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Profile: Marina Oshana (University of California, Davis)
  1.  89
    Marina A. L. Oshana (1998). Personal Autonomy and Society. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1):81-102.
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  2.  38
    Marina A. L. Oshana (1997). Ascriptions of Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):71 - 83.
  3.  65
    Marina A. L. Oshana (2002). The Misguided Marriage of Responsibility and Autonomy. Journal of Ethics 6 (3):261-280.
    Much of the literature devoted to the topics of agent autonomy and agent responsibility suggests strong conceptual overlaps between the two, although few explore these overlaps explicitly. Beliefs of this sort are commonplace, but they mistakenly conflate the global state of being autonomous with the local condition of acting autonomously or exhibiting autonomy in respect to some act or decision. Because the latter, local phenomenon of autonomy seems closely tied to the condition of being responsible for an act, we tend (...)
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  4. Marina A. L. Oshana (2010). The Importance of How We See Ourselves: Self-Identity and Responsible Agency. Lexington Books.
    The Importance of How We See Ourselves: Self-Identity and Responsible Agency analyzes the nature of the self and the phenomena of self-awareness and self-identity in an attempt to offer insight into the practical role self-conceptions play in moral development and responsible agency.
     
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  5.  38
    Marina A. L. Oshana (2006). Moral Taint. Metaphilosophy 37 (3-4):353–375.
    Moral taint occurs when one’s personality has been compromised by the introduction of something that produces disfigurement of the moral psyche. While taint may be traced to vicarious liability for our voluntary associations, the thought that we might be responsible for taint and that taint is something we must confront and make amends for becomes problematic when taint is acquired by circumstantial luck. I argue that the idea of circumstantial taint—for example, the idea that people can be morally compromised by (...)
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  6. Marina A. L. Oshana (2005). Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  7. Marina A. L. Oshana (2005). Autonomy and Free Agency. In Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  8.  30
    Marina A. L. Oshana (1998). Wanton Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 2 (3):261-276.
    Mainstream accounts of responsible agency either overlook or discount wanton agents as plausible candidates for responsible agency. This is largely due to the compatibilist project of such accounts, and to their deemphasis of historical and modal considerations. I argue that wantons – those who are indifferent to the desires that move them to act – can and ought to be counted as responsible agents. Indeed, they deserve special blame for the acts of wrong doing that issue from their wanton behavior.
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  9.  22
    Marina A. L. Oshana (1994). Autonomy Naturalized. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):76-94.
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  10. Marina A. L. Oshana (ed.) (2014). Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge.
    _Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression_ addresses the impact of social conditions, especially subordinating conditions, on personal autonomy. The essays in this volume are concerned with the philosophical concept of autonomy or self-governance and with the impact on relational autonomy of the oppressive circumstances persons must navigate. They address on the one hand questions of the theoretical structure of personal autonomy given various kinds of social oppression, and on the other, how contexts of social oppression make autonomy difficult or impossible.
     
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  11. Marina A. L. Oshana (2010). The Importance of How We See Ourselves: Self-Identity and Responsible Agency. Lexington Books.
    The Importance of How We See Ourselves: Self-Identity and Responsible Agency analyzes the nature of the self and the phenomena of self-awareness and self-identity in an attempt to offer insight into the practical role self-conceptions play in moral development and responsible agency.
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  12. Marina A. L. Oshana (2010). The Importance of How We See Ourselves: Self-Identity and Responsible Agency. Lexington Books.
    The Importance of How We See Ourselves: Self-Identity and Responsible Agency analyzes the nature of the self and the phenomena of self-awareness and self-identity in an attempt to offer insight into the practical role self-conceptions play in moral development and responsible agency.
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