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  1. Mark Sacks (2006). Kant's First Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):113–130.
    In what follows I will address Kant’s concerns in the First Analogy and in the Refutation of Idealism. Because the two discussions have a similar trajectory, it is of interest to identify some of the differences between them. As we will see, the manifest differences are indicative of more significant underlying differences, regarding two ways of construing transcendental proofs.
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  2. Mark Sacks (2006). Naturalism and the Transcendental Turn. Ratio 19 (1):92–106.
    This paper is to a large extent an exercise in philosophical geography. It traces the way in which a resilient naturalist orientation has derived support, specifically in the analytic tradition, from a central structuring tenet of transcendental idealism. It attempts to bring out the philosophical reasons that drive this Kantian alliance. Attention then turns to the identification of two salient problems that confront this alliance in its most acceptable form. To the extent that a resilient naturalism is desirable, these problems (...)
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  3. Mark Sacks (2005). Sartre, Strawson and Others. Inquiry 48 (3):275-299.
    This paper compares the treatment of other minds in Strawson and Sartre. Both discussions are presented here as transcendental arguments, and some striking parallels between them are brought out. However the primary significance of the alignment lies in the difference that emerges between two forms of transcendental proof, with the phenomenological treatment in Sartre promising to yield a stronger conclusion than Strawson's argument. The paper goes some way towards bringing out this difference.
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  4. Mark Sacks (2005). The Nature of Transcendental Arguments. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4):439 – 460.
    The paper aims to cast light on the kind of proof involved in central transcendental arguments. It is suggested that some of the difficulty associated with such arguments may result from the tendency to construe them simply as articulating relations between concepts or propositional contents. A different construal, connected with phenomenological description, is outlined, as a way of bringing out the force of these arguments. It is suggested that it can be fruitful to think in terms of this construal in (...)
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  5. Mark Sacks (2000). Objectivity and Insight. Oxford University Press.
    The first two parts of Objectivity and Insight explore the prospects for objectivity on the standard ontological conception, and find that they are not good. In Part I, under the heading of subject-driven scepticism, Sacks addresses the problem of securing epistemic reach that extends beyond subjective content. In so doing, he considers models of mind proposed by Locke, Hume, Kant, James, and Bergson. Part II, under the heading of world-driven scepticism, discusses the scope for universality of normative structure-a problem which (...)
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  6. Mark Sacks (1998). The Subject, Normative Structure, and Externalism. In Anat Biletzki & Anat Matar (eds.), The Story of Analytic Philosophy: Plot and Heroes. Routledge. 88--107.
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  7. Mark Sacks (1997). Transcendental Constraints and Transcendental Features. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):164 – 186.
    Transcendental idealism has been conceived of in philosophy as a position that aims to secure objectivity without traditional metaphysical underpinnings. This article contrasts two forms of transcendental idealism that have been identified: one in the work of Kant, the other in the later Wittgenstein. The distinction between these two positions is clarified by means of a distinction between transcendental constraints and transcendental features. It is argued that these conceptions provide the - fundamentally different - bases of the two positions under (...)
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  8. Mark Sacks (1994). Cognitive Closure and the Limits of Understanding. Ratio 7 (1):26-42.
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  9. Mark Sacks (1992). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 101 (401):191-195.
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  10. Mark Sacks (1992). Scepticism (The Problems of Philosophy:Their Past and Present). Philosophical Books 33 (4):227-228.
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  11. Mark Sacks (1991). Personal Identity and Unity of Consciousness. In Raymond Tallis & Howard Robinson (eds.), The Pursuit of Mind. Carcanet. 187.
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  12. Mark Sacks (1991). The Metaphysics of Mind. Philosophical Books 32 (1):50-52.
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  13. Mark Sacks (1990). Through a Glass Darkly: Vagueness in the Metaphysics of the Analytic Tradition. In David Bell & Neil Cooper (eds.), The Analytic Tradition: Roots and Scope. Blackwell.
     
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