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Marc A. Moffett [9]Marc Moffett [7]
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Profile: Marc Moffett (University of Texas at El Paso)
  1. Marc Moffett, A Paradox of Ideal Rational Inquiry.
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  2. Marc Moffett, Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowing How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence.
    Perhaps it is a pity that the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Conduct have fallen into separate compartments. (It certainly was not so in Socrates’ time, as his interest in the relation between eidos and technê bears witness.) If we studied them together, perhaps we might have a better understanding of both. H.H. Price, Thinking and Representation..
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  3. Marc Moffett, Epistemic Conservatism, Stability, and Self-Trust†.
    “Well, in our country,” said Alice, still panting a little, “you’d generally get to somewhere else—if you run very fast for a long time, as we’ve been doing.”.
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  4. Marc A. Moffett, Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson, The Folk on Know-How: Why Radical Intellectualism Does Not Over-Intellectualize.
    Philosophical discussion of the nature of know-how has focused on the relation between know-how and ability. Broadly speaking, neo-Ryleans attempt to identify know-how with a certain type of ability,1 while, traditionally, intellectualists attempt to reduce it to some form of propositional knowledge. For our purposes, however, this characterization of the debate is too crude. Instead, we prefer the following more explicit taxonomy. Anti-intellectualists, as we will use the term, maintain that knowing how to ? entails the ability to ?. Dispositionalists (...)
     
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  5. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.) (2011). Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This is the book on knowing how-an invaluable resource for philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and others concerned with knowledge, mind, and action.
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  6. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2011). Nonpropositional Intellectualism. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. 161.
  7. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2011). Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowledge How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence. In John Bengson & Marc Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. 3.
     
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  8. Marc Moffett & Greg Ray (2011). The 37th Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy. Synthese 181 (2):181 - 184.
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  9. Marc Moffett (2010). Against A Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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  10. Marc A. Moffett (2010). Against a Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 83-106.
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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  11. Marc A. Moffett (2010). Introduction: Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy. [REVIEW] Synthese 176 (2):151-152.
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  12. John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright (2009). The Folk on Knowing How. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.
    It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. (...)
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  13. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2007). Know-How and Concept Possession. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
    We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can (...)
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  14. Marc Moffett (2007). Know-How and Concept Possession. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
    We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can (...)
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  15. Marc Moffett (2007). Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry. Episteme 4 (3):352-367.
    According to one widely held view, a belief is fully justified only if it holds up against the strongest available counterarguments, and we can be appropriately confident that it does hold up only if there is free and open critical discussion of those beliefs between us and our epistemic peers. In this paper I argue that this common picture of ideal rational group inquiry interacts with epistemic problems concerning reasonable disagreement in a way that makes those problems particularly difficult to (...)
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  16. Marc A. Moffett (2003). Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift. Philosophical Studies 115 (1):81-97.
    The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form `the that p strongly suggests that `that-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositionaldenotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that `that-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the logical operation (...)
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