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  1. Mark Crimmins (1992). Talk About Beliefs. MIT Press.
    Talk about Beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of...
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  2. Mark Crimmins & John Perry (1989). The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs. Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685 - 711.
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...)
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  3. Mark Crimmins (1998). Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference. Philosophical Review 107 (1):1-47.
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  4. Mark Crimmins (1992). I Falsely Believe That P. Analysis 52 (3):191.
    I present a counterexample to the claim that it is never true to say "I falsely believe that so-and-so." .
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  5.  80
    Mark Crimmins (1992). Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs. Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.
  6. Mark Crimmins (1998). Philosophy of Language. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge 408-11.
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  7.  72
    François Recanati & Mark Crimmins (1995). Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69:175 - 209.
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  8.  88
    Mark Crimmins (1993). So-Labeled Neo-Fregeanism. Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):265 - 279.
    I explain and criticize a theory of beliefs and of belief sentences offered by Graeme Forbes. My main criticism will be directed at Forbes' idea that, as a matter of the semantic rules of belief reporting -- as a matter of the meaning of belief ascriptions -- to get at the subject's way of thinking in an attitude ascription, we must use expressions that are "linguistic counterparts" of the subject's expressions. I think we often do something like that, but that (...)
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  9.  33
    Mark Crimmins (1989). Having Ideas and Having the Concept. Mind and Language 4 (4):280-294.
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  10.  61
    Mark Crimmins (1992). Context in the Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (2):185 - 198.
    I wish first to motivate very briefly two points about the kind of context sensitive semantics needed for attitude reports, namely that reports are about referents and about mental representations; then I will compare two proposals for treating the attitudes, both of which capture the two points in question.
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  11.  27
    Mark Crimmins (1995). Notional Specificity. Mind and Language 10 (4):464-477.
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  12.  39
    Mark Crimmins (1995). Contextuality, Reflexivity, Iteration, Logic. Philosophical Perspectives 9:381-399.
  13.  46
    Mark Crimmins (2002). Thing Talk Moonlighting. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):83 - 98.
    It is controversial whether the truth conditions of attitude sentences are opaque. It is not, or shouldn't be controversial, however, that conditions of apt or unexceptionable usage are opaque. A framework for expressing such uncontroversial claims of opacity is developed, and within this framework it is argued that opacity resides at a locutionary level — that it is a matter of expressed content (which might not be truth-conditional). The same claim is made for a related pattern in attitude talk which (...)
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  14. Mark Crimmins (1991). Representation. In Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology. Philosophia Verlag 2--791.
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  15.  24
    Mark Crimmins (1999). The First Person Perspective and Other Essays, by Sydney Shoemaker. [REVIEW] Dialogue 38 (02):453-5.