Search results for 'Markus E. Schlosser' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Taking Something as a Reason for Action. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
    This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I will discuss the desire-belief and the deliberative model of acting for reasons. I will argue that we can avoid the weaknesses and retain the strengths of both views, if we pursue an alternative according to which acting for reasons involves taking something as a reason. In the main part, I will develop an account of what it is to take something (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  2.  50
    Markus E. Schlosser (forthcoming). Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  34
    Markus E. Schlosser (forthcoming). Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism. Philosophia:1-13.
    Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the "rollback argument". In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises. On her view, this points to an unexplored alternative in the free will debate, which she calls "chance-incompatibilism". I will argue that the rollback thought experiment does (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Markus E. Schlosser (2014). The Neuroscientific Study of Free Will: A Diagnosis of the Controversy. Synthese 191 (2):245-262.
    Benjamin Libet’s work paved the way for the neuroscientific study of free will. Other scientists have praised this research as groundbreaking. In philosophy, the reception has been more negative, often even dismissive. First, I will propose a diagnosis of this striking discrepancy. I will suggest that the experiments seem irrelevant, from the perspective of philosophy, due to the way in which they operationalize free will. In particular, I will argue that this operational definition does not capture free will properly and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Markus E. Schlosser (2014). The Luck Argument Against Event-Causal Libertarianism: It is Here to Stay. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.
    The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has defended event-causal (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Markus E. Schlosser (2011). Review of "Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity", by Christine M. Korsgaard, 2009. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):212-214.
  7. Markus E. Schlosser (2015). Agency. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 'agency' denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Free Will and the Unconscious Precursors of Choice. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):365-384.
    Benjamin Libet's empirical challenge to free will has received a great deal of attention and criticism. A standard line of response has emerged that many take to be decisive against Libet's challenge. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that this standard response fails to put the challenge to rest. It fails, in particular, to address a recent follow-up experiment that raises a similar worry about free will (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). In the second part, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  9. Markus E. Schlosser (2013). Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
    Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.
    Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical evidence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11. Markus E. Schlosser (2010). Agency, Ownership, and the Standard Theory. In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan 13-31.
    The causal theory of action has been the standard view in the philosophy of action and mind. In this chapter, I will present responses to two challenges to the theory. The first says, basically, that there is no positive argument in favour of the causal theory, as the only reason that supports it consists in the apparent lack of tenable alternatives. The second challenge says that the theory fails to capture the phenomenon of agency, as it reduces activity to mere (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  12. Markus E. Schlosser (2009). Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions. In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos
    Given some reasonable assumptions concerning the nature of mental causation, non-reductive physicalism faces the following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects (given the causal closure of the physical). If mental events cause only other mental events, they do not make the kind of difference we want them to. This dilemma can be avoided if we drop the dichotomy between physical and mental events. Mental events make a real difference if they cause actions. But actions (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  13. Markus E. Schlosser (2015). Manipulation and the Zygote Argument: Another Reply. Journal of Ethics 19 (1):73-84.
    Alfred Mele’s zygote argument is widely considered to be the strongest version of the manipulation argument against compatibilism (about free will and determinism). Opponents have focused largely on the first of its two premises and on the overall dialectic. My focus here will be on the underlying thought experiment—the Diana scenario—and on the second premise of the argument. I will argue that reflection on the Diana scenario shows that the second premise does not hold, and we will see that my (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  85
    Markus E. Schlosser (2007). Basic Deviance Reconsidered. Analysis 67 (295):186–194.
    Most contemporary philosophers of action agree on the following claims. Firstly, the possibility of deviant or wayward causal chains poses a serious problem for the standard-causal theory of action. Secondly, we can distinguish between different kinds of deviant causal chains in the theory of action. In particular, we can distinguish between cases of basic and cases of consequential deviance. Thirdly, the problem of consequential deviance admits of a fairly straightforward solution, whereas the possibility of basic deviance constitutes a separate and (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  15. Markus E. Schlosser (2010). Bending It Like Beckham: Movement, Control and Deviant Causal Chains. Analysis 70 (2):299-303.
    Like all causal theories in philosophy, the causal theory of action is plagued by the problem of deviant causal chains. I have proposed a solution on the basis of the assumption that mental states and events are causally efficacious in virtue of their contents. This solution has been questioned by Torbjörn Tännsjö (2009). First, I will reply to the objection, and then I will discuss Tännsjö’s alternative.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  16. Markus E. Schlosser (2011). The Metaphysics of Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):345-369.
    This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17. Markus E. Schlosser (2013). Review of "The Things We Do and Why We Do Them", by Constantine Sandis, 2012. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 33 (1):74-76.
  18. Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Review of "Free Will and Modern Science", R. Swinburne , 2011. [REVIEW] International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):463-466.
