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  1. Margaret A. Crouch (2012). Implicit Bias and Gender (and Other Sorts of) Diversity in Philosophy and the Academy in the Context of the Corporatized University. Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):212-226.
  2. Margaret A. Crouch & Lisa H. Schwartzman (2012). Introduction. Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):205-211.
  3. Margaret A. Crouch (2001). Locke on Language and Reality. Locke Studies 1:87-104.
     
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  4. Margaret A. Crouch (2001). Thinking About Sexual Harassment: A Guide for the Perplexed. OUP USA.
    Thinking About Sexual Harassment aims to provide the information necessary for careful, critical thinking about the concept of sexual harassment. Part I traces the construction of the concept of sexual harassment from the first public uses of the term through its definitions in the law, in legal cases, and in empirical research. Part II analyses philosophical definitions of sexual harassment and a number of issues that have arisen in the law, including the reasonable woman standard and whether same-sex harassment should (...)
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  5. Margaret A. Crouch (2000). Some Questions About Hypocrisy. Social Philosophy Today 15:427-435.
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  6. Margaret A. Crouch (1998). Campus Consensual Relationship Policies. Social Philosophy Today 14:317-343.
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  7. Margaret A. Crouch (1998). The "Social Etymology" of 'Sexual Harassment'. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (3):19-40.
  8. Margaret A. Crouch (1993). A "Limited" Defense of the Genetic Fallacy. Metaphilosophy 24 (3):227-240.
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  9. Margaret A. Crouch (1991). Feminist Philosophy and the Genetic Fallacy. Hypatia 6 (2):104 - 117.
    Feminist philosophy seems to conflict with traditional philosophical methodology. For example, some uses of the concept of gender by feminist philosophers seem to commit the genetic fallacy. I argue that use of the concept of gender need not commit the genetic fallacy, but that the concept of gender is problematic on other grounds.
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