1. Malte Dahlgrün (2010). The Notion of a Recognitional Concept and Other Confusions. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):139 - 160.
    The notion of a recognitional concept (RC) is stated precisely and shown to be unrelated to the proper notion of a perceptually based concept, defining of concept empiricism. More fundamentally, it is argued that the notion of an RC does not reflect a potentially sensible candidate theory of concepts at all and therefore ought to be abandoned from concept-theoretical discourse. In the later parts of the paper, it is shown independently of these points that Fodor's attacks on RCs are in (...)
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  2. Malte Dahlgrün, Concepts: Foundational Issues.
    This dissertation has three parts. Part I, comprising chapters 1 and 2, addresses some basic commitments which must be presupposed in theorizing about concepts. Concepts, to a first approximation, are mental representations that are constituents of thoughts. Chapter 1 attempts to clarify the notion of representing. Chapter 2 reconstructs arguments in the work of Frege against the mental nature of thoughts and (by the same token) of concepts, arguing that they are confused and leave the notion of concepts as mental (...)
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  3. Malte Dahlgrün (2003). The Compositionality Papers. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 57 (4).
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