  19. Markus E. Schlosser (2006). Causal Exclusion and Overdetermination. In E. Di Nucci & J. McHugh (eds.), Content, Consciousness and Perception. Cambridge Scholars Press
    This paper is about the causal exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism. Many philosophers think that this argument poses a serious problem for non-reductive theories of the mind — some think that it is decisive against them. In the first part I will outline non-reductive physicalism and the exclusion argument. Then I will distinguish between three versions of the argument that address three different versions of non-reductive physicalism. According to the first, the relation between mental and physical events is token-identity. According (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Agent-Causation and Agential Control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
    According to what I call the reductive standard-causal theory of agency, the exercise of an agent's power to act can be reduced to the causal efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. According to a non-reductive agent-causal theory, an agent's power to act is irreducible and primitive. Agent-causal theories have been dismissed on the ground that they presuppose a very contentious notion of causation, namely substance-causation. In this paper I will assume, with the proponents of the agent-causal approach, that substance-causation (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  60
    Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Review of "Self-Knowledge and Resentment", by Akeel Bilgrami, 2006. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):185–187.
  22.  51
    Markus E. Schlosser (2010). Review of "Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem", by Mark Balaguer, 2010. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online 14 (16).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  45
    Markus E. Schlosser (2010). Review of "Naturalizing Intention in Action", F. Grammont, D. Legrand, and P. Livet , 2010. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online 14 (34).
  24.  39
    Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Review: John R. Searle: Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1127-1130.
  25. Markus E. Schlosser (2007). The Metaphysics of Agency. Dissertation, St. Andrews
    Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. John E. Grumley, Paul Crittenden, Pauline Johnson & György Márkus (2002). Culture and Enlightenment Essays for György Markus. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  2
    Donka Markus (2000). Performing the Book: The Recital of Epic in First-Century C.E. Rome. Classical Antiquity 19 (1):138-179.
    The detrimental effect of the public recital on the quality of epic production in the first century is a stock theme both in ancient and in modern literary criticism. While previous studies on the epic recital emphasize its negative effects, or aim at its reconstruction as social reality, I focus on its conflicting representations by the ancients themselves and the lessons that we can learn from them. The voices of critics and defenders reveal anxieties about who controls the prestigious high (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  19
    R. A. Markus (1983). E. D. Hunt: Holy Land Pilgrimage in the Later Roman Empire A.D. 312–460. Pp. X + 269; 1 Map. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. £16.50. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 33 (02):353-354.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  1
    R. A. Markus (1995). The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds.Alan E. Bernstein. Speculum 70 (1):119-121.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. R. A. Markus (1972). Augustine; a Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City, N.Y.,Anchor Books.
    Introduction, by R. A. Markus.--St. Augustine and Christian Platonism, by A. H. Armstrong.--Action and contemplation, by F. R. J. O'Connell.--St. Augustine on signs, by R. A. Markus.--The theory of signs in St. Augustine's De doctrina Christiana, by B. D. Jackson.--Si fallor, sum, by G. B. Matthews.--Augustine on speaking from memory, by G. B. Matthews.--The inner man, by G. B. Matthews.--On Augustine's concept of a person, by A. C. Lloyd.--Augustine on foreknowledge and free will, by W. L. Rowe.--Augustine on (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  37
    Markus Schlosser & Fabio Paglieri (2014). Intentions: Philosophical and Empirical Issues. Topoi 33 (1):1-3.
    This topos is focused on intentions, with an emphasis on integrating philosophical analysis and empirical findings. Theorizing about human action has a long history in philosophy, and the nature of intention and intentional action has received a lot of attention in recent analytic philosophy. At the same time, intentional action has become an empirically studied phenomenon in psychology, cognitive neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and robotics. Many results obtained in these areas have been incorporated within the current philosophical debate, while at the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  4
    M. E. Schlosser (2008). Review of "Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading", by Alvin I. Goldman (2006). [REVIEW] Philosophy 28:264–267.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  3
    Not Available Not Available (1999). Jahrestagung 2000 Akademie für Ethik in der Medizin e.V. , Göttingen in Zusammenarbeit: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Urologie, Forum für Ethik in der Medizin Frankfurt/Main e.V., Zentrum für Ethik in der Medizin am Markus-Krankenhaus , Frankfurt/Main 5.-7. Oktober 2000 in Frankfurt/Main. [REVIEW] Ethik in der Medizin 11 (4):274-274.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  8
    S. F. (2000). Markus Enders Wahrheit Und Notwendigkeit. Die Theorie der Wahrheit Bei Anselm Von Canterbury. Studien Und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte de Mittelalters, 64. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999). Pp. XVIII + 622. NG 345·98, US×193·00 (Hbk). ISBN 9004112642. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 36 (4):505-507.
