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  1. Giuseppina D'oro, Mark Day, Luke O'sullivan, Jakub Capek, Nick Tosh, Adrian Haddock & Robert John Inkpen (2008). Philosophy of History. Philosophia 36 (4).
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  2. Mark Day (2008). Our Relations with the Past. Philosophia 36 (4):417-427.
    The approach that philosophers have taken to history has too often been one-dimensional. It is my aim in this paper to map out a future multi-dimensional philosophy of history, by invoking the notion of a relation with the past, and by arguing for the philosophical relevance of multiple such relations.
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  3. Mark Day (2008). The Philosophy of History: An Introduction. Continuum.
     
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  4. Mark Day & George S. Botterill (2008). Contrast, Inference and Scientific Realism. Synthese 160 (2):249 - 267.
    The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which empirically adequate theories are thin on the ground. We propose to advance a case for scientific realism which concentrates on the process of scientific reasoning rather than its theoretical products. Developing an account of causal–explanatory inference will make it easier to resist the (...)
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  5. Mark Day (2006). Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography - By Aviezer Tucker. Philosophical Books 47 (4):386-388.
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  6. Mark Day (2004). Explanatory Exclusion History and Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):20-37.
    Judgments of explanatory exclusion are a necessary part of the explanatory practice of any historian or social scientist. In this article, the author argues that all explanatory exclusion results from mutual explanatory incompatibility of some sort. Different types of exclusion arise primarily as a result of the different elements composing "an explanation." Of most philosophical interest are judgments of explanatory exclusion resulting from the incompatibility of explanatory relevance claims. The author demonstrates that an ontic theory of explanation is necessary to (...)
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