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Mark Newman [8]Mark P. Newman [2]
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Profile: Mark Newman (Rhodes College)
  1. Mark P. Newman (forthcoming). Eliminating Inconsistency in Science. Metascience:1-5.
    In this book, Peter Vickers argues that inconsistency in science has been massively exaggerated by philosophers. In his view, inconsistent science is neither as rampant nor as damaging as many have supposed. To argue his point, he develops a specific method he calls theory eliminativism and applies it to four case studies from the history of physics and mathematics (there are four additional cases he considers in the penultimate chapter, but they are rather brief and are apparently less highly cited (...)
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  2. Mark Newman (2014). EMU and Inference: What the Explanatory Model of Scientific Understanding Ignores. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (1):55-74.
    The Explanatory Model of Scientific Understanding (EMU) is a deflationary thesis recently advocated by Kareem Khalifa (Philosophy of Science, 79, 15–37, 2012). EMU is committed to two key ideas: all understanding-relevant knowledge is propositional in nature; and the abilities we use to generate understanding are merely our usual logical reasoning skills. In this paper I provide an argument against both ideas, suggesting that scientific understanding requires a significant amount of non-propositional knowledge not captured by logical relations. I use the Inferential (...)
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  3. Mark Newman (2013). Refining the Inferential Model of Scientific Understanding. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):173-197.
    In this article, I use a mental models computational account of representation to illustrate some details of my previously presented inferential model of scientific understanding. The hope is to shed some light on possible mechanisms behind the notion of scientific understanding. I argue that if mental models are a plausible approach to modelling cognition, then understanding can best be seen as the coupling of specific rules. I present our beliefs as ?ordinary? conditional rules, and the coupling process as one where (...)
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  4. Mark Newman (2013). Thinking About Achinstein's Philosophy of Science. Metascience 22 (3):641-646.
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  5. Mark P. Newman (2013). The Prospects of Evidentialism. Metascience 22 (3):673-676.
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  6. Mark Newman (2012). An Inferential Model of Scientific Understanding. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (1):1 - 26.
    In this article I argue that two current accounts of scientific understanding are incorrect and I propose an alternative theory. My new account draws on recent research in cognitive psychology which reveals the importance of making causal and logical inferences on the basis of incoming information. To understand a phenomenon we need to make particular kinds of inferences concerning the explanations we are given. Specifically, we come to understand a phenomenon scientifically by developing mental models that incorporate the correct causal (...)
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  7. Mark Newman, Raffaella Campaner, Maria Carla Galavotti, Open Biomedical Ontologies, Sabina Leonelli, Nathalie Gontier, Natural Kind Thingamajigs, Paul Needham & Alexander Bird (2012). International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 26 (1).
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  8. Mark Newman (2010). Beyond Structural Realism: Pluralist Criteria for Theory Evaluation. Synthese 174 (3):413 - 443.
    In this paper I argue that singularist approaches to solving the Pessimistic Induction, such as Structural Realism, are unacceptable, but that when a pluralist account of methodological principles is adopted this anti-realist argument can be dissolved. The proposed view is a contextual methodological pluralism in the tradition of Normative Naturalism, and is justified by appeal to meta-methodological principles that are themselves justified via an externalist epistemology. Not only does this view provide an answer to the Pessimistic Induction, it can also (...)
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  9. Mark Newman (2010). The No-Miracles Argument, Reliabilism, and a Methodological Version of the Generality Problem. Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.
    The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism. We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffers from a potentially devastating difficulty known as the Generality Problem and attempts to solve this problem require adopting both epistemic and metaphysical assumptions regarding local scientific theories. Although the externalist can happily adopt the former, if (...)
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  10. Mark Newman (2005). Ramsey Sentence Realism as an Answer to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1373-1384.
    John Worrall recently provided an account of epistemic structural realism, which explains the success of science by arguing for the correct mathematical structure of our theories. He accounts for the historical failures of science by pointing to bloated ontological interpretations of theoretical terms. In this paper I argue that Worrall’s account suffers from five serious problems. I also show that Pierre Cruse and David Papineau have developed a rival structural realism that solves all of the problems faced by Worrall. This (...)
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