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Profile: Marek Picha (Masaryk University)
  1.  15
    Marek Picha (2014). Apriorism, Psychologism, and Conceptualism About Thought Experiments. Dokos 2014 (1):27-47.
    Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not fully clear (...)
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  2. Marek Picha (2011). How to Reconstruct a Thought Experiment. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (2):154-188.
    The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemological status of thought experiments. I deal with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, I criticize an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, I introduce the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, I present objections to the (...)
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  3. Marek Picha (2001). Funkcionalismus, Zombie a Absence Mentalistického Slovníku. Filosoficky Casopis 49:857-864.
    [Functionalism, Zombies and the Absence of a Mental Dictionary].
     
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  4. Marek Picha (2004). Squeezing Searle. Filosoficky Casopis 52:721-734.
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