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  1. Mark Rowlands, Animals That Act for Moral Reasons.
    Non-human animals (henceforth, “animals”) are typically regarded as moral patients rather than moral agents. Let us define these terms as follows: 1) X is a moral patient if and only if X is a legitimate object of moral concern: that is, roughly, X is something whose interests should be taken into account when decisions are made concerning it or which otherwise impact on it. 2) X is a moral agent if and only if X can be morally evaluated–praised or blamed (...)
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  2. Mark Rowlands (2013). Animals and Moral Motivation: A Response to Clement. Journal of Animal Ethics 3 (1):15-24.
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  3. Mark Rowlands (2013). Enactivism, Intentionality, and Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):303-316.
    Enactivism has, perhaps, come to mean different things to different people. The version of enactivism that I am going to build on in this paper is that defended in my book The New Science of the Mind (henceforth NSM). That view is, I think, recognizably enactivist. Others might disagree, and I myself not only characterized it in other terms but was careful to distinguish it from other views that fall under the rubric "enactivist." However, the view I defended is, I (...)
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  4. Mark Rowlands (2013). Sartre, Consciousness, and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):521-536.
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  5. Mark Rowlands (2012). Can Animals Be Moral? Oup Usa.
    Can animals act morally? Philosophical tradition answers 'no,' and has apparently convincing arguments on its side. Cognitive ethology supplies a growing body of empirical evidence that suggests these arguments are wrong. This groundbreaking book assimilates both philosophical and ethological frameworks into a unified whole and argues for a qualified 'yes.'.
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  6. Mark Rowlands (2012). ¿Pueden los animales ser morales? Dilemata 9:1-32.
    La distinción dicotómica entre agentes y pacientes morales está ampliamente reconocida y bien asentada en filosofía moral. Los animales, en el caso de ser considerados como poseedores de estatuto moral alguno, son, casi invariablemente, reconocidos como pacientes morales más que como agentes. La tesis principal de este artículo sostiene que hay una tercera opción: mientras los animales son pacientes morales, en lugar de agentes morales, pueden ser también sujetos morales, donde: X es un sujeto moral si y solamente si X (...)
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  7. Mark Rowlands (2012). Reprezentowanie bez reprezentacji. Avant 3 (1).
    [Przekład] Mamy do czynienia z problemem reprezentacji oraz aparatury reprezentacji, która została wynaleziona do rozwiązania tego problemu. Artykuł ten ma dwa cele. Po pierwsze: pokaże on, dlaczego problem reprezentowania przerasta aparaturę reprezentacji w takim sensie, że nawet jeżeli pozbędziemy się owej aparatury, problem pozostanie. Po drugie: wykaże, że pytanie o to, czy poznanie to proces angażujący, czy nieangażujący reprezentacje, to pytanie słabo zdefiniowane i zbyt uproszczone, by mogło pomóc w zrozumieniu natury procesów poznawczych.
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  8. Mark Rowlands (2012). Representing Without Representations. Avant 3 (1):133-144.
    There is a problem of representation and an apparatus of representations that was devised to solve this problem. This paper has two purposes. First, it will show why the problem of representation outstrips the apparatus of representations in the sense that the problem survives the demise of the apparatus. Secondly, it will argue that the question of whether cognition does or not involve representations is a poorly defined question, and far too crude to be helpful in understanding the nature of (...)
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  9. Mark Rowlands (2011). Friendship and Animals: A Reply to Fröding and Peterson. Journal of Animal Ethics 1 (1):70-79.
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  10. Mark Rowlands (2011). Intentionality and Embodied Cognition. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):81-97.
    The theses of embodied and extended cognition are usually regarded as recherché doctrines, at odds with common sense. They are also, typically, regarded as theses that must be evaluated by way of their implications for the development of cognitive science. If they cohere with the likely trajectory of cognitive science they can be accepted. If they do not, they must be rejected. This paper argues against both these claims. At the conceptual heart of the theses of embodied and extended cognition (...)
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  11. Mark Rowlands (2011). Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Topoi 30 (2):175-180.
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  12. Mark J. Rowlands (2011). Friendship and Animals, Again: A Response to Fröding and Peterson. Journal of Animal Ethics 1 (2):190-194.
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  13. Mark Rowlands (2010). Consciousness Broadly Construed. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.
     
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  14. Mark Rowlands (2010). Responding to Animals. Common Knowledge 16 (2):351-360.
