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Profile: Marleen Rozemond (University of Toronto)
  1. Marleen Rozemond (forthcoming). The Faces of Simplicity in Descartes’s Soul. In K. Corcilius, D. Perler & C. Helmig (eds.), The Parts of the Soul. De Gruyter.
    In this paper I explain several ways in which Descartes denied that the human soul or mind is composite and the role this idea played in his thought. The mind is whole in the whole and whole in the parts of the body because it has no parts. Unlike body, the mind is indivisible, and this is a different idea from the thought that mind and body are incorruptible. Descartes connects the immortality of the soul with its status as a (...)
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  2. Marleen Rozemond (2014). Mills Can't Think: Leibniz's Approach to the Mind-Body Problem. Res Philosophica 91 (1):1-28.
    In the Monadology Leibniz has us imagine a thinking machine the size of a mill in order to show that matter can’t think. The argument is often thought to rely on the unity of consciousness and the notion of simplicity. Leibniz himself did not see matters this way. For him the argument relies on the view that the qualities of a substance must be intimately connected to its nature by being modifications, limitations of its nature. Leibniz thinks perception is not (...)
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  3. Marleen Rozemond (2013). Essays on Descartes. Philosophical Review 122 (1):122-125.
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  4. Marleen Rozemond (2013). Pasnau on the Material–Immaterial Divide in Early Modern Philosophy. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    In Metaphysical Themes: 1274–1671, Robert Pasnau compares the medieval and early modern approaches to the material-immaterial divide and suggests the medievals held the advantage on this issue. I argue for the opposite conclusion. I also argue against his suggestion that we should approach the divide through the notion of a special type of extension for immaterial entities, and propose that instead we should focus on their indivisibility.
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  5. Marleen Rozemond (2013). Roger Ariew . Descartes Among the Scholastics . Leiden: Brill, 2011. Pp. Xii+358. $136.00 (Cloth). Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (1):186-190.
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  6. Marleen Rozemond (2012). Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez's Soul. In Benjamin Hill & Henrik Lagerlund (eds.), The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez. Oup Oxford.
    Suárez held that the vital faculties of the soul are really distinct from the soul itself and each other and that they cannot causally interact. This means that he needed to account for the connections between the activities of the faculties: they both interfere with and contribute to each other’s activities. Suárez does so by giving the soul a direct causal role in these activities. This role requires the unity of the soul of a living being and Suárez used it (...)
     
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  7. Marleen Rozemond (2011). Real Distinction, Separability, and Corporeal Substance in Descartes. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35 (1):240-258.
    For Descartes different substances are really distinct. He frequently connects real distinction with mutual separability. I examine this connection and the notion of real distinction. I then apply the results of this analysis to the controversy over the question whether Descartes held that there is a multiplicity of corporeal substances or only one. I argue that there are several ways of defending the pluralist interpretation against the monist charge that Cartesian bodies are not separable and so not really distinct substances.
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  8. Marleen Rozemond (2010). Descartes and the Immortality of the Soul. In John Cottingham & Peter Hacker (eds.), Mind, Method and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny. OUP.
    Descartes held that the human mind or soul is indivisible, unlike body. In this paper I argue that his treatment of this feature of the soul is intimately connected to his engagement with Aristotelian scholasticism. I discuss two strands in Descartes. There is a long tradition of arguing for the immortality of the human soul on the basis of this view. Descartes did use this view in defense of dualism, but I argue that he held that the soul’s immortality should (...)
     
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  9. Marleen Rozemond (2009). Can Matter Think? The Mind-Body Problem in the Clarke-Collins Correspondence. In Jon Miller (ed.), Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind. Springer.
    The Clarke-Collins correspondence was widely read and frequently printed during the 18th century. Its central topic is the question whether matter can think. Samuel Clarke defends the immateriality of the human soul against Anthony Collins’ materialism. Clarke argues that consciousness must belong to an indivisible entity, and matter is divisible. Collins contends that consciousness could belong to a composite subject by emerging from material qualities that belong to its parts. While many early modern thinkers assumed that this is not possible, (...)
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  10. Marleen Rozemond (2009). Leibniz on Final Causation. In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. Oxford University Press.
    Early modern philosophers rejected various important aspects of Aristotelianism. Current scholarship debates the question to what extent the early moderns rejected final causation. Leibniz explicitly endorsed it. I argue that his notion of final causation should be understood in connection with his resurrection of substantial forms and his seeing such forms on the model of the soul. I relate Leibniz’ conception of final causation to the Aristotelian background as well as Descartes’s treatment of teleology. I argue that he agreed with (...)
     
