Despite the economic relevance and distinctiveness of family firms, little attention has been devoted to researching their nature and functioning. Traditionally, family firms have been associated both to positive and negative features in their relationships with the stakeholders. This can be linked to different orientations toward corporate social responsibility. Thus, this research aims to identify the approaches that Spanish family firms maintain about social responsibility, based on the model developed by Quazi and O Brien Journal of Business Ethics 25, 33–51 (...) (2000). An empirical study carried out for 112 Spanish family firms gives support to our initial assumption about these organizations not being a homogeneous group in terms of their orientation towards corporate social responsibility. The differences in perceptions do not seem to be associated to biographical characteristics. These results lead to some relevant academic and practical implications that suggest interesting lines for future research. (shrink)
Despite the economic relevance and distinctiveness of family firms, little attention has been devoted to researching their nature and functioning. Traditionally, family firms have been associated both to positive and negative features in their relationships with the stakeholders. This can be linked to different orientations toward corporate social responsibility. Thus, this research aims to identify the approaches that Spanish family firms maintain about social responsibility, based on the model developed by Quazi and O' Brien Journal of Business Ethics 25, 33-51 (...) (2000). An empirical study carried out for 112 Spanish family firms gives support to our initial assumption about these organizations not being a homogeneous group in terms of their orientation towards corporate social responsibility. The differences in perceptions do not seem to be associated to biographical characteristics. These results lead to some relevant academic and practical implications that suggest interesting lines for future research. (shrink)
It is shown that the before-before (or Suarez-Scarani) experiment refutes hidden variable models with a deterministic (“realistic”) nonlocal part, whereas experiments violating Leggett-type inequalities refute models with biased random local part. Therefore the claim that Gröblacher et al. (Nature 446:871–875, 2007) present “an experimental test of nonlocal realism” is misleading, and Marek Żukowski’s (Found. Phys. 38:1070, 2008) comment misses the point. A new experiment is suggested.
Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9465-5 Authors James Ladyman, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Rd, Bristol, BS8 1TB UK Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Mauricio Suárez, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA Journal Metascience (...) Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)
Abstract Widespread cheating among business students has been a great concern for educators and business managers in the West, but this issue is largely unexamined in Eastern cultures. This study explores the relationship between cheating at school and cheating in the real world in an international context by investigating Chinese business students’ perception of ethicality and practicality of common business practice. The results show that many Chinese students have engaged in academic dishonesty at school. It was further found that Chinese (...) students have a good understanding of what constitutes ethical behaviors in the real business world and the need for such behaviors. They also believe that business people fail to act in an ethical manner, yet they are unwilling to compromise their ethical standards in order to get ahead in their future career, except when they have a strong need for competitive success. The findings show that Chinese business students view the ethicality of an action as being more important than its practicality in the real business world even though they hold a completely opposite view in their classrooms. Concern arises when self-centered values like competitive success become more accepted in modern Chinese society. Content Type Journal Article Category Original Paper Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s13520-011-0012-2 Authors Zhenzhong Ma, Odette School of Business, University of Windsor, 401 Sunset Ave, Windsor, ON, Canada N9B 3P4 Journal Asian Journal of Business Ethics Online ISSN 2210-6731 Print ISSN 2210-6723. (shrink)
Nuestro propósito se cifra en esta ocasión, en mostrar los motivos filosóficos que condujeron al Martin Heidegger a introducir la metafísica suareciana en la configuración de su ontología existenciaria. Tomaremos como hilo conductor la historia del ser y más en concreto, la de su olvido en favor del ente y que Heidegger desarrolló en diferentes escritos como un momento negativo, fundamental y previo a la exposición de su concepción de la Metafísica. En este relato dejaremos anotado, la función capital que (...) para el proyecto heideggeriano de reinterpetación de la Metafísica desempeñó, la idea de la metafísica griega y en particular de la aristotélica alcanzada por el pensador alemán. Abordaremos este problema con cierta extensión pues sostenemos que el concepto de la metafísica suareciana manejado por Heidegger está determinado por su comprensión de la Metafísica de Aristóteles. Y que se resume en su conocida interpretación onto-teológica. En último término, el peso de la reflexión heideggeriana sobre la metafísica de Suárez, recae sobre el concepto de existencia y su modo de aprehensión que es comprendido como un antecedente moderno e imperfecto del Dasein como vía de acceso al Ser. (shrink)
A discussion of Suarez's views on continuous quantity in the context of his place in the history of philosophy. The paper raises issues about conceptual change in intellectual history. It advances original interpretations of Aristotle and Suarez on continuous quantity.
Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) publicou em 1597 sua obra-prima em metafísica, as Disputationes metaphysicae. Na trigésima terceira Disputa – o objeto deste artigo – Suárez defende primeiramente a substância sobtrês aspectos: como “ens per se” (uma entidade independente), como o que permanece no tempo, e como o suporte fundamental de acidentes. Secundariamente, ele utiliza três distinções com o objetivo de articular a noção de substância: substâncias completas e incompletas, substâncias perfeitas e imperfeitas, e a distinção entre substância primeira e (...) substância segunda. Uma gota d’água, por exemplo, é uma primeira substância completa, mas relativamente imperfeita. Em comparação com ela, a alma humana é uma primeira substância incompleta, mas mais perfeita. A regra é: quanto mais perfeita, tanto mais incompleta. Por trás dessas distinções, Suárez elabora um aspecto dinâmico da substância. A abordagem é aristotélica, sem incluir aspectos de filosofia social ou filosofia existencial. (shrink)
Comments on Roger Ariew’s “Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suarez," presented at Franscico Suarez, S.J.: Last Medieval or First Early Modern?, London, Ontario, University of Western Ontario, September 2008.
Modem neo-Confucianism is studied at two levels, one is at the historical level and the other at the academic level. Modern neo-Confucianism at the historical level was developed in the modern context, but its basic content belongs to the traditional Confucianism or the study of Confucian classics. Modem neo-Confucianism at the academic level recognizes both the deficiencies of the traditional Confucianism and rationality of western learning, and dedicates itself to the modernization of Confucianism. Though Ma Yifu's moral philosophy is developed (...) in the context of modem Chinese culture, it fails to deal with the problem of modern transformation of Confucian ethical values and its content still belongs to the traditional Confucianism. So it should be labeled as the modern neo-Confucianism in the historical sense. In this paper, the author makes a systematic exploration and an evaluation of Ma Yifu's ethical thought. (shrink)
When a great thinker of the Spanish Golden Age, such as Vitoria, Molina or Suárez, inquires about the fundamental cause which justifies a licit declaration of war, “injury” is included as one of these causes. Here, “injury” is understood as an infringement of a right, an injustice committed and for which restitution has not been made. Among the injuries which may licitly be considered a justification for war, there is the “insult to honor”, especially to the honor of the (...) Nation and the honor of the Sovereign. The difficulty in accepting this justification for war lies in making a demarcation between the interest of the Sovereign and the interest of the People, i.e. the men who make up the community, who are the immediate depositaries of power. For these thinkers, honor is always owed to the People. This is because a State, a Nation, a People, has the right to enjoy respect for its institutions, laws and customs, as an integral part of its own life. (shrink)
En el presente artículo se pretende mostrar la importante función que Suárez tiene reservada a los entes de razón: el aseguramiento de la validez científica. Al respecto resulta fundamental caer en la cuenta de la diferencia entre la quimera y el resto de los entes de razón: negación, relación de razón y privación. Con ello Suárez ha asentado las bases de la manera propiamente barroca de entender el mundo: una realidad extramental para cuyo conocimiento científico requerimos de la (...) introducción del artificio, del ente de razón; aunque Suárez tiene aún en mente el modelo de ciencia aristotélica, basado en la relación de universalidad, lo que le hace despreciar los entes de razón matemáticos. En todo caso, creemos que los entes de razón ayudan a comprender la singularidad de la metafísica barroca respecto al ontologismo posterior. Nos situamos así, críticamente, frente a las interpretaciones marcadamente ontologistas de la metafísica de Suárez. (shrink)
