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Profile: Mark Fedyk (Mount Allison University)
  1. Mark Fedyk (2014). How (Not) to Bring Psychology and Biology Together. Philosophical Studies 1:1-19.
    Evolutionary psychologists often try to “bring together” biology and psychology by making predictions about what specific psychological mechanisms exist from theories about what patterns of behaviour would have been adaptive in the EEA for humans. This paper shows that one of the deepest methodological generalities in evolutionary biology—that proximate explanations and ultimate explanations stand in a many-to-many relation—entails that this inferential strategy is unsound. Ultimate explanations almost never entail the truth of any particular proximate hypothesis. But of course it does (...)
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  2. Mark Fedyk & Barbara Koslowski, Intuition Versus Reason: Strategies People Use to Think About Moral Problems. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
    We asked college students to make judgments about realistic moral situations presented as dilemmas (which asked for an either/or decision) vs. problems (which did not ask for such a decision) as well as when the situation explicitly included affectively salient language vs. non-affectively salient language. We report two main findings. The first is that there are four different types of cognitive strategy that subjects use in their responses: simple reasoning, intuitive judging, cautious reasoning, and empathic reasoning. We give operational definitions (...)
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  3. Mark Fedyk (2011). Evolution and Human Behavior: Darwinian Perspectives on Human Nature. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):723 - 726.
  4. Daniel Cohnitz, Sören Häggqvist, Kristoffer Ahlstrom, Joshua Earlenbough, Bernard Molyneaux, Mark Fedyk, Jussi Haukioja, Jonathan Ichikawa & Sebastian Lutz (2009). The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2.
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  5. Mark Fedyk (2009). Philosophical Intuitions. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):54-80.
    What exactly is a philosophical intuition? And what makes such an intuition reliable, when it is reliable? This paper provides a terminological framework that is able answer to the first question, and then puts the framework to work developing an answer to the second question. More specifically, the paper argues that we can distinguish between two different "evidential roles" which intuitions can occupy: under certain conditions they can provide information about the representational structure of an intuitor's concept, and under different (...)
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