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Profile: Marcin Miłkowski (Polish Academy of Sciences)
  1. Marcin Miłkowski (2013). Explaining the Computational Mind. MIT Press.
    In the book, I argue that the mind can be explained computationally because it is itself computational—whether it engages in mental arithmetic, parses natural language, or processes the auditory signals that allow us to experience music. All these capacities arise from complex information-processing operations of the mind. By analyzing the state of the art in cognitive science, I develop an account of computational explanation used to explain the capacities in question.
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  2. Marcin Miłkowski (2013). On the Social Nature of Linguistic Prescriptions. Psychology of Language and Communication 17 (2):175-187.
    The paper proposes an empirical method to investigate linguistic prescriptions as inherent corrective behaviors. The behaviors in question may but need not necessarily be supported by any explicit knowledge of rules. It is possible to gain insight into them, for example by extracting information about corrections from revision histories of texts (or by analyzing speech corpora where users correct themselves or one another). One easily available source of such information is the revision history of Wikipedia. As is shown, the most (...)
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  3. Marcin Miłkowski (2013). Wyjaśnianie w kognitywistyce. Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 22 (2):151-166.
    The paper defends the claim that the mechanistic explanation of information processing is the fundamental kind of explanation in cognitive science. These mechanisms are complex organized systems whose functioning depends on the orchestrated interaction of their component parts and processes. A constitutive explanation of every mechanism must include both appeal to its environment and to the role it plays in it. This role has been traditionally dubbed competence. To fully explain how this role is played it is necessary to explain (...)
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  4. Marcin Miłkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kamiński (2013). Naturalizing the Mind. In Marcin Miłkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kamiński (eds.), Regarding the Mind, Naturally: Naturalist Approaches to the Sciences of the Mental. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    The introduction to the volume and the overview of the idea of naturalizing the mind.
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  5. Marcin Miłkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kamiński (eds.) (2013). Regarding the Mind, Naturally: Naturalist Approaches to the Sciences of the Mental. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Naturalism is currently the most vibrantly developing approach to philosophy, with naturalised methodologies being applied across all the philosophical disciplines. One of the areas naturalism has been focussing upon is the mind, traditionally viewed as a topic hard to reconcile with the naturalistic worldview. A number of questions have been pursued in this context. What is the place of the mind in the world? How should we study the mind as a natural phenomenon? What is the significance of cognitive science (...)
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  6. Marcin Miłkowski (2012). Is Computation Based on Interpretation? Semiotica 188 (1):219-228.
    I argue that influential purely syntactic views of computation, shared by such philosophers as John Searle and Hilary Putnam, are mistaken. First, I discuss common objections, and during the discussion I mention additional necessary conditions of implementation of computations in physical processes that are neglected in classical philosophical accounts of computation. Then I try to show why realism in regards of physical computations is more plausible, and more coherent with any realistic attitude towards natural science than the received view, and (...)
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  7. Marcin Miłkowski (2012). Limits of Computational Explanation of Cognition. In Vincent Muller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer.
    In this chapter, I argue that some aspects of cognitive phenomena cannot be explained computationally. In the first part, I sketch a mechanistic account of computational explanation that spans multiple levels of organization of cognitive systems. In the second part, I turn my attention to what cannot be explained about cognitive systems in this way. I argue that information-processing mechanisms are indispensable in explanations of cognitive phenomena, and this vindicates the computational explanation of cognition. At the same time, it has (...)
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  8. Marcin Miłkowski (2011). Beyond Formal Structure: A Mechanistic Perspective on Computation and Implementation. Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):359-379.
    In this article, after presenting the basic idea of causal accounts of implementation and the problems they are supposed to solve, I sketch the model of computation preferred by Chalmers and argue that it is too limited to do full justice to computational theories in cognitive science. I also argue that it does not suffice to replace Chalmers’ favorite model with a better abstract model of computation; it is necessary to acknowledge the causal structure of physical computers that is not (...)
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  9. Marcin Miłkowski (2011). Evolutionist of Intelligence. Introduction. Avant 2 (2).
    It would be hard to find a more fervent advocate of the position that computers are of profound significance to philosophy than Aaron Sloman. Yet, he is not a stereotypical proponent of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Far from it; in his writings, he undermines several popular convictions of functionalists. Through his drafts and polemics, Sloman definitely exerts quite substantial influence on the philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Sloman's paper “Evolution: The Computer Systems Engineer Designing Minds” presents a bold hypothesis that the evolution (...)
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  10. Marcin Miłkowski (2010). Making Naturalised Epistemology (Slightly) Normative. In Konrad Talmont-Kaminski & Marcin Miłkowski (eds.), Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity.
    The standard objection against naturalised epistemology is that it cannot account for normativity in epistemology (Putnam 1982; Kim 1988). There are different ways to deal with it. One of the obvious ways is to say that the objection misses the point: It is not a bug; it is a feature, as there is nothing interesting in normative principles in epistemology. Normative epistemology deals with norms but they are of no use in prac-tice. They are far too general to be guiding (...)
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  11. Konrad Talmont-Kaminski & Marcin Miłkowski (eds.) (2010). Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
    The contributors to this volume engage with issues of normativity within naturalised philosophy. The issues are critical to naturalism as most traditional notions in philosophy, such as knowledge, justification or representation, are said to involve normativity. Some of the contributors pursue the question of the correct place of normativity within a naturalised ontology, with emergentist and eliminativist answers offered on neighbouring pages. Others seek to justify particular norms within a naturalised framework, the more surprising ones including naturalist takes on the (...)