Freiheitsentziehende Maßnahmen in Altenpflegeheimen sind unter pflegerischen und ethischen, aber auch betreuungsrechtlichen und vor allem strafrechtlichen Gesichtspunkten von besonderer Bedeutung. Häufig sind eingeschränkte Mobilität, Verringerung der kognitiven Funktionen, große Hilfsbedürftigkeit des älteren Menschen der auslösende Faktor für den Einsatz derartiger Einschränkungen. Daneben gibt es jedoch Hinweise, dass die Anwendung freiheitsentziehender Maßnahmen auch mit organisatorischen Abläufen in Altenpflegeeinrichtungen zusammenhängt. Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert, wieweit freiheitsentziehende und freiheitsbeschränkende Maßnahmen bei alten Menschen überhaupt zulässig sind und zeigt auf, dass die Entwicklung von alternativen (...) Betreuungs- und Versorgungsansätzen dazu beitragen kann, dass durch weniger freiheitsentziehende Maßnahmen in der stationären Pflege die Würde der alten Menschen gewahrt bleibt. (shrink)
For Berkeley, a thing's existence 'esse' is nothing more than its being perceived 'as that thing'. It makes no sense to ask (with Samuel Johnson) about the 'esse' of the mind or the specific act of perception, for that would be like asking what it means for existence to exist. Berkeley's "existere is percipi or percipere" (NB 429) thus carefully adopts the scholastic distinction between 'esse' and 'existere' ignored by Locke and others committed to a substantialist notion of mind. Following (...) the Stoics, Berkeley proposes that, 'as' the existence of ideas, minds "subsist" rather than "exist" and, accordingly, cannot be identified as independently existing things. (shrink)
No presente texto, faço uma discussão das idéias de Júlio Cabrera, apresentadas no artigo “Sentido e valor da vida: uma diferença crucial”. Procuro mostrar, contra Cabrera, que a questão sobre o sentido da vida está imbricada com a questão do valor da vida. Argumento que, a favor de Cabrera, podemos identificar um valor negativo na vida, mas, contra ele, podemos identificar também um valor positivo. Seu pessimismo advém de uma visão parcial da realidade, uma vez que ele (...) rejeita, sem uma justificativa adequada, a possibilidade de uma experiência mística redentora. Na discussão do vitalismo de tipo nietzschiano com que Cabrera termina seu texto, argumento que a tese segundo a qual a vida se auto-sustenta em seu desvalor envolve um contrabando filosófico nessa constatação vital básica. Tento mostrar também que filosofia e vida não se opõem radicalmente, como pensa Cabrera, e que nisso segue o espírito da oposição estabelecida por Nietzsche entre verdade e vida. A complexidade do real só pode ser sugerida pelo discurso racional, através do apelo à complementaridade descritiva, que envolve a combinação de uma pluralidade de descrições do mesmo domínio do real. Isso revela as limitações do discurso racional, que só pode ser superado pela intuição silenciosa. Esta última não parece ter sido devidamente considerada por Cabrera. (shrink)
Suárez held that the vital faculties of the soul are really distinct from the soul itself and each other and that they cannot causally interact. This means that he needed to account for the connections between the activities of the faculties: they both interfere with and contribute to each other’s activities. Suárez does so by giving the soul a direct causal role in these activities. This role requires the unity of the soul of a living being and (...) class='Hi'>Suárez used it to argue against the view that a living being, in particular a human being, has more than one soul. This line of thought displays some affinity with arguments for the simplicity of the soul from the unity of consciousness. One important difference is that Suárez was talking not just about mental activities but about all vital activities. (shrink)
A Richard Rorty se le considera hoy en día como uno de los filósofos más importantes de Norteamérica. Es posible que esta afirmación sea discutible; lo indiscutible es que, a juicio de los críticos, es el mejor escritor filosófico después de Bertrand Russell….
