30 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Mario Gomez-Torrente (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico)
  1. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2013). How Quotations Refer. Journal of Philosophy 110 (7):353-390.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2011). What Quotations Refer To. In Elke Brendel (ed.), Understanding Quotation. De Gruyter Mouton. 139--160.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2011). Kripke on Color Words and the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. In Alan Berger (ed.), Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press. 290-323.
  4. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2010). On Quoting the Empty Expression. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):439 - 443.
    Roy Sorensen has argued that a certain technical use of quotation marks to name the empty string supports a revised version of Davidson’s theory of quotation. I point out that Sorensen’s considerations provide no support for Davidson’s original theory, and I show that at best they support the revised Davidsonian theory only to the same extent that they support a simpler revised version of a Tarskian theory.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2010). The Sorites, Linguistic Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture of Vagueness. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. 228-253.
    I postulate that the extension of a degree adjective is fixed by implicitly accepted non-analytic reference-fixing principles (“preconceptions”) that combine appeals to paradigmatic cases with generic principles designed to expand the extension of the adjective beyond the paradigmatic range. In regular occasions of use, the paradigm and generic preconceptions are jointly satisfied and determine the existence of an extension/anti-extension pair dividing the adjective’s comparison class into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses. Sorites paradoxical occasions of use are irregular occasions (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mario Gómez-torrente (2009). Rereading Tarski on Logical Consequence. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):249-297.
    I argue that recent defenses of the view that in 1936 Tarski required all interpretations of a language to share one same domain of quantification are based on misinterpretations of Tarskis views on the logical correctness of certain omega-arguments, on the Tarskian proof that Etchemendy took to be modal and fallacious, and on Tarskicommon concept of consequence”.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Mario Gómez-Torrente, Alfred Tarski. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2008). Kripke. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):219-222.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Mario Gómez-torrente (2008). Kripke. Names, Necessity, and Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):219–222.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2008). Are There Model-Theoretic Logical Truths That Are Not Logically True? In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 340-368.
  11. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2008). Tarski on Variable Domains. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:47-52.
    In earlier work I claimed that when Tarski wrote his seminal 1936 paper on logical consequence, he had in mind a now nonstandard convention, that he also used in his 1937 logic manual, requiring the domain of quantification of the different interpretations of a first-order mathematical language to covary with changes in the interpretation of a non-logical “domain predicate”. Recently Paolo Mancosu has rejected this claim, holding that it can be established on the basis of a passage from Tarski’s manual (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2008). The Private Language Argument and the Analogy Between Rules and Grounds. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:49-54.
    I identify one neglected source of support for a Kripkean reading of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: the analogy between rules and epistemic grounds and the existence of a Kripkean anti-privacy argument about epistemic grounds in On Certainty. This latter argument supports Kripke’s claims that the basic anti-privacy argument in the Investigations (a) poses a question about the distinguishability of certain first-person attributions with identical assertability conditions, (b) concludes that distinguishability is provided by third-person evaluability, and (c) is a general argument, not (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2006). Rigidity and Essentiality. Mind 115 (458):227-260.
    Is there a theoretically interesting notion that is a natural extension of the concept of rigidity to general terms? Such a notion ought to satisfy two Kripkean conditions. First, it must apply to typical general terms for natural kinds, stuffs, and phenomena, and fail to apply to most other general terms. Second, true ‘identification sentences’ (such as ‘Cats are animals’) containing general terms that the notion applies to must be necessary. I explore a natural extension of the notion of rigidity (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2005). Remarks on Impure Quotation. In Philippe De Brabanter (ed.), Hybrid Quotations. John Benjamins. 129-151.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2004). Beyond Rigidity? Essentialist Predication and the Rigidity of General Terms (¿Más Allá de la Rigidez? La Predicatión Esencialista y la Rigidez de Los Términos Generales). Crítica 36 (108):37 - 54.
    I offer a brief formal exploration of a certain natural extension of the notion of rigidity to predicates, the notion of an essentialist predicate. I show that, under reasonable assumptions, true "identification sentences" involving essentialist predicates (such as 'Cats are animals') are necessary, and hence that the notion of essentiality is formally analogous in this respect to the notion of singular term rigidity. /// El artículo hace una breve exploración formal de una extensión natural de la noción de rigidez a (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2004). The Indefinability of Truth in the “Wahrheitsbegriff”. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):27-37.
  17. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2003). Logical Consequence and Logical Expressions. Theoria 18 (2):131-144.
    The pretheoretical notions of logical consequence and of a logical expression are linked in vague and complex ways to modal and pragmatic intuitions. I offer an introduction to the difficulties that these intuitions create when one attempts to give precise characterizations of those notions. Special attention is given to Tarski’s theories of logical consequence and logical constancy. I note that the Tarskian theory of logical consequence has fared better in the face of the difficulties than the Tarskian theory of logical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2003). The 'Must' and the 'Heptahedron': Remarks on Remarks. Theoria 18 (2):199-206.
    I offer some brief remarks in reply to comments and criticisms of my earlier work on logical consequence and logical constants. I concentrate on criticisms, especially García-Carpintero’s charge that myviews make no room for modal intuitions about logical consequence, and Sher’s attempted rebuttal of my critique of her theory of logical constants. I show that García-Carpintero’s charge is based on misunderstandings, and that Sher’s attempted rebuttal actually reveals new problems for her theory.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2003). The 'Must' and the 'Heptahedron'. Theoria 18 (2):199-206.
    I offer some brief remarks in reply to comments and criticisms of my earlier work on logical consequence and logical constants. I concentrate on criticisms, especially García-Carpintero’s charge that myviews make no room for modal intuitions about logical consequence, and Sher’s attempted rebuttal of my critique of her theory of logical constants. I show that García-Carpintero’s charge is based on misunderstandings, and that Sher’s attempted rebuttal actually reveals new problems for her theory.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2003). Sumario Analitico/Summary. Theoria 18 (2):47-189.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2002). Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):107-125.
  22. Mario Gomez-Torrente (2002). The Problem of Logical Constants. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):1-37.
    There have been several different and even opposed conceptions of the problem of logical constants, i.e. of the requirements that a good theory of logical constants ought to satisfy. This paper is in the first place a survey of these conceptions and a critique of the theories they have given rise to. A second aim of the paper is to sketch some ideas about what a good theory would look like. A third aim is to draw from these ideas and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2001). Quotation Revisited. Philosophical Studies 102 (2):123-153.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2000). A Note on Formality and Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):529-539.
    Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truthpreserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truthpreserving. But he did not offer the proof. The question arises (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Mario Gómez-torrente (1998). Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth. Synthese 117 (3):375-408.
    This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1998). Report of an Unsuccessful Search for Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Issues 9:369-379.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1998). On a Fallacy Attributed to Tarski. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (4):227-234.
    The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski?s paper ?On the concept of logical consequence? and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further claims that the argument he attributes to Tarski is fallacious. Some (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1997). Two Problems for an Epistemicist View of Vagueness. Philosophical Issues 8:237-245.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1996). Tarski on Logical Consequence. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):125-151.
    This paper examines from a historical perspective Tarski's 1936 essay, "On the concept of logical consequence." I focus on two main aims. The primary aim is to show how Tarski's definition of logical consequence satisfies two desiderata he himself sets forth for it: (1) it must declare logically correct certain formalizations of the -rule and (2) it must allow for variation of the individual domain in the test for logical consequence. My arguments provide a refutation of some interpreters of Tarski, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation