9 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Markos Valaris (University of New South Wales)
  1. Markos Valaris, Agency and Control.
  2. Markos Valaris, Dogmatism and Moorean Reasoning.
    According to dogmatism, one may know a proposition by inferring it from a set of evidence even if one has no independent grounds for rejecting a skeptical hypothesis compatible with one’s evidence but incompatible with one’s conclusion. Despite its intuitive attractions, many philosophers have argued that dogmatism goes wrong because they have thought that it licenses Moorean reasoning — i.e., reasoning in which one uses the conclusion of an inference as a premise in an argument against a skeptical hypothesis that (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Markos Valaris (forthcoming). Reasoning and Regress. Mind.
    Regress arguments have convinced many that reasoning cannot require beliefs about what follows from what. In this paper I argue that this is a mistake. Regress arguments rest on dubious (although deeply entrenched) assumptions about the nature of reasoning—most prominently, the assumption that believing p by reasoning is simply a matter of having a belief in p with the right causal ancestry. I propose an alternative account, according to which beliefs about what follows from what play a constitutive role in (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Markos Valaris (2013). Spontaneity and Cognitive Agency. Kant Yearbook 5 (1).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Markos Valaris (2013). Self-Knowledge and the Phenomenological Transparency of Belief. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (8).
    I develop an account of our capacity to know what we consciously believe, which is based on an account of the phenomenology of conscious belief. While other recent authors have suggested that phenomenally conscious states play a role in the epistemology of self-ascriptions of belief, they have failed to give a satisfying account of how exactly the phenomenology is supposed to help with the epistemology — i.e., an account of the way “what it is like” for the subject of a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Markos Valaris (2012). Instrumental Rationality. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):n/a-n/a.
    Does rationality require us to take the means to our ends? Intuitively, it seems clear that it does. And yet it has proven difficult to explain why this should be so: after all, if one is pursuing an end that one has decisive reason not to pursue, the balance of reasons will presumably speak against one's taking the means necessary to bring that end about. In this paper I propose a novel account of the instrumental requirement which addresses this problem. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Markos Valaris (2011). Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):319-324.
    In his essay ‘Transparency, Belief, Intention’, Alex Byrne (2011) argues that transparency—our ability to form beliefs about some of our intentional mental states by considering their subject matter, rather than on the basis of special psychological evidence—involves inferring ‘from world to mind’. In this reply I argue that this cannot be correct. I articulate an intuitive necessary condition for a pattern of belief to count as a rule of inference, and I show that the pattern involved in transparency does not (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Markos Valaris (2009). Two-Dimensionalism and the Epistemology of Recognition. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):427 - 445.
    There is reason to expect a reasonable account of a priori knowledge to be linked with an account of the nature of conceptual thought. Recent “two-dimensionalist” accounts of conceptual thought propose an extremely direct connection between the two: on such views, being in a position to know a priori a large number of non-trivial propositions is a necessary condition of concept-possession. In this paper I criticize this view, by arguing that it requires an implausibly internalist and intellectualist conception of capacities (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Markos Valaris (2008). Inner Sense, Self-Affection, and Temporal Consciousness in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (4):1-18.
    In §24 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant remarks that his account of the capacity of the understanding to spontaneously determine sensibility explains how empirical self-knowledge is possible through inner-sense. Although most commentators consider Kant's conception of empirical self-knowledge through inner sense to be either a failure or at least drastically under-developed, I argue that (just as Kant claims) his account of the capacity of the understanding to determine sensibility - the "productive imagination" - can ground an attractive account of self-knowledge. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation