3):312-321.
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