    Émilie Hache and Bruno Latour argue in their article “Morality or Moralism?” that contemporary moral treatments of animals exhibit a hard-won insensitivity, and a corresponding inability to respond, to the “call” of animals—to the moral claims that animals legitimately make on us. In responding, Rowlands commends aspects of this thesis but argues that Hache and Latour have improperly formulated it. Rather than being an inability to respond to the call of animals, contemporary moral treatments of the moral claims of animals (...)
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  15. Mark Rowlands (2010). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. A Bradford Book.
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  16. Mark Rowlands (2010). 16 What is Cognition? Extended Cognition and the Criterion of the Cognitive. Proceedings of the British Academy 158:317.
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  17. Mark Rowlands (2009). Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Animal rights and moral theories -- Arguing for one's species -- Utilitarianism and animals : Peter Singer's case for animal liberation -- Tom Regan : animal rights as natural rights -- Virtue ethics and animals -- Contractarianism and animal rights -- Animal minds.
     
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  18. Mark Rowlands (2009). Enactivism and the Extended Mind. Topoi 28 (1):53-62.
    According to the view that has become known as the extended mind , some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed (partly) of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. Enactivist models understand mental processes as (partly) constituted by sensorimotor knowledge and by the organism’s ability to act, in appropriate ways, on environmental structures. Given the obvious similarities between the two views, it is both tempting and common (...)
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  19. Mark Rowlands (2009). Extended Cognition and the Mark of the Cognitive. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1 – 19.
    According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM) , at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an (...)
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  20. Mark Rowlands (2009). Situated Representation. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge. 117--133.
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  21. Mark Rowlands (2009). The Extended Mind. Zygon 44 (3):628-641.
    According to the view known variously as the extended mind (Clark & Chalmers 1998), vehicle externalism (Hurley 1998; Rowlands 2003, 2006) active externalism (Clark and Chalmers 1998), locational externalism (Wilson 2004) and environmentalism (Rowlands 1999), at least some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed, partly (and, on most versions, contingently), of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. More precisely, what I shall refer to as the (...)
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  22. Mark Rowlands (2008). Fame. The Philosophers' Magazine 43:15-23.
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  23. Mark Rowlands (2008). From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.
    To adopt a first-person perspective on consciousness is typically understood as a matter of inwardly engaging one's awareness in such a way as to make one's conscious states and their properties into objects of awareness. When awareness is thus inwardly engaged, experience functions as both act and object of awareness. As objects of awareness, an experience-token and its various properties are items of which a subject is aware. As an act of awareness, an experience-token is that in virtue of which (...)
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  24. Mark Rowlands (2008). Box Clever. The Philosophers' Magazine 43 (43):117-118.
    The value of individualism lies in its promotingthe possibility of selfrealisation: the idea, very roughly, that people should maximize their abilities and potentialities, thus becoming all they can be. You do this through the choices you make and your willingness to learn from those choices. However, it can’t be that any choice counts as self-realisation. If absolutely anything you do counts as self-realisation, then the idea of self-realisation is vacuous.
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  25. Mark Rowlands (2008). The Philosopher and the Wolf: Lessons From the Wild on Love, Death, and Happiness. Granta.
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  26. Mark Rowlands (2007). Mysterianism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 335--345.
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  27. Mark Rowlands (2007). Understanding the "Active" in "Enactive&Quot;. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):427-443..
    Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This coupling is no accident. The appeal to action is seen either as a way of explaining representation or explaining it away. This paper argues that the appeal to action as a way of explaining, supplementing, or even supplanting, representation can lead to a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the concept of action to which we (...)
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  28. Mark Rowlands (2006). Body Language: Representation in Action. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    This is not to say simply that these forms of acting can facilitate representation but that they are themselves representational.
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  29. Mark Rowlands (2006). Sensorimotor Activity. Psyche 12 (1).
    This paper explores the concept of _sensorimotor activity_ that is central to the enactive model of visual perception developed in Alva Noë’s book, _Action in Perception_. The appeal to sensorimotor activity is, I shall argue, subject to a dilemma. On one interpretation, such activity presupposes representational states, and therefore is unable to aid us in the project of understanding how an organism is able to represent the world. On the other interpretation, sensorimotor activity fails to accommodate the essential normativity of (...)
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  30. Mark Rowlands (2006). The Normativity of Action. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):401-416.
    The concept of action is playing an increasingly prominent role in attempts to explain how subjects can represent the world. The idea is that at least some of the role traditionally assigned to internal representations can, in fact, be played by the ability of subjects to act on the world, and the exercise of that ability on appropriate occasions. This paper argues that the appeal to action faces a serious dilemma. If the concept of action employed is a representational one, (...)
