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  1. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo, Priority Monism, Physical Intentionality and the Internal Relatedness of All Things.
    Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. We conclude (...)
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  2. Manuel de Pinedo (2012). Anomalous Monism and Radical Interpretation: A Reply to Dwayne Moore. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 31 (1):99-108.
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  3. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel De Pinedo (2011). Epistemic Virtues and Transparency. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):257-266.
    Transparency is commonly held to be a property of one’s beliefs: it is enough for me to examine an issue to establish my beliefs about it. Recent challenges to first-person authority over the content of one’s beliefs potentially undermine transparency. We start considering some consequences in terms of variations of Moore’s paradox. Then we study cases where, in the process of acquiring and managing beliefs, one pays excessive attention to how reliable, empirically adequate, coherent, or widely accepted they are from (...)
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  4. Manuel de Pinedo (2010). En busca del agente racional. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 29 (2):147-162.
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  5. Manuel de Pinedo & Hilan Bensusan (2009). El escéptico como despertador para sueños en tercera persona. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 28 (1):68-74.
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  6. Manuel de Pinedo & Hilan Bensusan (2009). The Sceptic as an Alarm Clock for Dreams in the Third Person. Teorema 28 (1):68-74.
     
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  7. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo (2008). Holism and Singularity Towards an Ontology of the Unfitting. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17:15-22.
    Holism about thought content – especially coupled with a measure of semantic externalism – can provide us with an attractive account of how thinking relates to the world. It can help us to tell a neat story that starts out with the inseparable entanglement of truth and intelligibility: in order to understand thought, to confront it to the world and to give verdicts about that confrontation, we need to grasp a considerable amount of truths. A variety of positions that emerge (...)
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  8. Manuel de Pinedo & Jason Noble, Beyond Persons: Extending the Personal / Subpersonal Distinction to Non-Rational Animals and Artificial Agents.
    The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agent’s interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to (...)
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  9. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo (2007). When My Own Beliefs Are Not First-Personal Enough. Theoria 22 (1):35-41.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this (...)
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  10. Josep E. Corbi, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Josep L. Prades, Hilan Bensusan, Manuel de Pinedo, Carla Bagnoli & Richard Moran (2007). On Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement. Author's Reply. Theoria 22 (58).
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  11. Manuel de Pinedo (2007). When My Own Beliefs Are Not First-Personal Enough. Theoria 22 (1):35-41.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this (...)
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  12. Manuel de Pinedo & Hilan Bensusan (2006). Brandom on Thought and Reality: Showing Receptivity the Way Out of the Bottleneck. Teorema 26 (1):21-36.
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  13. Manuel de Pinedo & Hilan Bensusan (2006). Una cura para la disyuntivitis: El papel de la experiencia en nuestra visión del mundo. Episteme 26 (1):41-56.
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  14. Manuel de Pinedo (2004). Truth Matters: Normativity in Thought and Knowledge. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (2):137-154.
  15. Manuel de Pinedo (2003). " El conflicto entre continentales y analíticos: dos tradiciones filosóficas", por Luis Sáez Rueda. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 22 (1):108-112.
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  16. Manuel De Pinedo (2002). De la imagen manifiesta a la actitud natural: el lugar de la ciencia en nuestra comprensión del mundo. Daimon 25:145-164.
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  17. Manuel de Pinedo (1997). Mind and World, de John McDowell. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 16 (3):115-117.
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  18. Gerard Casey, Dermot Moran, Manuel de Pinedo, Gary Elkins & Rom Harr (1995). Books Briefly Noted. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):217 – 224.
    Educating the Virtues David Carr Routledge, 1991. Pp. 304. ISBN 0?415?05746?9. £35. The Philosophical Theology of St Thomas Aquinas By Leo J. Elders E. J. Brill, 1990. Pp. 332. ISBN 0?04?09156?4. $74.36. The State and Justice: An Essay in Political Theory By Milton Fisk Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp. x + 391. ISBN 0?521?38966?6. £10.95 pbk. Perspectives on Language and Thought: Interrelations in Development Edited by S. A. Gelman and J. P. Byrnes Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 524. (...)
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