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Profile: Mark LeBar (Ohio University)
Profile: Mark LeBar (Florida State University)
  1.  8
    Mark LeBar (2013). The Value of Living Well. OUP Usa.
    In this book, Mark LeBar develops Virtue Eudaimonism, which brings the philosophy of the ancient Greeks to bear on contemporary problems in metaethics, especially the metaphysics of norms and the nature of practical rationality.
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  2. Mark LeBar (2009). Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints. Ethics 119 (4):642-671.
  3. Cheshire Calhoun, Mark LeBar, Matthew S. Bedke, Neil Levy & Daniel M. Hausman (2009). 10. Iakovos Vasiliou, Aiming at Virtue in Plato Iakovos Vasiliou, Aiming at Virtue in Plato (Pp. 796-800). In John Hawthorne (ed.), Ethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
     
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  4.  68
    Mark LeBar (2008). Aristotelian Constructivism. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):182-213.
    Constructivism about practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and practical judgment. The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Kant himself, John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the out-look. In this essay I explore a somewhat different (...)
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  5.  11
    Mark LeBar & Daniel Russell (2013). Well-Being and Eudaimonia. In Julia Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective. Routledge 52.
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  6.  27
    Mark LeBar (2005). Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 123 (3):175 - 211.
    Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...)
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  7.  24
    Mark LeBar (2001). Korsgaard, Wittgenstein, and the Mafioso. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):261-271.
    Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...)
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  8.  20
    Mark Lebar (2013). Shaping the Normative Landscape. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):851-853.
    The article reviews the book "Shaping the Normative Landscape" by David Owens.
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  9.  27
    Mark Lebar (2004). Good for You. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):195–217.
    Theories of human well-being struggle with a tension between opposing intuitions: on the one hand, that our welfare is subjectively determined by us as individuals, and on the other that there are objective constraints on what can count as our good. I argue that accounts driven primarily by subjectivist intuitions fail to come to grips with the signific-ance of objectivist intuitions, by failing to explain where our objectivist intuitions come from and why they are important, and defend an alternative account (...)
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  10.  12
    Mark LeBar (2005). Eudaimonist Autonomy. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3):171 - 183.
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  11.  3
    Mark LeBar (2015). Virtue and Second-Personal Reasons: A Reply to Cokelet. Ethics 126 (1):162-174.
    In “Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons,” Bradford Cokelet argues that we should reject one strategy—one I advanced earlier in this journal—for reconciling a virtue-ethical theoretical framework with that part of our moral experience that has been described as second-personal reasons. Cokelet frames a number of related objections to that strategy, and his concerns are worth taking up. Addressing them provides an opportunity both to revisit and develop the model bruited in my earlier article and to gain additional insight into second-personal (...)
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  12.  15
    Mark LeBar (1999). Kant on Welfare. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):225 - 249.
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  13.  2
    Mark Lebar (2005). Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 123 (3):175-211.
    Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...)
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  14.  9
    Mark LeBar (2008). Review: Development and Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):711 - 719.
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  15.  27
    Mark LeBar (2007). Prichard Vs. Plato: Intuition Vs. Reflection. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 1-32.
    This paper addresses a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients. The charge is that they commit a mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. I respond in two ways. First, Plato does not make the egregious mistake of substituting interest for duty, and thus giving the wrong kind of reason for duty’s requirements, as Prichard alleges. Second, we should see that the (...)
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  16.  10
    Mark LeBar (2013). Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer. [REVIEW] Mind 122 (488):1135-1140.
    Review of Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer.
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  17.  13
    Mark LeBar (2004). Ends. Social Theory and Practice 30 (4):507-533.
    Rationalist opponents of Instrumentalism believe that reason can and should play some further role in determining our ends. Instrumentalists deny this: reason can generate only reasons for taking the necessary means to ends established antecedently by conative states. I argue that Instrumentalism cannot make adequate sense of the notion of ends. Instrumentalism requires a non-rational way of identifying ends and ascribing rational force to them, and there appears to be none consistent with Instrumentalism’s commitments. As an alternative I outline what (...)
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  18.  15
    Mark LeBar (2001). Tara Smith, Viable Values. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (4):575-579.
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  19.  6
    Mark LeBar (2012). Brewer , Talbot . The Retrieval of Ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 344. $35.00 (Paper). [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (4):797-801.
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  20.  1
    Mark LeBar (2009). Ethical Value. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
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  21.  5
    Mark Lebar (2012). Nature, Reason, & the Good Life: Ethics for Human Beings. By Roger Teichmann. (Oxford UP, 2011). Pp. Xvi+192. Price £35.00.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):633-635.
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  22.  2
    Mark LeBar (2013). Virtue and Politics. In Daniel C. Russell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. Cambridge University Press 265.
    Various theorists have offered accounts of how a virtue ethical theory might inform a political theory — here meaning a theory of political legitimacy and authority. These theories claim to support a liberal regimen of authority, and they do, but only to a limited extent. -/- What they cannot support is a justificatory liberal authority structure. Each of the accounts given would authorize coercive force to impose on holders of other theories decisions counter to the values endorsed by those other (...)
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  23.  1
    Mark LeBar (2009). Book Reviews:Providence Lost. [REVIEW] Ethics 119 (3):576-580.
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  24. Mark LeBar (2014). The Virtue of Justice Revisited. In Stan van Hooft & Nafsika Athanassoulis (eds.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen Publishing Ltd.
     
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  25. Mark Lebar (1999). Virtue Ethics and the Interests of Others. Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    In recent decades "virtue ethics" has become an accepted theoretical structure for thinking about normative ethical principles. However, few contemporary virtue ethicists endorse the commitments of the first virtue theorists---the ancient Greeks, who developed their virtue theories within a commitment to eudaimonism. Why? I believe the objections of modern theorists boil down to concerns that eudaimonist theories cannot properly account for two prominent moral requirements on our treatment of others. ;First, we think that the interests and welfare of at least (...)
     
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