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  11. Marleen Rozemond (2008). Descartes’s Ontology of the Eternal Truths. In Paul Hoffman, David Owen & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Vere Chappel. Broadview.
    Descartes argued that the eternal truths, most prominently the truths of mathematics, are created by God. He was not explicit, however, about the ontological status of these truths. Interpreters have proposed interpretations ranging from Platonism and conceptualism. I argue for an intermediate interpretation: Descartes held they have objective being in God’s mind. In this regard his view was line with a prominent view in Aristotelian scholasticism. I defend this interpretation against objections based on divine simplicity and concerns about causation. I (...)
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  12. Marleen Rozemond (2008). The Achilles Argument and the Nature of Matter in the Clarke-Collins Correspondenc. In Tom Lennon & Robert Stainton (eds.), The Achilles of Rational Psychology.
    The Clarke-Collins correspondence was widely read and frequently printed during the 18th century. Its central topic is the question whether matter can think, or be conscious. Samuel Clarke defends the immateriality of the subject of the mental against Anthony Collins’ materialism. This paper examines important assumptions about the nature of body that play a role in their debate. Clarke argued that consciousness requires an “individual being”, an entity with some sort of significant unity as its subject. They agree that body (...)
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  13. Marleen Rozemond (2007). Descartes’s Dualism. In Janet Broughton & John Carriero (eds.), A Companion to Descartes. Blackwell.
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  14. Marleen Rozemond (2006). Lilli Alanen, Descartes's Concept of the Mind, Harvard University Press, 2003, 455 Pages, Isbn 0-674-01043-. [REVIEW] Theoria 72 (1):91-95.
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  15. Marleen Rozemond (2006). The Nature of the Mind. In Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations. Wiley-Blackwell. 48--66.
    IN this paper I explain how Descartes's conception of the mind was novel in relation to Aristotelian scholasticism. I also argue against the standard view that Descartes believed in transparency of the mental, the view that one cannot make mistakes about one's own mental states.
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  16. Marleen Rozemond (2005). Leibniz:Nature and Freedom. [REVIEW] The Leibniz Review 15:155-162.
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  17. Marleen Rozemond (2004). Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):591-613.
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  18. Marleen Rozemond (2004). Critical Notice of Janet Broughton, Descartes's Method of Doubt. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):591-613.
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  19. Marleen Rozemond (2004). Review: What Am I? Descartes and the Mind–Body Problem. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (449):147-150.
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  20. Marleen Rozemond & Gideon Yaffe (2004). Peach Trees, Gravity and God: Mechanism in Locke. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (3):387 – 412.
    Locke claimed that God superadded various powers to matter, including motion, the perfections of peach trees and elephants, gravity, and that he could superadd thought. Various interpreters have discussed the question whether Locke's claims about superaddition are in tension with his commitment to mechanistic explanation. This literature assumes that for Locke mechanistic explanation involves deducibility. We argue that this is an inaccurate interpretation and that mechanistic explanation involves a different type of intelligibility for Locke.
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  21. Marleen Rozemond (2003). Descartes, Mind-Body Union, and Holenmerism. Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2):343-367.
    In this paper I analyze Descartes's puzzling claim that the mind is whole in the whole body and whole in its parts, what Henry More called "holenmerism". I explain its historical background, in particular in scholasticism. I argue that like his predecessors, Descartes uses the idea for two purposes, for mind-body interaction and for the union of body and mind.
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  22. Marleen Rozemond (2002). Descartes's Dualism. Harvard University Press.
    In her first book, Marleen Rozemond explicates Descartes's aim to provide a metaphysics that would accommodate mechanistic science and supplant scholasticism.
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  23. Marleen Rozemond (2000). Passion and Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):723-726.
  24. Robert M. Adams, Janet Broughton, John Carriero, Michael Della Rocca, Daniel Garber, Don Garrett, Paul Hoffman, Christia Mercer, Steven Nadler, Marleen Rozemond, Donald Rutherford, Margaret D. Wilson & David Wong (1999). The Rationalists: Critical Essays on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  25. Marleen Rozemond (1999). Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction: What's the Problem? Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (3):435-467.
    I argue that Descartes treated the action of body on mind differently from the action of mind on body, as was common in the period. Descartes explicitly denied that there is a problem for interaction but his descriptions of interaction seem to suggest that he thought there was a problem. I argue that these descriptions are motivated by a different issue, the seemingly arbitrary connections between particular physical states and the particular mental states they produce. Within scholasticism there was already (...)
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  26. Marleen Rozemond (1998). Leibniz's 'New System' and Associated Contemporary Texts. [REVIEW] The Leibniz Review 8:100-104.
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  27. Marleen Rozemond (1998). Physiologia. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 107 (2):330-332.
  28. Marleen Rozemond (1997). Leibniz on the Union of Body and Soul. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 79 (2):150-178.
    Leibniz took pride in the Pre-established Harmony as an account of mind-body union. On the other hand, he sometimes claimed that he did not have a good account of such a union. I explain the tension by distinguishing between two importantly different issues that concern the union: body-soul interaction and the per se unity of the composite. Furthermore, I argue that, contrary to R.M. Adams, Leibniz did have the philosophical resources to account for a per se unity of the body-soul (...)
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  29. Marleen Rozemond (1996). The First Meditation and the Senses. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (1):21 – 52.
    One question that has created controversy among interpreters is just how much is in doubt at the end of the Dream Argument in Meditation I. I argue that there is doubt about the existence of composite bodies not yet about the existence of a physical world. I also caution against using later parts of the Meditations to interpret the First Meditation on account of the order of reasons in this work. I connect the Omnipotent God argument to Descartes's views about (...)
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  30. Marleen Rozemond (1995). Descartes's Case for Dualism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1):29-63.
    Descartes's dualism, and his argument for it, are often understood in terms of the modal notion of separability. I argue that the central notions, substance and real distinction, should not be understood this way. Descartes's well-known argument for dualism relies implicitly on views he spells out in the Principles of Philosophy, where he explains that a substance has a nature that consists in a single attribute, and all its qualities are modes of that nature. The argument relies ultimately on a (...)
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  31. Marleen Rozemond (1995). Descartes' Metaphysical Physics. History of European Ideas 21 (2):303-304.
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  32. Marleen Rozemond (1994). The Cambridge Companion to Descartes (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (2):304-306.
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  33. Marleen Rozemond (1993). Evans on de Re Thought. Philosophia 22 (3-4):275-298.
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  34. Marleen Rozemond (1993). The Role of the Intellect in Descartes's Case for the Incorporeity of the Mind. In Stephen Voss (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes.
    I argue that Descartes's best known argument for dualism relies on claims about intellectual activity and not on claims about mental states generally to establish dualism. I explain that this must be so give his historical context, where arguments for the immateriality of the mind on the basis of the intellect were common. But sensation and other non-intellectual states were regarded as pertaining to the body-soul composite.
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