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Marian David [47]Marian A. David [6]
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Profile: Marian David (Karl Franzens University)
Profile: Mariano David (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)
  1. Mauro Antonelli & Marian David (2014). Logical, Ontological, and Historical Contributions on the Philosophy of Alexius Meinong. De Gruyter.
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  2. Rudolf Haller, Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David, Maria E. Reicher & Leopold Stubenberg (eds.) (2014). Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 88 – 2013: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy. Editions Rodopi.
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  3. Marian David (2013). Lynch's Functionalist Theory of Truth. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. 42.
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  4. Marian David (2012). How To Take Truth As a Goal? In C. Jaeger & W. Loeffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreements (Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium). Ontos Verlag.
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  5. Marian David (2012). Lehrer on Trustworthiness and Acceptance. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):7-15.
    The paper explores Lehrer's notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between them; it adopts a historical approach, looking at how Lehrer's views on these topics have evolved over the years.
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  6. Marian David (2011). Review of M. Lynch: Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):743 - 746.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 743-746, December 2011.
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  7. Marian David (2011). Truth as One and Many. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):743-746.
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  8. Marian David (2009). Defending Existentialism? In M. Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs. Ontos Verlag. 167--209.
    This paper is concerned with a popular view about the nature of propositions, commonly known as the Russellian view of propositions. Alvin Plantinga has dubbed it, or more precisely, a crucial consequence of it, Existentialism, and in his paper “On Existentialism” (1983) he has presented a forceful argument intended as a reductio of this view. In what follows, I describe the main relevant ingredients of the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. I present a relatively simple response Russellians (...)
     
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  9. Marian David (2009). Truth-Making and Correspondence. In E. J. Lowe (ed.), Truth and Truth-Making. Acumen Press.
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  10. Marian David (2008). Quine's Ladder: Two and a Half Pages From the Philosophy of Logic. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):274-312.
    I want to discuss, in some detail, a short section from Quine’s Philosophy of Logic. It runs from pages 10 to 13 of the second, revised edition of the book and carries the subheading ‘Truth and semantic ascent’.1 In these two and a half pages, Quine presents his well-known account of truth as a device of disquotation, employing what I call Quine’s Ladder. The section merits scrutiny, for it has become the central document for contemporary deflationary views about truth.
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  11. Marian David, The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the (...)
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  12. Marian David (2008). Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth. In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press.
  13. Marian David & Ted A. Warfield (2008). Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  14. Melissa Barry, John Bishop, Benjamin Bradley, Sarah Buss, Ben Caplan, Erik Carlson, John Carriero, Peter Carruthers, C. A. J. Coady & Marian David (2007). The Editors of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Thank the Members of the Editorial Board and the Following Scholars, Who Have Served as Referees During the Period of October 2006 Through July 2007. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3).
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  15. Marian David (2007). Review of P. Horwich: From a Deflationary Point of View. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):427-434.
    The review of this collection is primarily concerned with essays pertaining to Horwich's deflationary approaches to truth and meaning.
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  16. Marian David (2006). A Substitutional Theory of Truth? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):182–189.
    Contribution to book symposium on C. Hill's: Thought and World. Focus is primarily on the intelligibility of Hill's substitutional quantification into propositions.
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  17. Marian David (2006). Horwich's World. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Clarendon Press.
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  18. Marian David (2006). Kuenne on Conceptions of Truth. [REVIEW] Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):179-191.
    The review focuses on Kuenne's account of truthmaking and on his minimalist approach to truth.
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  19. Michael A. Bishop, J. D. Trout, L. Johannes Brandl, Marian David, Leopold Stubenberg, Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2005). Appearance in This List Neither Guarantees nor Precludes a Future Review of the Book. Agamben, Giorgio, Trans. Kevin Attell, State of Exception, London and Chicago: Univer-Sity of Chicago Press, 2005, Pp. Vii+ 95,£ 8.50, $12.00. Aiken, William and John Haldane (Eds), Philosophy and Its Public Role, Exeter, UK and Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2004, Pp. Vi+ 272,£ 14.95, $29.90. [REVIEW] Mind 114:454.
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  20. Marian David (2005). Armstrong on Truthmaking. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon. 141.
  21. Marian David (2005). On 'Truth is Good'. Philosophical Books 46 (4):292-301.
    As to the preference which most people—as long as they are not annoyed by instances—feel in favor of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition: ‘It is good to believe true propositions, and bad to believe false ones’. This proposition, it is to be hoped, is true; but if it is not, there is no reason to think that we do ill in believing it. Bertrand Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (1904).
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  22. Marian David (2005). Review of Gerald Vision, Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and its Critics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
    The review focuses on Visions' general approach to correspondence theories.
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  23. Marian David (2005). Some T-Biconditionals. In B. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court. 382--419.
    The T-biconditionals, also known as T-sentences or T-equivalences, play a very prominent role in contemporary work on truth. It is widely held that they are so central to our understanding of truth that conformance with them is indispensable to any account of truth that aspires to be adequate. Even “deflationists” and “inflationists” tend to agree on this point; their debate turns largely on just how central a role these biconditionals can play in a theory of truth. In the present paper, (...)
     
