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Profile: Mario Gomez-Torrente (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico)
  1.  14
    Mario Gómez-Torrente, On the Essence and Identity of Numbers.
    Taking as premises some reasonable principles about the essences of natural numbers, pluralities and sets, the paper offers two types of argument for the conclusions that the natural numbers could not be the Zermelo numbers, the von Neumann numbers, the “Kripke numbers”, or the positions in the ω-structure, among other things. These conclusions are thus Benacerrafian in form, but it is emphasized that the two kinds of argument offered in the paper are anti-Benacerrafian in substance, as they are perfectly compatible (...)
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  2.  49
    Mario Gomez-Torrente, Logical Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2002). The Problem of Logical Constants. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):1-37.
    There have been several different and even opposed conceptions of the problem of logical constants, i.e. of the requirements that a good theory of logical constants ought to satisfy. This paper is in the first place a survey of these conceptions and a critique of the theories they have given rise to. A second aim of the paper is to sketch some ideas about what a good theory would look like. A third aim is to draw from these ideas and (...)
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  4.  27
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2001). Quotation Revisited. Philosophical Studies 102 (2):123-153.
    The main aim of this paper is to point out that Davidsonian and Fregean theories of quotation do not accommodate certain facts about disquotation. A second aim is to dispel some errors of interpretation in a common Davidsonian reading of Tarski's claims about quotation. This allows a correct exegesis of Tarski's view, which is then seen not to be affected by the arguments usually adduced against the view wrongly attributed to Tarski. Finally, a Tarskian view is proposed of some problems (...)
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  5.  90
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2009). Rereading Tarski on Logical Consequence. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):249-297.
    I argue that recent defenses of the view that in 1936 Tarski required all interpretations of a language to share one same domain of quantification are based on misinterpretations of Tarski’s texts. In particular, I rebut some criticisms of my earlier attack on the fixed-domain exegesis and I offer a more detailed report of the textual evidence on the issue than in my earlier work. I also offer new considerations on subsisting issues of interpretation concerning Tarski’s views on the logical (...)
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  6.  16
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2005). Remarks on Impure Quotation. In Philippe De Brabanter (ed.), Hybrid Quotations. John Benjamins 129-151.
    Quotation marks are ambiguous, although the conventional rules that govern their different uses are similar in that they contain quantifications over quotable expressions. Pure uses are governed by a simple rule: by enclosing any expression within quotation marks one gets a singular term, the quotation, that stands for the enclosed expression. Impure uses are far less simple. In a series of uses the quotation marks conventionally indicate that (part of) the enclosed expression is a contextually appropriate version of expressions uttered (...)
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  7.  56
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2002). Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):107-125.
    Timothy Williamson’s potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so-called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. A certain fallacy of equivocation seems to (...)
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  8.  29
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (1996). Tarski on Logical Consequence. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):125-151.
    This paper examines from a historical perspective Tarski's 1936 essay, "On the concept of logical consequence." I focus on two main aims. The primary aim is to show how Tarski's definition of logical consequence satisfies two desiderata he himself sets forth for it: (1) it must declare logically correct certain formalizations of the -rule and (2) it must allow for variation of the individual domain in the test for logical consequence. My arguments provide a refutation of some interpreters of Tarski, (...)
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  9.  73
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (1997). Two Problems for an Epistemicist View of Vagueness. Philosophical Issues 8:237-245.
    This paper presents some difficulties for Timothy Williamson's epistemicist view of vagueness and for an argument he gives in its defense. First, I claim that the argument, which uses the notion of an "omniscient speaker", is question-begging. Next, I argue that some presumably true scientific hypotheses, which postulate certain relations between everyday vague predicates and scientific predicates, make the central theses of epistemicism highly implausible. Finally, I show that the "margin for error principles" used by Williamson to explain away the (...)
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  10.  8
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2015). On the Essence and Identity of Numbers. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):317-329.
    Taking as premises some reasonable principles about the essences of natural numbers, pluralities and sets, the paper offers two types of argument for the conclusions that the natural numbers could not be the Zermelo numbers, the von Neumann numbers, the “Kripke numbers”, or the positions in the ω-structure, among other things. These conclusions are thus Benacerrafian in form, but it is emphasized that the two kinds of argument offered in the paper are anti-Benacerrafian in substance, as they are perfectly compatible (...)
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  11.  13
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2015). Quantifiers and Referential Use. In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers: Themes in Logic, Metaphysics, and Language. Springer 97-124.
    Referential uses of quantified determiner phrases other than descriptions have not been extensively considered. In this paper they are considered in some detail, and related to referential uses of descriptions. The first aim is to develop the observation that, contrary to the currently received view that it is only for descriptions that referential uses are frequent and standard, arising in run-of-the-mill contextual scenarios, this is in fact the case for all usual kinds of quantifier phrases. A second aim is to (...)
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  12.  30
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2010). On Quoting the Empty Expression. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):439 - 443.
    Roy Sorensen has argued that a certain technical use of quotation marks to name the empty string supports a revised version of Davidson’s theory of quotation. I point out that Sorensen’s considerations provide no support for Davidson’s original theory, and I show that at best they support the revised Davidsonian theory only to the same extent that they support a simpler revised version of a Tarskian theory.
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  13.  9
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2015). On the Essence and Identity of Numbers. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30 (3):317-329.
    Taking as premises some reasonable principles about the essences of natural numbers, pluralities and sets, the paper offers two types of argument for the conclusions that the natural numbers could not be the Zermelo numbers, the von Neumann numbers, the “Kripke numbers”, or the positions in the ω-structure, among other things. These conclusions are thus Benacerrafian in form, but it is emphasized that the two kinds of argument offered in the paper are anti-Benacerrafian in substance, as they are perfectly compatible (...)
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  14.  44
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2000). A Note on Formality and Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):529-539.
    Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truthpreserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truthpreserving. But he did not offer the proof. The question arises (...)
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  15.  24
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (1998). On a Fallacy Attributed to Tarski. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (4):227-234.
    The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski?s paper ?On the concept of logical consequence? and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further claims that the argument he attributes to Tarski is fallacious. Some (...)
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  16.  74
    Mario Gómez-torrente (1998). Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth. Synthese 117 (3):375-408.
    This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress (...)
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  17.  6
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2011). Kripke on Color Words and the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. In Alan Berger (ed.), Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press 290-323.
    An exposition of Kripke's unpublished critique of dispositionalism about color, followed by a review of some recent defenses of dispositionalism and a sketch of some objections that could be made to these defenses from a broadly Kripkean perspective.
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  18.  29
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2003). The 'Must' and the 'Heptahedron': Remarks on Remarks. Theoria 18 (2):199-206.
    I offer some brief remarks in reply to comments and criticisms of my earlier work on logical consequence and logical constants. I concentrate on criticisms, especially García-Carpintero’s charge that myviews make no room for modal intuitions about logical consequence, and Sher’s attempted rebuttal of my critique of her theory of logical constants. I show that García-Carpintero’s charge is based on misunderstandings, and that Sher’s attempted rebuttal actually reveals new problems for her theory.
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  19.  28
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2003). The 'Must' and the 'Heptahedron'. Theoria 18 (2):199-206.
    I offer some brief remarks in reply to comments and criticisms of my earlier work on logical consequence and logical constants. I concentrate on criticisms, especially García-Carpintero’s charge that myviews make no room for modal intuitions about logical consequence, and Sher’s attempted rebuttal of my critique of her theory of logical constants. I show that García-Carpintero’s charge is based on misunderstandings, and that Sher’s attempted rebuttal actually reveals new problems for her theory.
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  20.  10
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2004). The Indefinability of Truth in the “Wahrheitsbegriff”. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):27-37.
    Contrary to what often seems to be the implicit belief, Tarski's 1933 version of the theorem on the indefinability of truth did not mention semantic notions, either defined or intuitive. I state this version in a somewhat modernized form and explain briefly the self-imposed mathematico-philosophical constraints that led Tarski to formulate it as he did. I also point out that close attention to its content suggests a refined view of the exact contrast between Tarski's achievement and Gödel's achievement in his (...)
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  21.  43
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2006). Rigidity and Essentiality. Mind 115 (458):227-260.
    Is there a theoretically interesting notion that is a natural extension of the concept of rigidity to general terms? Such a notion ought to satisfy two Kripkean conditions. First, it must apply to typical general terms for natural kinds, stuffs, and phenomena, and fail to apply to most other general terms. Second, true ‘identification sentences’ (such as ‘Cats are animals’) containing general terms that the notion applies to must be necessary. I explore a natural extension of the notion of rigidity (...)
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  22.  15
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2008). The Private Language Argument and the Analogy Between Rules and Grounds. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:49-54.
    I identify one neglected source of support for a Kripkean reading of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: the analogy between rules and epistemic grounds and the existence of a Kripkean anti-privacy argument about epistemic grounds in On Certainty. This latter argument supports Kripke’s claims that the basic anti-privacy argument in the Investigations (a) poses a question about the distinguishability of certain first-person attributions with identical assertability conditions, (b) concludes that distinguishability is provided by third-person evaluability, and (c) is a general argument, not (...)
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  23.  19
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2013). How Quotations Refer. Journal of Philosophy 110 (7):353-390.
    The article proposes a theory on which quotations are unstructured, context-insensitive devices that get their referents fixed by a conventional wholesale reference-fixing rule. First, it criticizes recent theories for postulating eccentric or anomalous facts concerning the contribution of noun phrases to truth conditions, the semantics of demonstratives or general syntax. Second, it notes that the proposed theory is not subject to some familiar objections to classical theories, nor to eccentricity or anomalousness complaints. Third, it shows that recent arguments that quotations (...)
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  24.  2
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2008). Are There Model-Theoretic Logical Truths That Are Not Logically True? In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press 340-368.
    Tarski implicitly postulated that a certain pre-theoretical concept of logical consequence and his technical concept of logical consequence are co-extensional. This chapter makes explicit a few theses about logical consequence or logical truth that sound Tarskian somehow, including one that most deserves the name ‘Tarski's Thesis’. Some of these theses are probably true or close to true but weaker than Tarski's. Some are false but stronger than Tarski's. Tarski's Thesis plausibly postulated that a sentence of a classical language possibly extended (...)
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  25.  27
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2003). Logical Consequence and Logical Expressions. Theoria 18 (2):131-144.
    The pretheoretical notions of logical consequence and of a logical expression are linked in vague and complex ways to modal and pragmatic intuitions. I offer an introduction to the difficulties that these intuitions create when one attempts to give precise characterizations of those notions. Special attention is given to Tarski’s theories of logical consequence and logical constancy. I note that the Tarskian theory of logical consequence has fared better in the face of the difficulties than the Tarskian theory of logical (...)
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  26.  49
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2003). Logical Consequence and Logical Expressions. Theoria 18 (2):131-144.
    The pretheoretical notions of logical consequence and of a logical expression are linked in vague and complex ways to modal and pragmatic intuitions. I offer an introduction to the difficulties that these intuitions create when one attempts to give precise characterizations of those notions. Special attention is given to Tarski’s theories of logical consequence and logical constancy. I note that the Tarskian theory of logical consequence has fared better in the face of the difficulties than the Tarskian theory of logical (...)
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  27.  1
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2005). El Wittgenstein de Kripke y la analogía entre reglas y fundamentos. Dianoia 50 (55):55-94.
