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Profile: Mark McEvoy (Hofstra University)
  1. Mark McEvoy (2013). Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Lottery Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):73-92.
    The lottery problem is often regarded as a successful counterexample to reliabilism. The process of forming your true belief that your ticket has lost solely on the basis of considering the odds is, from a purely probabilistic viewpoint, much more reliable than the process of forming a true belief that you have lost by reading the results in a normally reliable newspaper. Reliabilism thus seems forced, counterintuitively, to count the former process as knowledge if it so counts the latter process. (...)
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  2. Mark McEvoy (2013). Does The Necessity of Mathematical Truths Imply Their Apriority? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):431-445.
    It is sometimes argued that mathematical knowledge must be a priori, since mathematical truths are necessary, and experience tells us only what is true, not what must be true. This argument can be undermined either by showing that experience can yield knowledge of the necessity of some truths, or by arguing that mathematical theorems are contingent. Recent work by Albert Casullo and Timothy Williamson argues (or can be used to argue) the first of these lines; W. V. Quine and Hartry (...)
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  3. Mark McEvoy (2013). Experimental Mathematics, Computers and the a Priori. Synthese 190 (3):397-412.
    In recent decades, experimental mathematics has emerged as a new branch of mathematics. This new branch is defined less by its subject matter, and more by its use of computer assisted reasoning. Experimental mathematics uses a variety of computer assisted approaches to verify or prove mathematical hypotheses. For example, there is “number crunching” such as searching for very large Mersenne primes, and showing that the Goldbach conjecture holds for all even numbers less than 2 × 1018. There are “verifications” of (...)
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  4. Mark McEvoy (2012). Platonism and the 'Epistemic Role Puzzle'. Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):289-304.
    Jody Azzouni has offered the following argument against the existence of mathematical entities: if, as it seems, mathematical entities play no role in mathematical practice, we therefore have no reason to believe in them. I consider this argument as it applies to mathematical platonism, and argue that it does not present a legitimate novel challenge to platonism. I also assess Azzouni's use of the ‘epistemic role puzzle’ (ERP) to undermine the platonist's alleged parallel between skepticism about mathematical entities and external-world (...)
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  5. Mark McEvoy (2009). Safety, The Lottery Puzzle, and Misprinted Lottery Results. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:47-49.
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  6. Mark McEvoy (2009). The Lottery Puzzle and Pritchard's Safety Analysis of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:7-20.
    Duncan Pritchard's version of the safety analysis of knowledge has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and (the “safety principle”) in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the (...)
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  7. Mark McEvoy (2008). The Epistemological Status of Computer-Assisted Proofs. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):374-387.
    Several high-profile mathematical problems have been solved in recent decades by computer-assisted proofs. Some philosophers have argued that such proofs are a posteriori on the grounds that some such proofs are unsurveyable; that our warrant for accepting these proofs involves empirical claims about the reliability of computers; that there might be errors in the computer or program executing the proof; and that appeal to computer introduces into a proof an experimental element. I argue that none of these arguments withstands scrutiny, (...)
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  8. Mark McEvoy (2008). Review of Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Metaphilosophy 39 (1):144–150.
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  9. Mark McEvoy (2007). Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. By Jody Azzouni. Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):344–350.
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  10. Mark McEvoy (2007). Kitcher, Mathematical Intuition, and Experience. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):227-237.
    Mathematical apriorists sometimes hold that our non-derived mathematical beliefs are warranted by mathematical intuition. Against this, Philip Kitcher has argued that if we had the experience of encountering mathematical experts who insisted that an intuition-produced belief was mistaken, this would undermine that belief. Since this would be a case of experience undermining the warrant provided by intuition, such warrant cannot be a priori.I argue that this leaves untouched a conception of intuition as merely an aspect of our ordinary ability to (...)
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  11. Mark McEvoy (2007). Review of [Azzouni, 2004]. [REVIEW] Metaphilosophy 38:344-350.
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  12. Mark McEvoy (2007). Should Analytic Epistemology Be Replaced By Ameliorative Psychology? Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):163-171.
  13. Mark McEvoy (2005). Belief-Independent Processes and the Generality Problem for Reliabilism. Dialectica 59 (1):19–35.
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  14. Mark Mcevoy (2005). Mathematical Apriorism and Warrant: A Reliabilist-Platonist Account. Philosophical Forum 36 (4):399–417.
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  15. Mark McEvoy (2005). The Internalist Counterexample to Reliabilism. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):179-187.
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  16. Mark McEvoy (2004). Is Reliabilism Compatible with Mathematical Knowledge? Philosophical Forum 35 (4):423-437.
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  17. Mark McEvoy (2003). A Defense of Propositional Functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:421-436.
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  18. Mark McEvoy (2003). Language and Other Abstract Objects [1981]: The Metaphysics of Linguistics. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):427–438.
  19. Mark McEvoy (2002). Naturalized Epistemology, Normativity and the Argument Against the A Priori. Essays in Philosophy 3 (2):6.
  20. Mark McEvoy (2001). Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths. Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (2):1-12.
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