Interpreters disagree on the origin that Francisco Suárez assigns to political obligation and correlative political subjection. According to some, Suárez, as other social contract theorists, believes that it is the consent of the individuals that causes political obligation. Others, however, claim that for Suárez, political obligation is underived from the individuals' consent which creates the city. In support of this claim they invoke Suárez's view that political power emanates from the city by way of "natural resultancy". (...) I argue that analysis of Suárez's less studied De voto and De iuramento reveals that, for Suárez, consent causes both the city and the citizen's political obligation. Moreover, close inspection of the notion of causation by natural resultancy within Suárez's metaphysics shows that what emanates from the body politic in this fashion is not, as claimed, political subjection and political obligation, but rather the city's right to self-mastership. Because for him political obligation does originate in consent it is not incorrect to regard Suárez as a social contract theorist. (shrink)
This article discusses Suárez''s views concerning the transcendentals, that is, being and those attributes of it that extend to everything. In particular it explores Suárez''s notion of transcendentality and the way in which he conceived the transcendental attributes of being are related to it. It makes two claims: First, that Suárez has an intensional, rather than an extensional understanding of transcendentality; and, second, that Suárez''s understanding of truth and goodness, as expressing real extrinsic denominations based on (...) real relations, appears to contain an inconsistency. (shrink)
Arnauld's criticisms as "a model of confusion confounded.” In a review of Wilson's book, R. McRae refers to "the difficult and not too coherent subject of material falsity. '' J. Cottingham describes the Descartes-Arnauld debate on the material falsity of adventitious ideas as "an involved and rather inconclusive exchange " and claims that the example of the material falsity of such ideas espoused by Descartes in Meditation III is "needlessly complicated. " A. Kenny, in turn, notes that several things are (...) "confusing in Descartes' account of false ideas. " Later reference is made to the fact that "Descartes appears confused. [...] and that "Descartes, it seems, cannot give a consistent answer. '' As will become clear, I take issue with each of these assessments. When Descartes' position on material falsity is understood in the light of late Scholastic sources, especially Suarez, whence it draws its strength and inspiration, the alleged confusion and incoherency vanishes. .. (shrink)
In this paper I will explore certain key features of Francisco Suarez's account of God's action in the world, with an eye toward explaining his view of the precise way in which God concurs with--that is, makes an immediate causal contribution to--free action in general and sinful action in particular. Suarez agrees with his mainly Thomistic opponents that God is an immediate cause of every effect produced by creatures--including every free act and, a fortiori , every sinful act elicited by (...) creatures with a rational or 'free' nature. But he differs markedly from them in his account of how it can be plausibly maintained that God permits sin without causing sin or, to put it somewhat differently, how it can be plausibly maintained that the moral defectiveness of a sin is not traceable to God as a source. (shrink)
During the seventeenth century Francisco Suárez was considered one of the greatest philosophers of the age. He was the last great Scholastic thinker and profoundly influenced the thought of his contemporaries within both Catholic and Protestant circles. Suárez contributed to all fields of philosophy, from natural law, ethics, and political theory to natural philosophy, the philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychology, and--most importantly--to metaphysics, and natural theology. Echoes of his thinking reverberate through the philosophy of Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, (...) and beyond. Yet curiously Suárez has not been studied in detail by historians of philosophy. It is only recently that he has emerged as a significant subject of critical and historical investigation for historians of late medieval and early modern philosophy. Only in recent years have small sections of Suárez's magnum opus, the Metaphysical Disputations, been translated into English, French, and Italian. The historical task of interpreting Suárez's thought is still in its infancy. The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez is one of the first collections in English written by the leading scholars who are largely responsible for this new trend in the history of philosophy. It covers all areas of Suárez's philosophical contributions, and contains cutting-edge research which will shape and frame scholarship on Suárez for years to come--as well as the history of seventeenth-century generally. This is an essential text for anyone interested in Suárez, the seventeenth-century world of ideas, and late Scholastic or early modern philosophy. (shrink)
