78 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Mark Textor [68]Markus Textor [6]M. Textor [5]Martin R. Textor [1]
See also:
Profile: Mark Textor (King's College London)
  1. Mark Textor (2010). Proper Names and Practices: On Reference Without Referents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):105-118.
    This is review essay of Mark Sainsbury's Reference without Referents. Its main part is a critical discussion of Sainsbury's proposal for the individuation of proper name using practices.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  2.  85
    Mark Textor (2009). Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions. Erkenntnis 71 (3):395 - 405.
    Michael Devitt has argued that a satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need not assume that they are derived from tacit knowledge of principles of grammar. Devitt’s Modest Explanation is based on a controversial construal of linguistic intuitions as meta-linguistic central-processor judgements. I will argue that there are non-judgemental responses to linguistic strings, linguistic seemings, which are evidence for linguistic theories. Devitt cannot account for their epistemic authority. This spoils his ‘modest explanation’. Devitt’s opponent, the Voice of Competence (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  3.  95
    M. Textor (2010). Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth. Mind 119 (475):615-655.
    According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4.  18
    Mark Textor (2015). Frege’s Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Extended. Mind 124 (495):823-847.
    According to Frege, neither demonstratives nor indexicals are singular terms; only a demonstrative together with ‘circumstances accompanying its utterance’ has sense and singular reference. While this view seems defensible for demonstratives, where demonstrations serve as non-verbal signs, indexicals, especially pure indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, seem not to be in need of completion by circumstances of utterance. In this paper I argue on the basis of independent reasons that indexicals are in fact in need of completion; I identify the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  20
    Mark Textor (2015). "Inner Perception Can Never Become Inner Observation”: Brentano on Awareness and Observation. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (10).
    Self-representational theories of consciousness hold that a mental phenomenon is conscious if, and only if, it presents, among other things, itself. But in conscious perception one may lose oneself in the object perceived and not be aware of one’s perceiving. The paper develops a Brentano-inspired response to this objection. He follows Aristotle in holding that one is aware of one’s perceiving only ‘on the side’: when one perceives something one’s perception neither is nor can become observation of itself. I argue (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  24
    Mark Textor & Dolf Rami (2015). Proper Names: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. Erkenntnis 80 (2):191-194.
    Proper names play an important role in our understanding of linguistic ‘aboutness’ or reference. For instance, the name-bearer relation is a good candidate for the paradigm of the reference relation: it provides us with our initial grip on this relation and controls our thinking about it. For this and other reasons proper names have been at the center of philosophical attention. However, proper names are as controversial as they are conceptually fundamental. Since Kripke’s seminal lectures Naming and Necessity the controversy (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  74
    Mark Textor (2007). Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended. Mind 116 (464):947-982.
    Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8.  88
    Mark Textor (2009). A Repair of Frege's Theory of Thoughts. Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
    Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  43
    M. Textor (2011). Is 'No' a Force-Indicator? No! Analysis 71 (3):448-456.
    No categories
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  69
    Mark Textor (2010). Frege's Concept Paradox and the Mirroring Principle. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):126-148.
    Frege held that singular terms can refer only to objects, not to concepts. I argue that the counter-intuitive consequences of this claim ('the concept paradox') arise from Frege's mirroring principle that an incomplete expression can only express an incomplete sense and stand for an incomplete reference. This is not, as is sometimes thought, merely because predicates and singular terms cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate ( congruitate ). The concept paradox, properly understood, poses therefore a different, harder, challenge. An investigation of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  55
    Markus Textor (2010). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege on Sense and Reference. Routledge.
    The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege On Sense and Reference helps the student to get to grips with Frege's thought, and introduces and assesses:the ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Mark Textor (2010). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege on Sense and Reference. Routledge.
    Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) is considered the father of modern logic and one of the founding figures of analytic philosophy. He was first and foremost a mathematician, but his major works also made important contributions to the philosophy of language. Frege’s writings are difficult and deal with technical, abstract concepts. The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege On Sense and Reference helps the student to get to grips with Frege’s thought, and introduces and assesses: the background of Frege’s philosophical work Frege’s main (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  11
    Gabriel Segal & Mark Textor (2015). Hope as a Primitive Mental State. Ratio 28 (2):207-222.
    We criticize attempts to define hope in terms of other psychological states and argue that hope is a primitive mental state whose nature can be illuminated by specifying key aspects of its functional profile.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  76
    Mark Textor (2011). Knowing the Facts. Dialectica 65 (1):75-86.
    Keith Hossack argues in his The Metaphysics of Knowledge(2007) that knowledge is a simple and metaphysically fundamental relation between a thinker and a fact: knowledge is uptake of fact. Facts are conceived as combinations of particulars and universals, distinct from true propositions. Hossacks's general argument is, roughly, that one can define central philosophical concepts (belief, content, justification, etc.) if one assumes that knowledge is primitive, but that knowledge cannot be defined in terms of such concepts. In this paper, I will (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  58
    Mark Textor (2006). Brentano on Inner Consciousness. Dialectica 60 (4):411-432.
    I offer a reconstruction of Brentano's view of inner consciousness and show how Brentano prevented a regress of higher-order mental acts.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  9
    Mark Textor (2001). Logically Analytic Propositions: A Posteriori? History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (1):91 - 113.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  17.  42
    Mark Textor (2013). Brentano on the Dual Relation of the Mental. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):465-483.
    Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  1
    Mark Textor & Jocelyn Benoist (2000). Bolzano et Husserl sur l'analyticité. Les Etudes Philosophiques:435-454.
    L'auteur expose la tentative faite par Bolzano de définir le concept de proposition en soi analytique à l'aide du concept de variation de représentation. Puis, il discute les difficultés qui résultent de ce modèle quant à la définition bolzanienne du concept étroit de vérité logiquement analytique ou de vérité logique. En conclusion, il compare la définition bolzanienne du concept de proposition en soi analytique et la définition husserlienne: celle-ci se découvre être une application de l'idée fondamentale de Bolzano — employer (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  19.  85
    Mark Textor (2009). Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's Challenge, Frege's Answer. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82.
    Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  12
    Mark Textor (1997). Bolzano's Sententialism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 53:181-202.
    Bolzano holds that every sentence can be paraphrased into a sentence of the form "A has b". Bolzano's arguments for this claim are reconstructed and discussed. Since they crucially rely on Bolzano's notion of paraphrase, this notion is investigated in detail. Bolzano has usually been taken to require that in a correct paraphrase the sentence to be paraphrased and the paraphrasing sentence express the same proposition. In view of Bolzano's texts and systematical considerations this interpretation is rejected: Bolzano only holds (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  37
    Mark Textor (forthcoming). States of Affairs. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  49
    Mark Textor (1998). Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
    Most discussions of Kripke's Naming and Necessity focus either on Kripke's so-called "historical theory of reference" or his thesis that names are rigid designators. But in response to problems of the rigidity thesis Kripke later points out that his thesis about proper names is a stronger one: proper names are de jure rigid. This sets the agenda for my paper. Certain problems raised for Kripke's view show that the notion of de jure rigidity is in need of clarification. I will (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  47
    Mark Textor (2010). Reviews the Unity of the Proposition . By Richard Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, Pp. XII+455. Isbn: 78-0-19-923945-0. £60. [REVIEW] Philosophy 85 (4):563-567.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  27
    Mark Textor (2001). 'Portraying' a Proposition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):137-161.