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  12. Marcin Miłkowski (2009). Is Evolution Algorithmic? Minds and Machines 19 (4):465-475.
    In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Daniel Dennett claims that evolution is algorithmic. On Dennett’s analysis, evolutionary processes are trivially algorithmic because he assumes that all natural processes are algorithmic. I will argue that there are more robust ways to understand algorithmic processes that make the claim that evolution is algorithmic empirical and not conceptual. While laws of nature can be seen as compression algorithms of information about the world, it does not follow logically that they are implemented as algorithms by physical (...)
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  13. Marcin Miłkowski (2009). Reprezentacje w systemach klasycznych i koneksjonistycznych. Studia Z Kognitywistyki I Filozofii Umysłu 3.
    Autor artykułu broni tezy, że niektóre systemy obliczeniowe mogą mieć własności semantyczne. Wskazana została klasa systemów obliczeniowych, w których reprezentacje mogą mieć przynajmniej dwie własności: własność odnoszenia się do obiektów (desygnowanie) i własność wspomagania rozpoznawania obiektów oznaczanych przez daną reprezentację (konotowanie). Autor argumentuje także, że własności semantyczne reprezentacji nie zależą wyłącznie od architektury systemów obliczeniowych, w których te reprezentacje występują. Konkretna architektura obliczeniowa nie jest czynnikiem kluczowym, a bodaj najmniej istotne są same rodzaje struktur danych, które mają mieć własności desygnowania (...)
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  14. Marcin Miłkowski (2008). Definining Ontological Naturalism. In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences. Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    Many philosophers use “physicalism” and “naturalism” interchangeably. In this paper, I will distinguish ontological naturalism from physicalism. While broad versions of physicalism are compatible with naturalism, naturalism doesn't have to be committed to strong versions of physical reductionism, so it cannot be defined as equivalent to it. Instead of relying on the notion of ideal physics, naturalism can refer to the notion of ideal natural science that doesn't imply unity of science. The notion of ideal natural science, as well as (...)
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  15. Marcin Miłkowski (2008). When Weak Modularity is Robust Enough? Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):77-89.
    In this paper, I suggest that the notion of module explicitly defined by Peter Carruthers in The Architecture of The Mind (Carruthers 2006) is not really In use in the book. Instead, a more robust notion seems to be actually in play. The more robust notion, albeit implicitly assumed, seems to be far more useful for making claims about the modularity of mind. Otherwise, the claims would become trivial. This robust notion will be reconstructed and improved upon by putting it (...)
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  16. Marcin Miłkowski & Robert Poczobut (eds.) (2008). Analityczna Metafizyka Umysłu: Najnowsze Kontrowersje. Wydawn. Instytutu Filozofii I Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk.
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  17. Marcin Miłkowski (2007). Is Computationalism Trivial? In Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Susan Stuart (eds.), Computation, Information, Cognition: The Nexus and the Liminal. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    In this paper, I want to deal with the triviality threat to computationalism. On one hand, the controversial and vague claim that cognition involves computation is still denied. On the other, contemporary physicists and philosophers alike claim that all physical processes are indeed computational or algorithmic. This claim would justify the computationalism claim by making it utterly trivial. I will show that even if these two claims were true, computationalism would not have to be trivial.
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  18. Marcin Miłkowski (2005). Demokryt w oczach Nietzschego. Nowa Krytyka 15.
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  19. Marcin Miłkowski & Robert Poczobut (2005). Czym jest i jak istnieje umysł? Diametros 3:27-55.
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  20. Marcin Miłkowski (2004). Filozofia jako inżynieria odwrotna: rzecz o naturalizmie Daniela C. Dennetta. Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 50 (2):75-89.
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  21. Marcin Miłkowski (2003). Czy Nietzsche mógł mieć rację? Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki 1 (1):213-235.
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  22. Marcin Miłkowski (2002). Dlaczego Wittgenstein nie był dualistą. Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 44 (4):69-83.
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  23. Marcin Miłkowski (1999). Hegel, Nietzsche I Konserwatyzm. Principia:199-221.
    Deleuze uważa, ze nie można pogodzić Hegla i Nietzschego. Hegel jest wedle niego abstrakcyjny, a Nietzsche - konkretny. Tymczasem pojęcia "konkret" i "abstrakcja" należą do ideologicznego arsenału konserwatyzmu. Rozpatruję nie tyle prawdziwość tezy Deleuza, co jej genealogię. Hegel i Nietzsche kontynuują oświeceniowe poszukiwania "człowieka konkretnego". "Człowiek konkretny" to wytwór drugiej fazy oświecenia (rodzaj "kompensacji" w znaczeniu Marquarda): przekształcenie parenetyki w filozofię historii i kultury (wzgl. społeczną). "Wielki bohater historii" i "nadczłowiek" są próbami ujęcia konkretu społeczno-historycznego. Rzut oka na strukturalną pozycję (...)
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  24. Marcin Miłkowski (1998). Heroizm idylliczny - Epikur w oczach Nietzschego. Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 28 (4):121-135.
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  25. Marcin Miłkowski (1998). Idyllic Heroism: Nietzsche's View of Epicurus. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 15:70-79.
    In this paper, Nietzsche's interpretation of Epicurus is sketched. The ancient philosopher is seen as subscribing to 'idyllic heroism', i.e., heroically adopting an idyllic way of life.
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