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  31. Mark Rowlands (2005). Environmental Epistemology. Ethics and the Environment 10 (2):5-27.
  32. Mark Rowlands (2005). Further Watching. The Philosophers' Magazine 30:66-69.
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  33. Mark Rowlands (2004). Keanu's Cartesian Meditations. Think 3 (7):71.
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  34. Mark Rowlands (2003). Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
    Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted (...)
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  35. Mark Rowlands (2003). Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. Acumen.
    An examination of the view that mental states and processes are essentially dependent on the world for their nature and contents.
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  36. Mark Rowlands (2003/2004). The Philosopher at the End of the Universe: Philosophy Explained Through Science Fiction Films. T. Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press.
    The Philosopher at the End of the Universe demonstrates how anyone can grasp the basic concepts of philosophy while still holding a bucket of popcorn. Mark Rowlands makes philosophy utterly relevant to our everyday lives and reveals its most potent messages using nothing more than a little humor and the plotlines of some of the most spectacular, expensive, high-octane films on the planet. Learn about: The Nature of Reality from The Matrix , Good and Evil from Star Wars , Morality (...)
     
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  37. Mark Rowlands (2002). Two Dogmas of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):158-80.
  38. Mark Rowlands (2001). Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts. Mind and Language 16 (3):290-310.
  39. Mark Rowlands (2001). The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative and radical account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the (...)
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  40. M. Rowlands (2000). In Nature's Interests: Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics. Philosophical Review 109 (4):598-601.
  41. Mark Rowlands (1999). Memory. In , The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes. Cambridge University Press.
    In this chapter, the focus switches from perception to memory. I shall argue that the sort of principles which emerged in the discussion of perception also apply to the case of memory. More precisely, I shall argue that precise analogues of the principles P1–P4 occur for at least some memory processes. Consequently, at least some memory processes can be understood not as purely internal processes, but as a series of interactions between a remembering organism and its environment. For at least (...)
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  42. Mark Rowlands (1999). The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes. Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Mark Rowlands challenges the Cartesian view of the mind as a self-contained monadic entity, and offers in its place a radical externalist or environmentalist model of cognitive processes. Drawing on both evolutionary theory and a detailed examination of the processes involved in perception, memory, thought and language use, Rowlands argues that cognition is, in part, a process whereby creatures manipulate and exploit relevant objects in their environment. This innovative book provides a foundation for an unorthodox but increasingly (...)
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  43. Mark Rowlands (1998). Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence. St. Martin's Press.
    The question of the nature and extent of our moral obligations to non-human animals has featured prominently in recent moral debate. This book defends the novel position that a contradictarian moral theory can be used to justify the claim that animals possess a substantial and wide-ranging set of moral rights. Critiquing the rival accounts of Peter Singer and Tom Regan, this study shows how an influential form of the social contract idea can be extended to make sense of the concept (...)
     
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  44. Mark Rowlands (1997). Contractarianism and Animal Rights. Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3):235–247.
    It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non-human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that non-human animals possess direct moral (...)
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  45. Mark Rowlands (1997). Teleological Semantics. Mind 106 (422):279-304.
    Teleological theories of content are thought to suffer from two related difficulties. According to the problem of indeterminacy, biological function is indeterminate in the sense that, in the case of two competing interpretations of the function of an evolved mechanism, there is often no fact of the matter capable of determining which function is the correct one. Therefore, any attempts to construct content out of biological function entail the indeterminacy of content. According to the problem of transparency, statements of biological (...)
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  46. Mark Rowlands (1995). Against Methodological Solipsism: The Ecological Approach. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):5-24.
    This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made (...)
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  47. Mark Rowlands (1995). Externalism and Token-Token Identity. Philosophia 24 (3-4):359-75.
  48. Mark Rowlands (1995). Supervenience and Materialism. Avebury.
    This article argues that weak supervenience is sufficiently strong to establish a reasonable and plausible materialism. Supervenience is a relation between families of properties, Such that, Roughly speaking, Family a supervenes on family b if any objects which are indiscernible with respect to b are thereby indiscernible with respect to a. Weak supervenience is supervenience restricted to one possible world; strong supervenience is a "necessary" supervenience extending across some principled set of possible worlds. These notions are made somewhat more rigorous (...)
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  49. Mark Rowlands (1994). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.
    In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the (...)
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