29 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Marc Slors [28]Marc V. P. Slors [1]
  1. Marc Slors (forthcoming). Conscious Intending as Self-Programming. :1-20.
    Conscious intending as self-programming. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.803922.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2014). Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading. Topoi 33 (1):173-184.
    In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Marc Slors (2012). Belichaamde sociale cognitie: consequenties voor de status van'theory of mind'. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Wijsbegeerte 104 (3).
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Marc Slors (2012). The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory. Inquiry 55 (5):521-542.
    Abstract ?Theory of Mind? (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is mostly sub-personal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers a novel explanation of the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible with (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Leon Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2011). Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2011). Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Marc Slors (2010). Neural Resonance: Between Implicit Simulation and Social Perception. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):437-458.
    Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have recently argued against a simulationist interpretation of neural resonance. Recognizing intentions and emotions in the facial expressions and gestures of others may be subserved by e.g. mirror neuron activity, but this does not mean that we first experience an intention or emotion and then project it onto the other. Mirror neurons subserve social cognition, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, by being integral parts of processes of enactive social perception. I argue that the notion of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Marc Slors (2009). The Narrative Practice Hypothesis and Externalist Theory Theory: For Compatibility, Against Collapse. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Marc Slors (2008). The Importance and Limits of Phenomenological Mind. Abstracta 4 (3):34-44.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Marc Slors & Cynthia Macdonald (2008). Rethinking Folk-Psychology: Alternatives to Theories of Mind. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):153 – 161.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Nina P. Azari & Marc Slors (2007). From Brain Imaging Religious Experience to Explaining Religion: A Critique. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 29 (1):67-85.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Marc V. P. Slors (2007). Intentional Systems Theory, Mental Causation and Empathic Resonance. Erkenntnis 67 (2):321-336.
    In the first section of this paper I argue that the main reason why Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory (IST) has been perceived as behaviourist or antirealist is its inability to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. The rest of the paper is devoted to the claim that by emending the theory with a phenomenon called ‘empathic resonance’ (ER), it can account for the various explananda in the mental causation debate. Thus, IST + ER is a much more (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Marc Slors & Nina Azari (2007). From Brain Imaging Religious Experience to Explaining Religion: A Critique. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 29 (1):67-85.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Maureen Sie, Marc Slors & Bert van den Brink (eds.) (2004). Reasons of One's Own. Ashgate.
    This book presents a range of investigative essays on the concept of reasons of one's own by leading authors from all relevant philosophical areas of expertise.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Marc Slors (2004). Care for One's Own Future Experiences. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):183-195.
    We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Marc Slors (2004). The Closest Continuer View Revisited. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):387-402.
    Many theories of personal identity allow for the metaphysical possibility of fission. In 1981 Nozick proposed a theory of personal identity called ‘the closest continuer view’ (CCV) that denies fission in the case of persons but allows fisson in the case of human beings. CCV may thus appear to reduce ‘person’ to a nonmetaphysical, practical notion. Against this I argue that CCV is an externalist metaphysical theory that purports to solve a problem that is insurmountable within the confines of an (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Marc Slors (2003). Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):15-36.
    In the first part of this paper I argue that epiphenomenalism does not pose a threat to nonreductive physicalism, if type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy of mental (or in general higher-level) typing of events and/or states. Furthermore, if justifiable induction over folk-psychological regularities is possible independently of the ways in which these regularities are realized, type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy ofmental typing. Inthe second part of this paper I explain how justifiable 'cross-realization induction' can be possible. This explanation (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Marc Slors & Sven Walter (2003). Introduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):1-13.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Marc Slors (2002). Nijmegen University. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie 65:15.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Marc Slors (2001). Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory. Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):186-214.
  21. Marc Slors (2001). Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity. Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):186 - 214.
  22. Marc Slors (2000). Personal Identity and Responsibility for Past Actions. In. In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer. 63--76.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Marc Slors (1999). A Reply to Igor Douven. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):150-152.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Marc Slors (1998). Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Marc Slors (1998). Two Conceptions of Psychological Continuity. Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):61 – 80.
    In this article, I develop and defend a conception of psychological continuity that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of overlapping chains of strongly connected mental states. By recognizing the importance of the (narrative) interrelatedness of qualitatively dissimilar mental contents, as well as the role of the body in psychological continuity, I argue, serious problems confronting the orthodox view can be solved.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Marc Slors (1998). Two Claims That Can Save a Nonreductive Account of Mental Causation. In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 225--248.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Marc Slors (1998). The Kinds of Things. Philosophical Review 107 (3):465-468.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Jan Bransen & Marc Slors (eds.) (1996). The Problematic Reality of Values. Van Gorcum.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Marc Slors (1996). Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):93-98.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation