6 found
Sort by:
See also:
  1. Ian Carter & Maria Paola Ferretti (2013). Introduction. Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (3):191-194.
    In attempting to clarify both the concept of toleration and its role in contemporary society several authors have interpreted it as based on the notion of respect for persons. Persons are due respect as moral agents and as such should be allowed to make their own choices, even if the content of those choices meets with our disapproval. According to a classical understanding of toleration, one can be said to tolerate something if one disapproves of it (this is commonly called (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Maria Paola Ferretti & Sune Lægaard (2013). A Multirelational Account of Toleration. Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (3):224-238.
    Toleration classically denotes a relation between two agents that is characterised by three components: objection, power, and acceptance overriding the objection. Against recent claims that classical toleration is not applicable in liberal democracies and that toleration must therefore either be understood purely attitudinally or purely politically, we argue that the components of classical toleration are crucial elements of contemporary cases of minority accommodation. The concept of toleration is applicable to, and is an important element of descriptions of such cases, provided (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Maria Paola Ferretti & Enzo Rossi (2013). Pluralism Slippery Slopes and Democratic Public Discourse. Theoria 60 (137):29-47.
    Agonist theorists have argued against deliberative democrats that democratic institutions should not seek to establish a rational consensus, but rather allow political disagreements to be expressed in an adversarial form. But democratic agonism is not antagonism: some restriction of the plurality of admissible expressions is not incompatible with a legitimate public sphere. However, is it generally possible to grant this distinction between antagonism and agonism without accepting normative standards in public discourse that saliently resemble those advocated by (some) deliberative democrats? (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Maria Paola Ferretti (2010). Risk and Distributive Justice: The Case of Regulating New Technologies. Science and Engineering Ethics 6 (3): 501-515.
    There are certain kinds of risk for which governments, rather than individual actors, are increasingly held responsible. This article discusses how regulatory institutions can ensure an equitable distribution of risk between various groups such as rich and poor, and present and future generations. It focuses on cases of risk associated with technological and biotechnological innovation. After discussing various possibilities and difficulties of distribution, this article proposes a non-welfarist understanding of risk as a burden of cooperation.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Maria Paola Ferretti (2009). Exemptions for Whom? On the Relevant Focus of Egalitarian Concern. Res Publica 15 (3):269-287.
    Granting differential treatment is often considered a way of placing some groups in a better position in order to maintain or improve their cultural, economic, health-related or other conditions, and to address persistent inequalities. Critics of multiculturalism have pointed out the tension between protection for groups and protection for group members. The ‘rule-and-exemption’ approach has generally been conceived as more resistant to such criticism insofar as exemptions are not conceded to minorities or ethical and religious groups as such, but to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Maria Paola Ferretti & Lenka Strnadová (2009). Rules and Exemptions: The Politics of Difference Within Liberalism. Res Publica 15 (3):213-217.
    In what ways might we best, and justly, allow for cohabitation between individuals and groups with plural conceptions of the good? Confronting this question, students of political philosophy in the past two decades have encountered a routine contrast between liberal universalism, with a focus on equal individual rights and uniform application of the law, and on the other hand various versions of a 'politics of difference'(...).
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation