We argue against a positive case Enoch offers for thinking that there are non-natural normative properties. Enoch had argued that there is a general difference in how we should treat preference disputes and factual disputes--a difference that shows that normative disputes look more like factual disputes than like preference disputes. We argue that that is not so.
Abstract In spite of the officially secular character of public institutional life, including education, religion is a pervasive undercurrent which affects moral education, both at home and in school. In different ways Buddhism, Shinto, Confucian traditions and new religious movements (including Christian elements) are all influential. The nationalist emphasis, which became prominent in the period 1872?1945, was replaced by a deliberately secular social studies or citizenship in keeping with the spirit of the war settlement. Latterly patriotic features have been re?introduced (...) alongside a stated priority for international understanding. Significantly, however, Western thought is nominated alongside Buddhism and Confucianism in government decrees on the curriculum as now integral to Japanese tradition. (shrink)
Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest that (...) we should accept Strawson’s contention that the activity of reasoning with someone about what she ought to do naturally belongs to the interpersonal mode of interaction. I also suggest that reasons for an agent to perform some action are considerations which would be apt to be cited in favor of that action, within an idealized version of this advisory social practice. I then go on to argue that one would take leave of the interpersonal stance towards someone—thus crossing the line, so to speak—in suggesting that she do something one knows she wouldn’t want to do, even following an exhaustive attempt to hash it out with her. An internalist necessity constraint on reasons is defended on this basis. (shrink)
La caricatura de Garzón, que aparece en el periódico El Espectador con el título de Cartones, es una caricatura filosófica, un dibujo del alma humana, en contraste con la de su contemporáneo Osuna que es la clásica caricatura política. Garzón prescinde, en general, de las palabras y critica con humor seco la insensatez. Adopta en sus dibujos del alma una posición ética que repudia el espíritu mercantil de nuestra época. El hombrecillo protagonista de sus dibujos recuerda los hombres grises, creados (...) por Michael Ende, en su novela Momo. En el maletín los hombrecillos de Garzón llevan el tiempo, pero también, como en una caja de Pandora, portan muchos otros de los pseudovalores que los humanos empleamos para autodestruirnos. Sin embargo, en ese mismo maletín muchos hombres llevan la esperanza. La obra de Garzón nos plantea tres desafíos: (I) el problema de la percepción, con la cual vemos y oímos solamente lo que podemos y queremos ver y oir, poniendo en jaque la objetividad; (II) el problema del lenguaje, que resuelve dejando el texto implícito, como Nicolás Gómez Dávila, invitándonos a escribir nuestros propios escolios; (III) el problema del instante y de nuestra inevitable relación con el tiempo, cuyo planteamiento nos deja entrever jirones de Heidegger y de Ende, cuando él dice, al comentar su propia obra que “conocemos desde donde estamos”. Garzón, de muchos de sus Cartones, ha hecho grabados, duplicando en esta forma la energía creadora de su obra periodística, dándose y dándonos un placer estético redoblado con genial generosidad. (shrink)
Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) publicou em 1597 sua obra-prima em metafísica, as Disputationes metaphysicae. Na trigésima terceira Disputa – o objeto deste artigo – Suárez defende primeiramente a substância sobtrês aspectos: como “ens per se” (uma entidade independente), como o que permanece no tempo, e como o suporte fundamental de acidentes. Secundariamente, ele utiliza três distinções com o objetivo de articular a noção de substância: substâncias completas e incompletas, substâncias perfeitas e imperfeitas, e a distinção entre substância primeira e substância segunda. (...) Uma gota d’água, por exemplo, é uma primeira substância completa, mas relativamente imperfeita. Em comparação com ela, a alma humana é uma primeira substância incompleta, mas mais perfeita. A regra é: quanto mais perfeita, tanto mais incompleta. Por trás dessas distinções, Suárez elabora um aspecto dinâmico da substância. A abordagem é aristotélica, sem incluir aspectos de filosofia social ou filosofia existencial. (shrink)
This article by Johannes B. Lotz, S.J., never before translated into English, describes his contacts with Martin Heidegger. First it describes his arrival, along with Karl Rahner, S.J., to pursue doctoral studies in Freiburg im Breisgau and their first experiences with the famous professor. Lotz continues his narrative by mentioning times he met with Heidegger over the subsequent forty years up to the philosopher’s death. With Gustav Siewerth, Max Müller, Bernhard Welte, and Karl Rahner, Lotz belonged to a group of (...) Catholic thinkers influenced—some more, some less—by Martin Heidegger. In Lotz’s view some of Heidegger’s ideas were already found in Aquinas, and a philosophy of Being needed to go beyond existential analysis into religion, revelation, and cultural criticism. (shrink)
This article will examine McCormick's moral epistemology both at the level of how human persons know values and disvalues, which hereinafter will be referred to as synderesis, and at the level of how human persons know the rightness and wrongness of an action, which hereinafter will be referred to as normative moral judgment. On the one hand, from this investigation it appears that McCormick operates with a dual moral epistemology, at least at the level of synderesis. This means that at (...) one point in time it appears that a significant shift may have occurred in his moral epistemology at the level of synderesis. This may also be true at the level of normative moral judgment. On the other hand, McCormick's moral epistemology may in fact be a synthesis, which is the product of development and maturity in his thought process. This article will articulate, examine, and analyse both moral epistemologies. The first moral epistemology is operative in McCormick's writing up until 1983. The second moral epistemology corresponds to McCormick's decision in 1983 to write primarily in the area of bioethics from a theological perspective. Since the year 1983 seems to be the pivotal time when these two moral epistemologies converge, I will refer to the first moral epistemology as “prior to 1983” and I will refer to the second moral epistemology as “after 1983.” Because of the numerous criticisms that surround McCormick's moral epistemology, and the ambiguity that it entails, McCormick needed to articulate his theoretical foundations clearly and develop them systematically and coherently. Numerous moral theologians called for him to do this, yet he never responded. A systematic understanding of McCormick's moral epistemology is not only necessary but crucial in examining various issues in bioethics. It is necessary because it is the basis of moral decision making. It is crucial because the life and death of individuals may hang in the balance. (shrink)