In this paper I argue indirectly for Frege's semantics, in particular for his conception of propositions, by reviewing some difficulties faced by one of the main contemporary alternative approaches, i.e., the direct reference theory. While Frege's semantics can yield an explanation of cognitive value and belief-preservation, the alternative approach seems to run into trouble here. I shall also briefly consider the question of whether epistemic issues should be of any concern for semantics, i.e., whether the feature mentioned above should really (...) be regarded as an advantage of Frege's theory. (shrink)
In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.
In this paper, I seek to clarify an aspect of Frege's thought that has been only insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical objects. I adduce some elements of Frege's philosophy that elucidate why he saw extensions as natural candidates for paradigmatic cases of logical objects. Moreover, I argue (against the suggestion of some contemporary scholars, in particular, Wright and Boolos) that Frege could not have taken Hume's Principle instead of Axiom V as a fundamental law of (...) arithmetic. This would be inconsistent with his views on logical objects. Finally, I shall argue that there is a connection between Frege's view on this topic and the famous thesis first formulated in ‘Über Begriff und Gegenstand’ that ‘the concept horse is not a concept’. As far as I know, no due attention has been given to this connection in the scholarly literature so far. (shrink)
Matthias Schirn has argued on a number of occasions against the interpretation of Frege's ``objects of a quite special kind'' (i.e., the objects referred to by names like `the concept F') as extensions of concepts. According to Schirn, not only are these objects not extensions, but also the idea that `the concept F' refers to objects leads to some conclusions that are counter-intuitive and incompatible with Frege's thought. In this paper, I challenge Schirn's conclusion: I want to try and argue (...) that the assumption that `the concept F' refers to the extension of F is entirely consistent with Frege's broader views on logic and language. I shall examine each of Schirn's main arguments and show that they do not support his claim. (shrink)
The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis (i.e., the assumption that judgeable contents are prior to concepts) does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.
El objeto de este libro es mostrar quién fue, qué pensó y cual es el sentido, para nosotros, del pensamiento de Abu al-Ualíd Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Ahmad Ibn Ruxd, en adelante Averroes, nombre que deriva de la latinización del apelativo Ibn Ruxd, nacido en Córdoba en 1126 y muerto en Marrakex en 1181. Su impronta en la cultura de su tiempo le hizo figurar nada menos que entre el auténtico canon onomástico de la teología y (...) la filosofía medievales que supuso La Divina Comedia de Dante, o en el parnaso de la filosofía de Rafael en "La escuela de Atenas". Y eso no resulta incompatible con su peso central en el pensamiento racionalista que marcó el rumbo de la modernidad de donde surge nuestro mundo presente. Averroes supone una cima del pensamiento universal en cualquier tiempo y lugar. Entre los límites cronológicos que encierran una vida como la de Averroes no podemos lograr totalidades, más allá de un conjunto de fragmentos, indicios, referencias indirectas procedentes de datos que nos ofrecen autores contemporáneos o sucesores. El conjunto de todas esas informaciones, que forman la biografía del filósofo, resulta ser muy escaso y poco ilustrativo si lo comparamos con la trayectoria de su pensamiento, un proceso intelectual cuyo prodigioso esfuerzo racional deja en la sombra al Averroes persona en beneficio del Averroes pensador. Frente a los momentos destacados de una vida, cuyos límites espaciales o geográficos vienen determinados por continuos desplazamientos de ida y vuelta entre Córdoba, Sevilla y Marrakex, lugares donde desempeñó cargos oficiales, sobresale un constante y sostenido esfuerzo intelectual plasmado en sus 92 obras escritas en 72 años de vida del filósofo. (shrink)
Em 2011, celebra-se o centenário de morte de Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). Para esta data, no Brasil e no exterior, editoras e universidades vêm se mobilizando, desde o ano passado, para organizar novas edições e eventos acadêmicos sobre o filósofo alemão. Associados à Fundação Fritz Thyssen em Colônia, Alemanha, tradutores de diversos idiomas vêm vertendo a obra para o inglês, o russo e o japonês. Também traduções para o português estão sendo preparadas no Brasil.
