Among Plato's works, the Statesman is usually seen as transitional between the Republic and the Laws. This book argues that the dialogue deserves a special place of its own. Whereas Plato is usually thought of as defending unchanging knowledge, Dr Lane demonstrates for the first time how, by placing change at the heart of political affairs, Plato reconceives the link between knowledge and authority. The statesman is shown to master the timing of affairs of state, and to use this (...) expertise in managing the conflict of opposed civic factions. To this political argument corresponds a methodological approach which is seen to rely not only on the familiar method of 'division', but equally on the unfamiliar centrality of the use of 'example'. The demonstration that method and politics are interrelated transforms our understanding of the Statesman and its fellow dialogues. (shrink)
Are the values of business students of today synchronized with the reality of the present business environment? Two hundred twenty-two business students rated the importance of twenty corporate goals. Moreover, the students rated the same goals as they perceived chief executive officers (CEOs) would have rated them. Significant differences were found between the two ratings, with students ranking social and employee-oriented goals as more important than they perceived CEOs would have.
Lane, K. A., Banaji, M. R., Nosek, B. A., & Greenwald, A. G. (2007). Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: IV. What we know (so far) (Pp. 59–102). In B. Wittenbrink & N. S. Schwarz (Eds.). Implicit measures of attitudes: Procedures and controversies . New York: Guilford Press. PDF - 652KB ].
Communication and Conflict Management Training for Clinical Bioethics Committees Content Type Journal Article Pages 341-349 DOI 10.1007/s10730-009-9116-7 Authors Lauren M. Edelstein, Johns Hopkins Medicine’s Howard County General Hospital 5755 Cedar Lane Columbia MD 21044 USA Evan G. DeRenzo, Washington Hospital Center Center for Ethics 110 Irving St Washington, D.C. NW 20010 USA Elizabeth Waetzig, Change Matrix Inc. 485 Maylin St. Pasadena CA 91105 USA Craig Zelizer, Georgetown University Department of Government 3240 Prospect St. Washington, D.C. NW 20057 USA Nneka (...) O. Mokwunye, Washington Hospital Center Center for Ethics 110 Irving St Washington, D.C. NW 20010 USA Journal HEC Forum Online ISSN 1572-8498 Print ISSN 0956-2737 Journal Volume Volume 21 Journal Issue Volume 21, Number 4. (shrink)
Coalitions are frequently more visible than payoffs. The theory of n-person games seeks primarily to identify stable allocations of valued resources; consequently, it gives inadequate attention to predicting which coalitions form. This paper explores a way of correcting this deficiency of game-theoretic reasoning by extending the theory of two-person cooperative games to predict both coalitions and payoffs in a three-person ‘game of status’ in which each player seeks to maximize the rank of his total score. Martin Shubik, ‘Games of Status’, (...) Behavioral Science 17 (1971), 117–129. To accomplish this, we analyze the negotiations within each potential two-person coalition from the perspective of Nash's procedure for arbitrating two-person bargaining games,R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1958, pp. 121–143. then assume that players expect to achieve the arbitrated outcome selected by this procedure and use these expectations to predict achieved ranks and to identify players' preferences between alternative coalition partners in order to predict the probability that each coalition forms.This work is supported by Research Grant SOC72-05245, awarded to the second author by the National Science Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., August 29 – September 2, 1974. We thank Peter C. Ordeshook for suggesting that Nash's arbitration model might be applied to this game, and David Deutsch for assisting us in this research. We test these payoff and coalition predictions with data from three laboratory studies, and compare the results with those attained in the same data by von Neumann and Morgenstern's solution of two-person cooperative games,Luce and Raiffa, op.cit., pp. 115–119. Aumann and Maschler's bargaining set solution for cooperative n-person games,R. J. Aumann and Michael Maschler, ‘The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games’, in M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker (eds.), Advances in Game Theory, Annals Math. Studies, No. 52, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 443–476. and an alternative model of coalition behavior in three-person sequential games of status.For an extension and application of the bargaining set to three-person games of status and a comparison of the bargaining set with our alternative model of coalition behavior in the three laboratory studies reported in this paper, see Richard J. Morrison's Ph.D. thesis, ‘Rational Choice Models of Coalition Formation in the Triad’, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1974 (this dissertation is available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan); and the paper by Laing and Morrison, ‘Sequential Games of Status’, Behavioral Science 19 (1974), 177–197. The coalition model is developed more extensively by Laning and Morrison in “Coalitions and Payoffs in Three-Person Sequential Games: Initial Tests of Two Formal Models”, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 3 (1973), 3–26 (hereinafter cited as ‘Initial Tests of Two Formal Models’). (shrink)
The body of work pre s ented in this issue and the next (Volume 12, Issue 1) arose from a question both editors had separately harboured for some years, namely: what role can philosophy play in the practice and conceptualisation of management? Contemporary discourses within the academic discipline of management have tended to err on the side of science, either in the striving for replicative and iterative advancement in the proof-laden establishment of âfactsâ or, what is worse perhaps, the iterative (...) and replicative containment of knowledge within languages or discourse that force the writer and the reader into narrow confines of thought â" and thus narrow lanes by which to survey the field of enquiry. Indeed the extent of oneâs vision itself becomes constrained such that only those fields readily open to view from the confines of the discourseâs perspective are ever regarded as legitimate; science has a remarkable degree of parochialism built into its very axiology. Unfortunately so too has logic, the ultimate science of philosophy. As the Cambridge mathematician and Harvard metaphysician A.N. Whitehead concluded, âthe final outlook of Philosophic thought cannot be based upon the exact statements that form the basis of the special sciences. The exactness is a fakeâ. (1941: 700) Never has Whiteheadâs assertion been more true and yet more disregarded. (shrink)
Along with the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Straits, the Strait of Hormuz is arguably the most important bottleneck in international navigation because a large part of the global oil production needs to be shipped through this passage, which is only a few kilometers wide. In the context of the dispute about Iran’s nuclear program and new sanctions, Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz for international shipping, effectively cutting off many Western countries from important oil imports. (...) In this article, the legality of such action as well as the legality of the mere threat to close the Strait of Hormuz are investigated. In addition to the International Law of the Sea, general rules of international law and the international law of armed conflict are taken into consideration. Particular emphasis is put on the sovereignty of other states, which is infringed upon by such threats on the part of the Iranian leadership. First, the question has to be answered whether a passage through these waters would be transit passage through a Strait or normal passage through the coastal state’s territorial sea. The authors of the article conclude that the regime of transit passage applies qua lex specialis, as far as the part of the Strait of Hormuz, which is included in Iran’s territorial waters, is concerned. The next step is to ask the question whether preventing such a passage as well as threatening to prevent such a passage are permissible for Iran. In this context, the potential abuse of otherwise permitted traffic separation schemes is highlighted. Traffic separation schemes are of particular importance in narrow but highly frequented bodies of water, such as the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, the contemporary Iranian state practice has received some attention. One issue to be considered in more detail is the requirement that foreign warships receive authorization from the coastal state prior to entry into the territorial sea. This approach might be incompatible with the right to innocent passage under both the Law of the Sea Convention and customary international law, as there is no clear legal source, which provides for this requirement. Finally, the authors look at the question of the legality of the mere threat to close the Strait of Hormuz as opposed to actually closing the Strait. The sovereignty of other states may be affected to such an extent that such threats already amount to a violation of international law. In light of the historic precedents during the Iran-Iraq War, these threats should not be dismissed lightly. Iran would be well advised to refrain from such rhetoric. (shrink)