This article deals with the question of Suárez’s conception of being, which prima facie seems to oscillate between a Scotistic univocal conception anda conception of being according to the analogy of intrinsic attribution. The paper intends to show that Suárez’s doctrine can in no way be interpreted as representative of the univocal conception, and proceeds in six steps. First, it highlights the importance of the Uncommon Doctor’s theory of the unity of both the formal and the objective concepts (...) of being. In the second part, the paper asks how the concept of being can, without any internal differentiation and structure, give rise to the different relations that it has to the natures subordinated to it. In the second and the third parts, this question receives an answer against the backgroundof Suárez’s critique of Scotus’s conception, and with the help of his theory of the radical intimate transcendence of being. In the fourth section, there follows anexposition of Suárez’s doctrine on the explication of the concept of being. The fifth section offers a brief presentation of the significance of esse for ratio entis. Inthe last section, the author places his interpretation in the general context of the Metaphysical Disputation. (shrink)
Suarezii de formis, universalibus, notitia intellectiva sententiaSententia Suarezii circa quaestionem famosam de statu universalium variissimis modis ab diversis interpretibus exponi solet. In disertatio quidem proposita res paulo aliter pertractatur, a Suarezii metaphysica doctrina de formis substantialibus et de cognitione intellectiva ac sctientia exeundo. Quae Suarezii doctrinae diligenti analysi subiciuntur earumque conexio consideratur. Respectu quaestione supradicta, scil. quaenam fuit vera Suarezii de statu universalium sententia, arguitur, Suarezium nominalismum moderatum professum esse, quae conclusio suadetur ex doctrinis suis de formis substantialibus et de (...) cognitione intellectiva. Translatio: Lukáš NovákSuárez on Forms, Universals and UnderstandingThe interpretations in the secondary literature of Suárez’ position in the “classical” debate on the status of universals vary considerably. In this article, the problem is looked at from a slightly different angle: that of Suárez’ basic metaphysics of substantial forms and his views concerning understanding and knowledge. These areas of Suárez’ thought are thoroughly analysed and related to each other. Regarding the question of the status of universals it is argued that Suárez’ thought in the areas of substantial forms and of understanding generally supports the reading of Suarez as a “moderate nominalist”. (shrink)
Franciscus Suarez de additione Unitatis ad Ens et prioritate Unitatis respectu MultitudinisSolutio quaestionis de natura additionis conceptuali Unius ad Ens, quam Suarez proponit, traditionem Aristotelico-Averroisticam (per Aquinatum mediatam) primo sequitur. Secundum hanc traditionem, Unum non superaddit Enti nisi determinationem negativam. Suárez similiter negat Unum dicere perfectionem positivam ab Ente ut sic distinctam, sive ex natura rei, sive ratione tantum. Sententiam suam exponens, Suarez multas alias conceptiones critice pertractat, praecipue autem doctrinam auctorum quorundam (plerumque Franciscanorum) impugnat, qui docent Unum superaddere (...) ad Ens perfectionem quandam positivam, quae tamen ratione tantum ab Ente ut sic distinguitur. Argumentum principale pro ista sententia assumit, indivisionem ut negationem negationis intelligendam esse, quae dicit affirmationem. Secundum Suarezium istam notionem indivisionis etiam D. Thomas defendit, qui negationem, quam Unum dicit, divisionem unius entis ab altero negare tenet. Istam solutionem Suarez reicit, sententiam propriam proponens, secundum quam Unum non negativam divisionem unius entis ab alio, sed intrinsecam et essentialem divisionem unius entis in semetipso negat, quae est divisio realis et positiva. Hac explicatione innitens Suarez consequenter doctrinam Aquinatis et Thomistarum de prioritate concpetuali Unius prae Multitudine, quem ut solutionem difficultatis in doctrina Aristotelis de oppositione privativa Unius ad Multum repertae confecerunt, reicit. Suárez prioritatem realem indivisionis prae divisione, itemque et realem et conceptualem prioritatem Unius prae Multo defendit. Haec Suarezii sententia cum doctrina eius de additione mere negativa Unius ad Ens bene consona esse videtur. Translatio: L. NovákFrancisco Suárez on the Addition of the One to Being and the Priority of the One over the ManySuárez’s solution to the problem of the conceptual Addition of the One to being follows firstly the Aristotelian-Averroistic tradition mediated by Aquinas. According to this tradition, the One adds to being only a negative determination. Suárez claims that the One does not signify any positive perfection either really or conceptually distinct from being as such. Suárez’s own solution to the problem is presented in a critical discussion with many different conceptions, but Suárez pays most attention to the theory of certain, mainly Franciscan, authors who hold that the One adds to being a positive perfection which is only conceptually distinct from being as such. The main argument for this thesis is based on the assumption that indivision is to be taken as a double negation, by which an affirmation is expressed. This concept of indivision was, according to Suárez, also