O texto é uma resenha de uma obra do filósofo e psicólogo alemão Wilhelm Dilthey. A resenha aborda uma publicação para o português da obra Introdução às ciências humanas (1883), na data em que se celebra o centenário de morte de Dilthey. A iniciativa dessa análise se justifica por ressaltar esta edição que: apresenta ao público brasileiro este autor relativamente pouco conhecido em nosso país; introduz os termos de sua filosofia. Dilthey é pensador crucial para o século XX por ter (...) contestado a influência que doutrina positivista possuiria sobre as ciências humanas (especialmente as sociais, as históricas e as do psiquismo) com seu método hermenêutico. A influência deste pensador se fez sensivelmente presente na obra de autores como Weber, Spengler, Ortega y Gasset e Gadamer. (shrink)
The task of speaking the truth is an infinite labor: to respect it in its complexity is an obligation that no power can afford to shortchange, unless it would impose the silence of slavery (Foucault 1989, p. 308).... the attainment of truth is the outcome of the development of complex and elaborate methods of searching, methods that... in many respects go against the human grain, so they are adopted only after long discipline in a school of hard knocks (Dewey  (...) 1988, pp. 234-35). (shrink)
I try to reconstruct how Frege thought to reconcile the cognitive value of arithmetic with its analytical nature. There is evidence in Frege's texts that the epistemological formulation of the context principle plays a decisive role; it provides a way of obtaining concepts which are truly fruitful and whose contents cannot be grasped beforehand. Taking the definitions presented in the Begriffsschrift,I shall illustrate how this schema is intended to work.
Há pelo menos dois registros diferentes sobre o significado de “direitos”. Segundo um deles, os direitos são relações entre dois termos: uma pessoa e um bem; para o outro, os direitos são relações entre três termos: um indivíduo, uma pessoa e uma ação ou algo. Os registros são diferentes, mas não são totalmente incompatíveis. De acordo com a interpretação de direitos como entitlements, trata-se de direitos morais ou legais, ou seja, as relações de ordem moral ou jurídica das pessoas com (...) bens (de benefícios concedidos a pessoas por uma lei humana, moral ou legal). Como uma espécie de direitos, os direitos humanos são vistos como direitos (entitlements) das pessoas ou dos indivíduos a bens essenciais, dos quais podem-se inferir reivindicações (claims) contra outras pessoas ou contra governos e representantes. Falamos sobre direitos humanos geralmente desta forma. Mas de acordo com o outro registro, os direitos em sentido próprio têm que ser interpretados como claims. Neste artigo, pretendo apresentar alguns argumentos em favor da vantagem de expor todos os enunciados significativos dos direitos como entitlements em termos explícitos de claims. (shrink)
Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Quais sáo as teorias vulgares da moralidade criticadas por Hume na famosa passagem is-ought ? Quais eram seus defensores? Neste ensaio, trato de algumas diferenças entre Hume e Hutcheson que podem iluminar algumas respostas. Hume, ao contrário de Hutcheson, combateu toda forma de separaçáo da natureza humana em componentes naturais e divinos. O conceito de simpatia cumpre uma funçáo essencial nesse aspecto. Há bons indícios de que o jovem Hume adotou no Tratado uma (...) estratégia abertamente crítica a todas as teorias morais defendidas pelos pensadores, religiosos e moralistas de sua época. Isso inclui o voluntarismo contratualista, as éticas racionalistas, bem como as concepções religiosas influenciadas pelo dogmatismo evangélico escocês. Nisso Hume distanciou-se de Hutcheson, pois sua crítica também incluía as visões influenciadas pelas teorias do direito natural com referência na providência divina. A passagem is-ought sinaliza essa intençáo. Todavia, todo esse ímpeto juvenil resultou numa série de maus resultados pessoais, o que o levou, na maturidade a mitigar sua agressividade filosófica e a adotar, em seus escritos, uma atitude mais equilibrada. (shrink)
Neste artigo, procuro extrair algumas conseqüências da lição de Lewis Carroll sobre a diferença entre premissas e regras de inferência no tocante aos raciocínios práticos. Meu questionamento dirige-se à clássica suposição formalista contida na famosa “Lei de Hume”, a saber, a regra formulada, dentre outros, por Richard Hare, de que é logicamente impossível derivar-se uma conclusão moral prática apenas de premissas fatuais. Na primeira parte deste artigo, proponho que o leitor imagine-se numa situação hipotética, na qual adota uma postura evasiva (...) mesmo diante de razões prima facie suficientes para tomar uma certa decisão. A situação apresentada é uma versão do “análogo prático”, engenhosamente construído por G. F. Schueler, ao clássico paradoxo de Lewis Carroll, contido em sua conhecida e genial estória da disputa entre Aquiles e a Tartaruga, publicada originalmente na revista Mind, em 1895. Na segunda parte, relembro e brevemente analiso a fábula carrolliniana, comparando-a com a versão prática de Schueler, discutindo suas analogias e dessemelhanças. Na terceira parte, mostro como as duas estórias são capazes de nos ajudar a desvendar alguns malentendidos sobre o raciocínio prático e sobre suas imbricações com a ética, em especial, com a conhecida tese de que de fatos não derivamos normas. Pretendo mostrar como essa famosa tese é vítima do mesmo vício formalista denunciado por Lewis Carroll, a saber, que é fruto de entendimentos equívocos acerca dos papéis que podem ser desempenhados por uma norma em um raciocínio prático, isto é, que, primariamente, normas, na condição de regras práticas, não figuram propriamente como premissas, e sim como regras especiais ou materiais de inferência. Se minha tese for verdadeira, então a alegação de que não podemos derivar “normas” de “fatos” resulta, na verdade, de um mal-entendido. Na última parte do artigo, destaco algumas outras confusões acerca do significado do termo ‘dever’ tal como esse termo é empregado usualmente em conclusões de raciocínios práticos. Numa referência a Stanley Cavell, sustentarei que o termo ‘dever’ serve-nos, nessa condição, de modo de apresentação do conteúdo das premissas que temos ou das razões que oferecemos para agir de uma certa maneira. Sendo assim, o termo ‘dever’, que usamos para apresentar a conclusão de um raciocínio prático, não pode ser interpretado, de maneira simplista (tal como fazem os defensores de visões kantianas sobre a ética), como tendo o mesmo sentido que o termo ‘obrigação’, cujo significado é mais estrito. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Razões práticas. Racionalidade prática. Raciocínios morais. Raciocínios práticos. Lewis Carroll. David Hume. (shrink)
This article aims at showing that contemporary attempts to rehabilitat Pyrrhonian scepticism do not hold water. I claim that a sceptic of this trend gets stuck in two major dilemmas. The first regards her object of investigation. I argue that, if she holds that her object of investigation is the non-evident truth, she will not be able to distance herself from dogmatism. In turn, if she holds that she seeks to establish sense data propositions, she will not be able to (...) pose herself as an investigator. The second dilemma stems from the sceptical attempt to wipe out dogmatism by developing arguments to the effect that no (dogmatic) proof exists. I contend that those arguments can be viewed either as "good" arguments, in which case the sceptic will be considered just another theorist in possession of an explanation, or as expendable devices, in which case the sceptic will be incapable of carrytng out her anti-dogmatic programme. Either way the sceptical position crumbles. (shrink)
In this article I challenge the current view that Hume is a naturalist as well as a sceptic. I hold he is a peculiar kind of rationalist. I argue that his position is best viewed as a philosophical approach designed to accommodate the tendencies of human nature. This task is carried out by means of a second-order reflection, which turns out to be based upon reason of a non-demonstrative kind. It is brought into clear focus when the mind discovers a (...) conflict between two tendencies. In section one, I highlight this kind of conflict in Hume's account of causal inference. In section two, I unfold the conflict that can be found in his account of our belief in the continued and independent existence of objects. In section three, I show how it is possible to reconcile our tendencies. I maintain that this reconciliation is effected by means of second-order, reason-based arguments. In section four, I examine the status of Hume's scepticism in the light of the preceding account and conclude that his standpoint is not sceptical at all. (shrink)
In this article, I am intent on rehabilitating Strawson's overall anti-sceptical strategy. First, I focus on his earlier attempt, which ignited the debate about the adequacy of transcendental arguments against the sceptic. I present Stroud's main reservation that Strawson's viewpoint is unworkable because it does not take into consideration the view of the external world upon which the sceptic is based in order to challenge our knowledge claims. I then focus on Strawson's later attempt, which is based upon a Humean-like (...) naturalistic strategy. I show that his naturalism is intractable for two reasons: first because it reproduces the proof structure of transcendental arguments and ends up employing a rational proof to counter rational proofs; and second, because it matches the sceptic's advice that we should live according to our natural inclinations without ever trying to justify our beliefs. In the last section, I claim that it is possible to rehabilitate transcendental arguments as sound anti-sceptical proofs if we argue for the senselessness of the idea of thing in itself completely apart from our powers of conceptualisation. (shrink)