    I explore an argument for epistemic non-factualism, the thesis that epistemic attributions do not describe facts. The argument is analogous to but independent of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s argument for nonfactualism about rule-following. Some objections to the two arguments are considered and rejected, in particular accusations of incoherence and “reductivism”. The epistemic argument and a “skeptical solution” to it are argued to be part of Wittgenstein’s conception in On Certainty.
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  28.  11
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2003). Sumario Analitico/Summary. Theoria 18 (2):47-189.
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  29.  9
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2011). What Quotations Refer To. In Elke Brendel (ed.), Understanding Quotation. De Gruyter Mouton 139--160.
    When quotations are used with a purely referential purpose, they are mostly used with the purpose of referring to expressions, in the sense of rather abstract expression types. However, in many cases purely referential quotations are used with the purpose of referring to things other than very abstract expression types, such as boldface types, sounds, particular tokens, etc. The paper deals with the question of what mechanism underlies the possibility of successfully referring to different things and kinds of things with (...)
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  30.  4
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2010). The Sorites, Linguistic Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture of Vagueness. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press 228-253.
    I postulate that the extension of a degree adjective is fixed by implicitly accepted non-analytic reference-fixing principles (“preconceptions”) that combine appeals to paradigmatic cases with generic principles designed to expand the extension of the adjective beyond the paradigmatic range. In regular occasions of use, the paradigm and generic preconceptions are jointly satisfied and determine the existence of an extension/anti-extension pair dividing the adjective’s comparison class into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses. Sorites paradoxical occasions of use are irregular occasions (...)
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  31.  8
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2008). Tarski on Variable Domains. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:47-52.
    In earlier work I claimed that when Tarski wrote his seminal 1936 paper on logical consequence, he had in mind a now nonstandard convention, that he also used in his 1937 logic manual, requiring the domain of quantification of the different interpretations of a first-order mathematical language to covary with changes in the interpretation of a non-logical “domain predicate”. Recently Paolo Mancosu has rejected this claim, holding that it can be established on the basis of a passage from Tarski’s manual (...)
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  32.  26
    Mario Gómez-torrente (2008). Kripke. Names, Necessity, and Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):219–222.
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  33.  17
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2004). Beyond Rigidity? Essentialist Predication and the Rigidity of General Terms (¿Más Allá de la Rigidez? La Predicatión Esencialista y la Rigidez de Los Términos Generales). Critica 36 (108):37 - 54.
    I offer a brief formal exploration of a certain natural extension of the notion of rigidity to predicates, the notion of an essentialist predicate. I show that, under reasonable assumptions, true "identification sentences" involving essentialist predicates (such as 'Cats are animals') are necessary, and hence that the notion of essentiality is formally analogous in this respect to the notion of singular term rigidity. /// El artículo hace una breve exploración formal de una extensión natural de la noción de rigidez a (...)
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  34.  3
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2004). Forma y modalidad. Una introducción al concepto de consecuencia lógica. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 36 (107):87-107.
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  35.  20
    Mario Gómez-Torrente, Alfred Tarski. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  36.  23
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (1998). Report of an Unsuccessful Search for Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Issues 9:369-379.
    In his “What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?”, Robert Stalnaker finds no good argument for the claim that certain intuitive differences between perception and belief must be explained by a distinction between the kinds of content of perception states (which would have nonconceptual content) and belief states (which would have conceptual content). I object to Stalnaker that he does not examine arguments for this claim actually produced by its defenders. But I reach a conclusion of the same kind as Stalnaker’s after (...)
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  37.  13
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2008). Kripke. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):219-222.
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  38.  1
    Massimo Germano, James Evans & Mario Gomez-Torrente (1999). Letters to the Editor. Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 90:95-97.
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  39. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2013). How Quotations Refer. Journal of Philosophy 110 (7):353-390.
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  40. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1997). Review. [REVIEW] Critica 29 (87):117-138.
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  41. Mario Gomez-Torrente (1998). Logical Dilemmas: The Life and Work of Kurt Godel by John W. Dawson, Jr. [REVIEW] Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 89:356-357.
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