    Hector-Neri Castaneda claimed in several papers that a proposition expressed by an indexical sentence can be re-expressed by means of an oratio obliqua clause that contains a quasi-indicator. Robert M. Adams and Rogers Albritton have presented a counter-argument that is accepted by Castaneda himself. I will argue that the Adams/Albritton argument is not convincing: The argument uses several assumptions which could be disputed. The paper tries to develop a more direct argument against Castaneda’s central claim. If Castaneda’s thesis is false, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  11
    Mark Textor (2013). Unity Without Self: Brentano on the Unity of Consciousness. In D. Fisette & G. Frechette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopî 44--67.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  51
    Mark Textor (2009). Review of Robin D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
  27.  48
    Mark Textor (2007). The Use Theory of Meaning and Semantic Stipulation. Erkenntnis 67 (1):29 - 45.
    According to Horwich’s use theory of meaning, the meaning of a word W is engendered by the underived acceptance of certain sentences containing W. Horwich applies this theory to provide an account of semantic stipulation: Semantic stipulation proceeds by deciding to accept sentences containing an as yet meaningless word W. Thereby one brings it about that W gets an underived acceptance property. Since a word’s meaning is constituted by its (basic) underived acceptance property, this decision endows the word with a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  31
    Mark Textor (2005). Truth Via Sentential Quantification. Dialogue 44 (3):539-550.
    This paper is a critical evaluation of Kuenne's attempt to define truth via quantification into the position of a sentence.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  40
    Mark Textor (2009). 'Demonstrative' Colour Concepts: Recognition Versus Preservation. Ratio 22 (2):234-249.
    Arguments for and against the existence of demonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents of propositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. Shades are conceived as (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  1
    Markus Textor (2003). " Caius-at-Noon" or Bolzano on Tense and Persistence. History of Philosophy Quarterly 20 (1):81-102.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31.  13
    Mark Textor (2013). Bolzano on Conceptual and Intuitive Truth: The Point and Purpose of the Distinction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):13-36.
    Bolzano incorporated Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts into the doctrine of propositions by distinguishing between conceptual (Begriffssätze an sich) and intuitive propositions (Anschauungssätze an sich). An intuitive proposition contains at least one objective intuition, that is, a simple idea that represents exactly one object; a conceptual proposition contains no objective intuition. After Bolzano, philosophers dispensed with the distinction between conceptual and intuitive propositions. So why did Bolzano attach philosophical importance to it? I will argue that, ultimately, the value of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  32
    Mark Textor (2001). Intense Heat Immediately Perceived is Nothing Distinct From a Particular Sort of Pain. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1):43 – 68.
    The paper proposes a novel interpretation of Berkeley's so-called Assimilation Argument in the First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Wolfgang Künnne, Mark Siebel & Mark Textor (eds.) (1997). Bolzano and Analytic Philosophy. Rodopi.
    Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Vorbemerkung/Preface. Dagfin FØLLESDAL: Bolzano's Legacy. Jan BERG: Bolzano, the Prescient Encyclopedist. Jan SEBESTIK: Bolzano, Exner and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Paul RUSNOCK: Bolzano and the Traditions of Analysis. Peter SIMONS: Bolzano on Collections. Ali BEHBOUD: Remarks on Bolzano's Collections. Mark SIEBEL: Variation, Derivability and Necessity. Edgar MORSCHER: Bolzano's Method of Variation: Three Puzzles. Rolf GEORGE: Bolzano's Programme andObjects. Mark TEXTOR: Bolzano's Sententialism. Wolfgang KÜNNE: Propositions in Bolzano and Frege. Michael DUMMETT: Comments on Wolfgang Künne's Paper. Carsten (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  28
    Mark Textor (2001). Does the Truth-Conditional Theory of Sense Work for Indexicals? Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):119-137.
    The truth-conditional theory of sense holds that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as a theory of sense: if knowledge of a theory of truth for a language L is sufficient for understanding utterance of L-sentences, the T-sentences of the theory 'show' the sense of the uttered object-language sentences. In this paper I aim to show that indexicals create a serious problem for this prima facie attractive theoretical option. The so-called 'instantiation problem' is that a truth-theory (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  15
    Mark Textor (2013). 'Thereby We Have Broken with the Old Logical Dualism'–Reinach on Negative Judgement and Negation. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):570 - 590.