Although the notion of logical object plays a key role in Frege's foundational project, it has hardly been analyzed in depth so far. I argue that MarcoRuffino's attempt to fill this gap by establishing a close link between Frege's treatment of expressions of the form ‘the concept F’ and the privileged status Frege assigns to extensions of concepts as logical objects is bound to fail. I argue, in particular, that Frege's principal motive for introducing extensions into his (...) logical theory is not to be able to make in-direct statements about concepts, but rather to define all numbers as logical objects of a fundamental kind in order to ensure that we have the right cognitive access to them qua logical objects via Axiom V. Contrary to what Ruffino claims, reducibility to extensions cannot be the ‘ultimate criterion’ for Frege of what is to be regarded as a logical object. (shrink)
Gould and Lewontin use San Marco, Venice, to criticise the adaptationist program in biology. Following their lead, the architectural term “spandrel” is now widely used in biology to denote a feature that is a necessary byproduct of other aspects of the organism. I review the debate over San Marco and argue that the spandrels are not necessary in the sense originally used by Gould and Lewontin. I conclude that almost all the claims that Gould makes about San (...) class='Hi'>Marco are wrong and that it is reasonable to view the architectural spandrel as an adaptation. The spandrels example has not provided a good illustration of why adaptive explanations should be avoided. In fact, it can be used as an example of how adaptive explanations can be dismissed even when there is evidence in their favour. I also discuss the use of the concept of a spandrel in biology. (shrink)
This paper, drawing on original sources, provides an overview of and a discussion on those writings and ideas, in Antonio Gramsci's huge corpus of work, that are relevant to the education of adults. This should provide a fitting tribute to this major social theorist of the 20th century on the 70th anniversary of his death. Among the topics discussed are those of adult education for industrial democracy, adult education and cultural preparation, adult literacy, prison education, adult education and the (...) Southern Question with specific reference to immigration, and, most important of all, adult education in the context of an intellectual and moral reform. (shrink)
We construct a modular semantic frameworks for LFIs (logics of formal (in)consistency) which extends the framework developed in [1; 3], but includes Marco’s schema too (and so practically all the axioms considered in  plus a few more). In addition, the paper provides another demonstration of the power of the idea of nondeterministic semantics, especially when it is combined with the idea of using truth-values to encode relevant data concerning propositions.
Upshot: In his latest book, Antonio Damasio explores the neural underpinnings of self-consciousness in an evolutionary context, while reconsidering his previous views. His current views may be interesting for constructivists.
The spectacular success of Empire and Multitude has brought Antonio Negri's writing to a new and wider audience. Negri'as work is singular in its depth and expression. It can be difficult to grasp the complexity of his ideas as they are rooted in the history of philosophy. This book offers an introduction to his thinking and is ideal for readers who want to come to grips with his key themes. Contributors include Pierre Macherey, Daniel Bensai;d, Charles Wolfe, Alex Callinicos, (...) Miguel Vatter, Jason Read, Alberto Toscano, Mamut Mutman, Ted Stolze, and Judith Revel. Written with dynamism and originality, the book will appeal to anyone interested in the evolution of Negri's thought, and especially to students of political philosophy, international studies, and literary theory. This book is the sequel to The Philosophy of Antonio Negri, Volume One: Resistance in Practice , but can be read entirely independently. (shrink)
Con motivo del bicentenario del nacimiento de Darwin, esta obra realiza un recorrido por la Teoría de la Evolución a partir del patrimonio bibliográfico y científico de la Universidad de Sevilla. Sus autores muestran la vigencia actual de esta teoría y el papel de Antonio Machado y Núñez, destacado darwinista de la Sevilla de finales del XIX.