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  24. Marian David (2004). Theories of Truth. In I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen & J. Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer. 331--414.
  25. Marian David (2004). Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
    Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.
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  26. Marian David (2002). Content Essentialism. Acta Analytica 17 (28):103-114.
    The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, (...)
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  27. Marian David (2002). Minimalism and the Facts About Truth. In R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?
    Minimalism, Paul Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich’s highly stimulating book Truth1. I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only by tampering with the standards of adequate (...)
     
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  28. Marian David (2002). Truth and Identity. In J. K. Campbell & M. O'Rourke (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations Into Philosophical Semantics.
    According to a classical correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true iff it corresponds to a fact. The approach has its competitors. One of them, the identity theory of truth, pushes for a surprising simplification. It says that true propositions do not correspond to facts, they are facts. Some find this view too bizarre to be taken seriously. Some are attracted to it because they worry that the correspondence theory opens a gap between our thoughts and reality--a gap that, (...)
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  29. Marian David (2001). Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  30. Marian David (2001). Truth as the Epistemic Goal. In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press. 151-169.
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  31. Marian David (1997). Kim's Functionalism. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):133-48.
    In some recent articles, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is a myth: when it comes to the mind-body problem, the only serious options are reductionism, eliminativism, and dualism.[1] And when it comes to reductionism, Kim is inclined to regard a functionalist theory of the mind as the best available option—mostly because it offers the best explanation of mind-body supervenience. In this paper, I will discuss Kim’s views about functionalism. They may be contended on two general grounds. First, some (...)
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  32. Marian David (1997). Review of F. Schmitt: Truth, A Primer. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 106 (3):441-443.
  33. Marian David (1997). Truth. Philosophical Review 106 (3):441-443.
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  34. Marian David (1997). Two Conceptions of the Synthetic A Priori. In L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm (The Library of Living Philosophers). Chicago: Open Court. 629--651.
    Roderick Chisholm appears to agree with Kant on the question of the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge. But Chisholm’s conception of the a priori is a traditional Aristotelian conception and differs markedly from Kant’s. Closer scrutiny reveals that their agreement on the question of the synthetic a priori is merely verbal: what Kant meant to affirm, Chisholm denies. Curiously, it looks as if Chisholm agreed on all substantive issues with the empiricist rejection of Kant’s synthetic a priori. In the (...)
     
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  35. Marian David (1996). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296.
    Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, (...)
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  36. Marian David (1996). Review Essay: Working Without a Net. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):943-952.
  37. Marian David (1996). Working Without a Net. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):943-952.
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  38. Marian David (1994). Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    Marian David defends the correspondence theory of truth against the disquotational theory of truth, its current major rival. The correspondence theory asserts that truth is a philosophically rich and profound notion in need of serious explanation. Disquotationalists offer a radically deflationary account inspired by Tarski and propagated by Quine and others. They reject the correspondence theory, insist truth is anemic, and advance an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a collection of platitudes: "Snow is white" is true if and only (...)
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  39. Marian A. David (1993). Introduction. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):111-114.
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  40. Marian A. David (1993). Review of K. Mulligan (Ed.): Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):229-232.
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  41. Marian A. David (1993). Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):229-232.
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  42. Marian David (1991). Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove That We Are Not Brains in a Vat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):891-896.
    In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in (...)
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  43. Marian David (1991). On the Roles of Trustworthiness and Acceptance. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:93-107.
    Our tmst in our own trustworthiness as evaluators of tmth plays a uniquely important role in Lehrer's recent work in epistemology. Lehrer has claimed that a person who trusts in her own trustworthiness has a reason for accepting everything she accepts, including that she is trustworthy. This claim is too bold, trust in our trustworthiness cannot play the epistemic role Lehrer assigns to it. Neither does a suitably revised version of the claim succeed in assigning any important epistemic role to (...)
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  44. Marian A. David (1989). Truth, Eliminativism, and Disquotationalism. Noûs 23 (5):599-614.
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  45. Marian A. David (1988). Review of E. Runggaldier: Signifier and Signified. Linguistico-Philosophical Enquiries Into the Problem of Reference. [REVIEW] Philosophy and History 21 (1):31-34.
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  46. Marian A. David (1988). Signifier and Signified. Linguistico-Philosophical Enquiries Into the Problem of Reference. Philosophy and History 21 (1):31-34.
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  47. Marian David (1986). Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common Sense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 28:3-16.
    Es gibt zwei Schlüsselfragen in der Theorie der Erkenntnis: ''Was wissen wir?" und "Wie wissen wir?". Chisholm hat argumentiert, daß uns der Versuch, diese Fragen zu beantworten, in eines der wichtigsten und schwierigsten philosophischen Probleme führt: in das Problem des Kriteriums. In dieser Arbeit wird in erster Linie die dem Common Sense verpflichtete Position des "Partikularismus" betrachtet, die von Chisholm als Lösung des Problems des Kriteriums vorgeschlagen wurde. Dabei wird der Frage nachgegangen, worin genau die partikularistische Lösung besteht, wie sich (...)
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  48. Marian David (1985/86). Non-Existence and Reid's Conception of Conceiving. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:585-599.
    Brentano's famous thesis of the Intentionality of the Mental was already formulated by Thomas Reid who used it in his campaign against the Locke-Berkeley-Hume Theory of Ideas. Apphed to the case of conceiving the thesis says that to conceive is to conceive something. This principle stands in apparent conflict with the common-sensical view, defended by Reid, that we can conceive what does not exist. Both principles, it is argued, are plausible and should be retained. The problem is how to resolve (...)
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