defended by Aquinas, who holds that the negation which is expressed by the One negates the division of one being from another. Suárez rejects this solution and proposes his own conception, according to which the One does not negate the negative moment of the division of one being from another, but the positive moment of an essential division of a being in itself. The One thus negates a real positive division of being in itself. On the basis of this theory, Suárez further rejected Aquinas’s (and the Thomistic) conception of a conceptual priority of the One over the Many, which was put forth as an answer to the old Aristotelian problem of a privative opposition between the One and the Many. Suárez defends the real priority of an indivision over a division as well as a real and conceptual priority of the One over the Many. Suárez’s conception seems to us to be compatible with his concept of a negative Addition of the One to being. (shrink)
Beings of reason or non-existent objects have always been a source of mind-boggling paradoxes that have vexed philosophers and thinkers in the past and present. Consider Bertrand Russell’s paradox: “if A and B are not different, then the difference between A and B does not subsist. But how can a non-entity be the subject of a proposition?” Or Meinong’s paradox: “There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects.” At the root of these troubling conundrums (...) are two basic questions: What are beings of reason? What kind of existence do they have? Francisco Suárez was well aware that a solution to the metaphysical questions concerning the essential character of beings of reason and their ontological status would serve as the key to solving the puzzles and paradoxes just described. A solution to these metaphysical questions would also bring about an understanding of how we talk about beings of reason and other problems that they give rise to in the philosophy of language. In this paper, I present Suárez’s view on the nature andontological status of beings of reason and clarify some of the following questions: What kind of beings (entia) are beings of reason? What kind of being (esse) do beings of reason have? This latter concern is related to the following metaphysical issues: What are real beings? What is the nature and ontological status of possible beings? What is the distinction between real beings, actual beings, and possible beings? (shrink)
De indole Suarezii doctrinae metaphysicaeTractatio proposita septem principales proprietates Francisci Suarezii doctrinae metaphysicae describit: scil. “univocalisationem” conceptus entis eiusque passionum; “reificationem” actu et potentiae, “ontologisationem” individualitatis, “conceptualisationem” Scotisticae doctriane, “existentialem” naturamconceptus entis, “epistemologisationem” et “methodologisationem” metaphysicae. Quarum cum quinque priores bene intra scholasticam traditionem maneant, relictae duae iam methodologicam prioritatem subiectivitatis, qua philosophia modernorum insignitur, praesignant. Translatio: Lukáš NovákThe nature of Suárez’s metaphysicsThe paper presents seven basic features of Francisco Suárez’s metaphysics. They are as follows: “Univocalization” of the (...) concept of being and transcendental properties, “reification” of the act-potency doctrine, “ontologization” of individuality, “conceptualization” of the Scotist perspective, “existential” character of the concept of being, “epistemologization” and “methodologization” of metaphysics. Whereas the first five are indicated as remaining in the preserve of the traditional scholastic philosophy, the last two are taken as portending the methodological priority of the subjective states of affairs of early modern “main-stream” philosophy. (shrink)
In the fiftieth disputation of his Disputationes metaphysicae (1597), Francisco Suárez distinguishes three notions of time. Suárez offers an account of the ways in which the predicate ‘when’ can be taken and presents a more general perspective based on the principle of duration, rather than the Aristotelian definition of time. His view differs from Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ account because Suárez emphasizes that time cannot be reduced to the number of the movement of the last sphere in the (...) Aristotelian model of the cosmos. The intrinsic duration of a thing is its true time; this duration can be taken in an absolute or a relative sense. In an absolute sense, intrinsic time is an internal property of a thing that cannot be really distinguished from existence itself and cannot be compared with other durations. In a relative sense, we can imagine this intrinsic duration as filling up a certain interval within an infinitely extended imaginary succession. This imaginary succession is an ens rationis. The third concept of time is the Aristotelian notion: this is just an extrinsic time, a measurement of one movement by means of a comparison with another movement, especially the motion of the last sphere. Finally, in order to show the value of Suárez’s insights, I compare them with some contemporary issues in the analytic philosophy of time. (shrink)