What a sublime and, at the same time, sordid vocation this theological discipline has. My major concern is an unfamiliar Antonio Negri, one who engages in some biblical criticism in his recently translated The Labor of Job (2009), a detailed philosophical exegesis of the “marvelous” biblical book of Job.1 Two features of Negri’s analysis stand out: the oppositions of kairós and ákairos, and measure and immeasure. However, before I explore those oppositions in some detail, two preliminary comments are needed. (...) At the heart of the book is what I would like to call a radical homiletics. A discipline much neglected these days, homiletics is really the art of connecting a text like the Bible with the realities .. (shrink)
This collection of specially commissioned essays is the first of its kind in English on the work of Antonio Negri, the Italian philosopher and political theorist. The spectacular success of Empire , Negri's collaboration with Michael Hardt, has brought Negri's writing to a new, wider audience. A substantial body of his writing is now available to an English-speaking readership. Outstanding contributors—including Michael Hardt, Sergio Bologna, Kathi Weeks and Nick Dyer-Witheford—reveal the variety and complexity of Negri's thought and explores its (...) unique relevance to modern politics. Negri is one of the most sophisticated analyists of modern political philosophy. Philosophers and critics alike find his work both difficult and exhilarating, engaging as it does with Marx, Spinoza, Deleuze, Guattari, Tronti and others. This book is ideal for readers who want to get to grips with Negri's key themes, in particular his theories on labour, capital, power, the state and revolution. It makes a great introduction to his work for students of political philosophy, as well as providing a comprehensive critical approach for Negri enthusiasts. (shrink)
From a feminist perspective, I am interested in 'women's ways of knowing' ( Belenky et al., 1997 ) and the relationship between knowledge, difference and power ( Goldberger et al., 1996 ). Here I trace the relevance of Gramsci to my own feminist consciousness, and the part he played in my journey to praxis. I also address feminism's intellectual debts, most particularly in relation to the concept of hegemony. The intellectual context has shifted in emphasis from macro- to micro-narratives which (...) reject Marxism as masculinist and dichotomous. The dilemma has been an overemphasis on the personal-cultural at the expense of the collective-political, distracting us from action for social justice at the same time as globalisation is creating escalating world crises of justice and sustainability. In conclusion, I advocate a re-reading of Gramsci in the light of key feminist critiques of class and patriarchy in order to develop i) analyses based on multiple sites of oppression and ii) action which reaches from local to global through alliances to achieve a more integrated feminist praxis. Throughout, I use 'dis'ability and 'race' to denote the socially constructed nature of these concepts. (shrink)
Through its social and political activism goals, postcolonial feminist theoretical approaches not only focus on individual issues that affect health but encompass the examination of the complex interplay between neocolonialism, neoliberalism, and globalization, in mediating the health of non-Western immigrants and refugees. Postcolonial feminism holds the promise to influence nursing research and practice in the 21st century where health remains a goal to achieve and a commitment for humanity. This is especially relevant for nurses, who act as global citizens and (...) as voices for the voiceless. The commitment of nursing to social justice must be further strengthened by relying on postcolonial theories to address issues of health inequities that arise from marginalization and racialization. In using postcolonial feminist theories, nurse researchers locate the inquiry process within a Gramscian philosophy of praxis that represents knowledge in action. (shrink)
This article examines Nietzsche’s analysis of the phenomenology of agent causation. Sense of agent causation, our sense of self-efficacy, is tenacious because it originates, according to Nietzsche’s hypothesis, in the embodied and situated experience of effort in overcoming resistances. It arises at the level of the organism and is sustained by higher-order cognitive functions. Based on this hypothesis, Nietzsche regards the sense of self as emerging from a homeostatic system of drives and affects that unify such as to maintain self-efficacy (...) levels. He relies on the same hypothesis to explain the emergence of an ascetic moral system and its specific, interpretive-affective ‘mechanism of willing’. The article aligns Nietzsche’s account of agent causation with Albert Bandura’s self-efficacy studies and Antonio Damasio’s recent account of self-systems as homeostatic systems. (shrink)