The purpose of this paper is twofold: first we outline a version of non-descriptivism, ‘minimal expressivism’, leaving aside certain long-standing problems associated with conventional expressivist views. Second, we examine the way in which familiar expressivist results can be accommodated within this framework, through a particular interpretation that the expressive realm lends to a theory of meaning. Expressivist theories of meaning address only a portion of the classical problems attributed to this position when they seek to explain why the expressions they (...) deal with have a given meaning. A position can nevertheless be termed ‘expressivist’ – in the minimal sense that we favor – based simply on the following key features of the meaning of these expressions: they can be used as functions of propositions, and they are not used to describe the way the world is. (shrink)
The distinguished philosopher of language, Francois Recanati, has proposed a wide-ranging truth-conditional model of pragmatics. In this collection, various aspects of his theories are addressed by distinguished contributors, and are then commented on or answered by Recanati himself. This allows the reader to be drawn into the central debate within philosophy of language and cognitive science as to what kind of pragmatics system is needed.
El propósito de este artículo es mostrar que las llamadas "teorías de la identidad psiconeural" no tienen la estructura lógica de una teoría genuina de la identidad. Un operador de identidad genuino es un operador de segundo orden, o de órdenes superiores, que convierte predicados n-ádicos en predicados n-1-ádicos. Si las teorias de la identidad psiconeural no son, en realidad, teorías de la identidad, entonces la críticas habituales que usan la Ley de Leibniz y otros rasgos que se relacionan con (...) la identidad no tienen ningún efecto. Así, dos serán las conclusiones: (i) que las llamadas "teorías de la identidad psiconeural" deben de reformularse, de manera que expresen claramente su contenido, y (ii) que las críticas utizadas hasta ahora contra ellas no consiguen su objetivo.The aim of this paper is to show that the so-called "theories of psichoneural identity" do not possess the logical structure of a genuine theory of identity. The identity operator is a second- or higher-order operator that converts n-adic predicates into n-1-ádic ones. If the so-called "theories of psichoneural identity" are not theories of identity at all, then two conclusions follow: (i) these theories of the mind-body relation should state their contents in a more appropiate way, and (ii) the usual criticisms against them, which bear on some features that all idetity theories must hold, as for instance Leibniz Law, leave them untouched. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to discuss Kripkc?s reasons for declaring the existence of both necessary a posteriori as well as contingent a priori statements, thus breaking the traditional extensional coincidence of the two pairs of concepts:necessary?contingent and a priori?a posteriori. As I shall argue, there is no reason, from Kripke?s work at least, to reject the usual picture of the topic The appeal ot his arguments rests on the ambiguity with which his expressions are used and on the (...) introduction o\ new senses for old notions. This does not mean, however, that all Knpke?s and Putnam?s intuitions on singular terms and natural kind nouns are wrong. Once Kripke?s ideas are properly uudeistood, they are much moreharmless then they are presented to be and they do not pose a threat to traditional relations relations between modal and epistemological categories. (shrink)