  35.  2
    W. F. S. M. (2000). Markus Enders Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit. Die Theorie der Wahrheit bei Anselm von Canterbury. Studien und texte zur Geistesgeschichte de Mittelalters, 64. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999). Pp. xviii + 622. NG 345·98, US×193·00 (Hbk). ISBN 9004112642. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 36 (4):505-507.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Diogo Ferrer (2013). Recensão a: SILVA, Markus Figueira da - Epicuro: Sabedoria e Jardim. Humanitas 65:352-355.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Luigi Imperato (2010). Schede Markus Krienke (a cura di), Sulla ragione. Rosmini e la filosofia tedesca. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 3:617.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  40
    T. Tannsjo (2009). On Deviant Causal Chains - No Need for a General Criterion. Analysis 69 (3):469-473.
    Donald Davidson brought to our attention deviant causal chains as a problem for causal theories of action. Consider Davidson's own example: " A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  39.  40
    Torbjörn Tännsjö (2009). On Deviant Causal Chains – No Need for a General Criterion. Analysis 69 (3):469 - 473.
    Donald Davidson brought to our attention deviant causal chains as a problem for causal theories of action. Consider Davidson's own example: " A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  3
    Markus E. Schlosser (forthcoming). Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism. Philosophia:1-13.
    Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the “rollback argument”. In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises. On her view, this points to an unexplored alternative in the free will debate, which she calls “chance-incompatibilism”. I will argue that the rollback thought experiment does (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Glenn W. Erickson (2010). Metafí­sica: história e problemas, de Bonaccini, J. A.; Medeiros, M. da Paz N.; Silva, M. F. e Bauchwitz, O. F. (Orgs.). [REVIEW] Princípios 13 (19-20):216-218.
    Resenha do livro de Juan Adolfo Bonaccini, Maria de Paz Nunes Medeiros, Markus Figueira de Silva e Oscar Frederico Bauchwitz (Org.). Metafísica: história e problemas: atas do I Colóquio Internacional da Metafísica . Natal: EDUFRN, 2006, 332 páginas. [Coleçáo Metafísica n. 5].
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Markus Figueira da Silva (2010). A Noção Epicúrea de Eustatheí­a e a Téchne Hé Ietriké. Princípios 5 (6):147-154.
    Este breve artigo traz em seu bojo a articulaçáo da compreensáo physiologica do corpo-carne em Epicuro com a Techne he Ietrike (Medicina Antiga), com vistas a mostrar o ethos (carater) comum à medicina e a filosofia na antiguidade.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Markus Figueira da Silva (1998). A Noção Epicúrea de Eustatheí­a e a Téchne Hé Ietriké. Princípios 5 (6):147-154.
    Este breve artigo traz em seu bojo a articulaçáo da compreensáo physiologica do corpo-carne em Epicuro com a Techne he Ietrike (Medicina Antiga), com vistas a mostrar o ethos (carater) comum à medicina e a filosofia na antiguidade.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  1
    Markus Ophälders (2011). Aritmetiche e alchimie di suoni. Severino Boezio e Luciano Berio. Doctor Virtualis 10:157-175.
    Luciano Berio apre il suo testamento poetico, Un ricordo al futuro, con un esplicito rinvio alla tripartizione della musica operata da Boezio e durante la discussione di specifiche tematiche della musica contemporanea vi torna a più riprese. Il presente lavoro intende indagare i motivi per un tale coinvolgimento dell’autore medievale nella ricerca poetica ed estetica di uno dei più importanti rappresentanti del mondo musicale novecentesco nonché il modo in cui la teoria di Boezio viene attualizzata da Berio. Si scoprirà che (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  3
    Markus Gabriel (2014). Dissenso e Oggetto. Rivista di Estetica 57:29-50.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  25
    Siegfried Müller-Markus (1964). Erwiderung an M.E. Omel'janovskij. Studies in East European Thought 4 (2):114-119.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Markus Figueira da Silva (2010). Epicuro e a Morte como a Perda da Subjetividade. Princípios 2 (3):140-146.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  18
    E. J. Kenney (1985). Markus Weber: Die mythologische Erzählungen in Ovids Liebeskunst: Verankerung, Struktur und Funktion. (Studien zur klassischen Philologie, 6.) Pp. 232. Frankfurt a. M./Berne: Peter Lang, 1983. Paper, 53 Sw. frs. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 35 (02):389-390.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Markus Figueira da Silva (1995). Epicuro e a Morte como a Perda da Subjetividade. Princípios 2 (3):140-146.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Markus Figueira da Silva (1995). Ensaio acerca da imagem Poética: Bachelard e João do Rio. Princípios 2 (2):135-142.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000