    Does (affirmative) judgement have a logical dual, negative judgement? Whether there is such a logical dualism was hotly debated at the beginning of the twentieth century. Frege argued in ?Negation? (1918/9) that logic can dispense with negative judgement. Frege's arguments shaped the views of later generations of analytic philosophers, but they will not have convinced such opponents as Brentano or Windelband. These philosophers believed in negative judgement for psychological, not logical, reasons. Reinach's ?On the Theory of Negative Judgement? (1911) spoke (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  6
    Mark Textor (2011). Sense-Only-Signs: Frege on Fictional Proper Names. Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):375-400.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  30
    Mark Textor (2004). Has the Ethics of Belief Been Brought Back on the Right Track? [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 61 (1):123-142.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  23
    Mark Textor (2004). What Brentano Criticizes in Reid. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (1):75 – 92.
  39.  25
    Mark Textor (2008). Samples as Symbols. Ratio 21 (3):344-359.
    Nelson Goodman and, following him, Catherine Z. Elgin and Keith Lehrer have claimed that sometimes a sample is a symbol that stands for the property it is a sample of. The relation between the sample and the property it stands for is called 'exemplification' (Goodman, Elgin) or 'exemplarisation' (Lehrer). Goodman and Lehrer argue that the notion of exemplification sheds light on central problems in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. However, while there seems to be a phenomenon to be captured, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  11
    Mark Textor (2013). Cambridge Companion to Frege. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):189-200.
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 189-200, January 2013.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  18
    Mark Textor (2004). Reconstructing Frege. Philosophical Books 45 (3):197-208.
  42.  12
    Mark Textor (2007). Papers on Time and Tense by Kit Fine. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Philosophy 82 (2):361-365.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  3
    Mark Textor (2010). Frege on Conceptual and Propositional Analysis. Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):235-257.
    In his Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege aims to extend our a priori arithmetical knowledge by answering the question what a natural number is. He rejects conceptual analysis as a method to acquire a priori knowledge . Later he unsuccessfully tried to solve the problems that beset conceptual analysis . If these problems remain unsolved, which rational method can he use to extend our a priori knowledge about numbers? I will argue that his fundamental arithmetical insight that numbers belong to concepts (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  7
    Mark Textor (2013). Bolzano on the Source of Necessity: A Reply to Rusnock. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):381 - 392.
    (2013). Bolzano on the Source of Necessity: A Reply to Rusnock. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 381-392. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.692661.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  12
    Mark Textor (2003). Peter Van Inwagen Ontology, Identity and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Pp. IX+261. £45 (Hbk). ISBN 0 521791 64 2. £15.95 (Pbk). ISBN 0 521795 48. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 39 (4):475-479.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  5
    Mark Textor (2000). Knowledge Transmission and Linguistic Sense. Theoria 15 (2):287-302.
    Michael Dummett holds that the sense of a natural language proper name is part of its linguistic meaning. I argue that this view sits uncomfortably with Frege's observation that the sense of a natural language proper name varies from speaker to speaker. Moreover, the thesis under discussion is not supported by Frege's views on communication. Recently Richard Heck has tried to develop an argument which is intended to show that assertoric communication with sentences containing proper names is only possible if (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  7
    Mark Textor (2003). "Caius-at-Noon" or Bolzano on Tense and Persistence. History of Philosophy Quarterly 20 (1):81 - 102.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Mark Textor (2007). Papers on Time and Tense. [REVIEW] Philosophy 82 (320):361-365.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. MM McCabe & Mark Textor (eds.) (2008). Perspectives on Perception.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  1
    Georg Meggle, Andreas Kemmerling & Mark Textor (eds.) (2004). Ethics of Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism. De Gruyter.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 78