In hac dissertatione primo ostendo Cartesii “argumentum a priori” contra formas substantiales proprie intelligendum esse ex definitione formae substantialis, quam F. Suarez proposuit, et ex ipsius argumentis a priori pro ea. Hoc quidem argumentum Cartesianum non nisi polemicam vim habere videtur, nam Cartesius potius ex superioritate explanationum mechanicarum a se percepta formas substantiales impugnavit. Tamen ipsum factum, Cartesium scil. in doctrinamSuarezianam de forma substantiali incurrisse, doctrinae Suarezianae auctoritatem et famam contestatur. Aliis verbis, Descartes sane demonstrationem, qua Suarezii argumenta ad absurdum (...) reducentur, maiori momenti esse exspectavit quam argumentationem contra doctrinam Thomisticam de forma substantiali. Secundo ostendo definitionem Suarezianam formae substantialis novam conceptionem causalitatis formalis exegisse. Suarez causalitatem formalem ad modum unionis formae substantiali cum materia limitavit, quo pacto vim eius in philosophia naturali diminuit significantiamque causarum materialis ac efficientis in nova philosophia mechanistica anticipavit. Hoc modo serior metaphysica scholastica indirecte velut dispositionem fundamentalem praebuit ad rerum naturalium explanationes mechanisticas recipiendas ac sustinendas.In this paper I first show that Descartes’ a priori argument against substantial forms is properly understood against the background of Suárez’s definition of and a priori arguments for the substantial form. Even though Descartes’ a priori argument appears to have only a polemical value since his own path to the elimination of substantial forms was based on the perceived superiority of mechanical explanations, the fact that Descartes targeted Suárez’s account of the substantial form in his polemical argument bears witness to its widespread influence. In other words, Descartes expected that a proof that reduced Suárez’s argument to absurdity would have a greater impact than an argument directed against Aquinas’ account of substantial forms. Secondly, I show that Suárez’s definition of the substantial form prompted a reconceptualization of the role of formal causality. Suárez limits formal causality to the mode of union between the substantial form and matter, thus deemphasizing its importance to natural philosophical explanations and anticipating the emphasis on material and efficient causes typical of the new mechanical philosophy. In this indirect manner, late Scholastic metaphysics provided a general framework in which mechanical explanations of natural phenomena could find a place and take hold. (shrink)
In this groundbreaking book, Daniel D. Novotny explores one of the most controversial topics of Suarez's philosophy: "beings of reason." Beings of reason are impossible intentional objects, such as blindness and square-circle.
Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) sieht es als Problem an, dass nach dem traditionellen Modell der Kunstproduktion der Gedanke immer nur als Vorkonzeption und damit auf sehr vermittelte Weise in das Kunstwerk eingeht.
Leibnizii Disputatio de Principio Individui et F. SuarezIn hac dissertatione primitiae laborum philosophicorum Leibnizii, scil. Disputatio metaphysica de Principio Individui, examinantur et quidem itam ut Leibniziisententia cum doctina Suarezii in Disputationibus Metaphysicis proposita comparetur. Lebnizii et Doctoris Eximii de hoc principio opiniones in multis concordant: Uterque enim auctor quaestionem de individuatione pure ontologice pertractat, uterque idem principium individuationis materialibus et immaterialibus tribuit, uterque nominalismo quodammodo favet. Hoc ex conclusionibus, quas defendunt, elucet, et modo, quo sententias adversarias(Scotisticam praesertim) impugnant, confirmatur. Affinitas (...) quaedam non solum inter dictorum auctorum doctrinam de principio individuationis conspicitur, sed et alibi, e. g. in doctrina de distinctione inter essentiam et existentiam, de untiate transcendentali eiusque habitudine ad ens, de principiis substantialirum materialium apparet.Leibniz’s Disputatio de Principio Individui and F. SuárezThe article examines the first fruit of Leibniz´s philosophical endeavour, which is his baccalaureate thesis Disputatio metaphysica de Principio Individui, on thebackground of the comparison with Suárez´s conception of individual unity in his Disputationes Metaphysicae. Despite Suárez´s more differentiated attitude to the issue of individuation in general, the author is convinced that one can find strong parallels between both authors, namely the following: purely ontological treatment of the problem of the principle of individuation; search for a single principle which is common both to material and nonmmaterial substances; nominalist tendency, which is apparent not only in the positive statements of the two authors, but also in their criticisms of rival solutions in general, and theScotist conception in particular. The similarities are not limited only to the principle of individuation or to the problem of individual unity in general but they also extend to the problem of the distinction between essence and existence, the conception of transcendental unity and its relation to ens, or to the problem of reification of hylemorphic components of material substances. (shrink)
(2011). Theory in Health Promotion Research and Practice: Thinking outside the Box. Patricia Goodson. Boston, MA: Jones and Bartlett. 2010. 245, pp. $78.95. Educational Studies: Vol. 47, No. 6, pp. 583-588.
