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Maja Spener [7]Maja H. Spener [1]
  1. Maja Spener (2013). Moderate Scepticism About Introspection. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1187-1194.
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  2. Maja Spener (2012). Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 381.
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  3. Maja Spener (2011). Disagreement About Cognitive Phenomenology. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 268.
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  4. Maja Spener (2011). Using First-Person Data About Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):165-179.
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  5. Tim Bayne & Maja Spener (2010). Introspective Humility. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
    Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by commonsense, it is also taken for (...)
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  6. Maja Spener (2007). Expecting Phenomenology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):526-527.
    Block's argument against correlationism depends in part on a view about what subjects in certain experiments can be aware of phenomenally. Block's main source of evidence for this view is introspection. I argue that introspection should not be trusted in this respect. This weakens Block's argument and undermines correlationism at the same time.
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  7. Maja Spener (2005). Review of William Robinson, Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9).
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  8. Maja H. Spener (2003). Gilding and Staining the Mind: Introspection and the Metaphysics of Visual Phenomenology. Dissertation, King's College, University of London
     
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