Temperature reconstructions indicate that the Pliocene was approximately 3°C warmer globally than today, and several recent reconstructions of Pliocene atmospheric CO2 indicate that it was above pre-industrial levels and similar to those likely to be seen this century. However, many of these reconstructions have been of relatively low temporal resolution, meaning that these records may have failed to capture variations associated with the 41 kyr glacial–interglacial cycles thought to have operated in the Pliocene. Here we present a new, high temporal (...) resolution alkenone carbon isotope-based record of pCO2 spanning 3.3–2.8 Ma from Ocean Drilling Program Site 999. Our record is of high enough resolution (approx. 19 kyr) to resolve glacial–interglacial changes beyond the intrinsic uncertainty of the proxy method. The record suggests that Pliocene CO2 levels were relatively stable, exhibiting variation less than 55 ppm. We perform sensitivity studies to investigate the possible effect of changing sea surface temperature (SST), which highlights the importance of accurate and precise SST reconstructions for alkenone palaeobarometry, but demonstrate that these uncertainties do not affect our conclusions of relatively stable pCO2 levels during this interval. (shrink)
Suárez's discussion of time in the Metaphysical Disputations is one of the earliest long treatises on time (extending over sixty pages), and includes detailed arguments supporting the view that physical actions take place within an absolute temporal reference frame. Whereas some previous thinkers, such as John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureole, had made tantalising suggestions that time exists independently of physical changes, their ideas were primarily negative theses in response to perceived problems with the dominant view that time was (...) caused by the celestial motion. Suárez, in contrast, provides a positive thesis based on his revision of traditional, Scholastic metaphysics. He argues that the ordering of earlier and later events can only be understood by conceiving events as existing within the embrace of a ?flowing and successive space? which he refers to as ?entirely necessary and immutable in its own flux? (omnino necessarium et immutabile in suo fluxu) - something at least very like an absolute temporal reference frame. Yet it would be simplistic to describe Suárez's work on time only in terms of its nascent absolutism, since for him there is a second kind of time, a more properly ?real? time, which is an accident of material being. This kind of time is ontologically tied to the most intimate existence of objects, creating a plurality of individual continua of time - one for each distinct being. He calls this kind of time ?intrinsic time? (tempus intrinsecum). Suárez's dualistic account of time, in which he proposes an ?intrinsic time?, linked to being, which exists within a second order absolute temporal reference frame, or ?imaginary succession?, forms a bridge between scholasticism and early modern philosophy providing a foundation for the work of later absolutists like Gassendi and Newton. (shrink)
Die bei Krebserkrankungen junger Frauen erforderliche Chemo- bzw. Strahlentherapie kann in der Folge bei den betroffenen Patientinnen zur Unfruchtbarkeit führen. Somit werden die Betroffenen oft gleichzeitig mit einer potentiell lebensbedrohlichen Erkrankung und einem potentiell kinderlosen Leben konfrontiert. Die derzeitigen Methoden zum Erhalt der Fertilität sind experimentell, mit therapeutischer Unsicherheit und gesundheitlichen Risiken belastet, dennoch werden sie zunehmend nachgefragt. Die mit dem Angebot fertilitätserhaltender Maßnahmen verbundene derzeitige Beratungspraxis wird in dem hier vorliegenden Beitrag aus ethischer Perspektive hinterfragt. Ausgehend von einer kritischen (...) Würdigung des nach wie vor häufig angewandten Autonomiekonzepts von Beauchamp und Childress wird diskutiert, auf welche Weise die normative Belastbarkeit der Entscheidungsfindung durch die Vulnerabilität der Patientin limitiert sein kann. Als Alternative zum Autonomiekonzept von Beauchamp und Childress wird anschließend eine Entscheidungsfindung auf der Grundlage biographischer Identität in Anlehnung an das Konzept der personalen Autonomie nach Quante erörtert. (shrink)
Cuatro siglos después de la primera edición de las Disputationes Metaphysicae (1597), esa voluminosa obra sigue siendo la mayor aportación de la filosofía española. Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) es el autor de una de las grandes síntesis del pensamiento escolástico. La clave de su pensamiento y de las "Disputationes" se encuentra en la idea de causalidad o acción libre. Desde esta clave se formulan brevemente algunos tópicos: acto y potencia, causalidad, creación. El autor muestra la Metafísica de Suárez desde (...) una óptica existencial y rechaza las acusaciones de abstractismo. (shrink)