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  1. Martha I. Gibson (2011). A Revolution in Method, Kant's “Copernican Hypothesis”, and the Necessity of Natural Laws. Kant-Studien 102 (1):1-21.
    In an effort to account for our a priori knowledge of synthetic necessary truths, Kant proposes to extend the successful method used in mathematics and the natural sciences to metaphysics. In this paper, a uniform account of that method is proposed and the particular contribution of the ‘Copernican hypothesis’ to our knowledge of necessary truths is explained. It is argued that, though the necessity of the truths is in a way owing to the object's relation to our cognition, the truths (...)
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  2. Martha I. Gibson (2008). Truth and Predication. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):215–219.
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  3. Martha I. Gibson (2004). From Naming to Saying: The Unity of the Proposition. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  4. Martha I. Gibson (1998). The Unity of the Sentence and the Connection of Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):827-845.
    This paper attempts a solution to the classical problem of predication, "the unity of the sentence": how, instead of merely listing the several things they designate, the parts of the sentence combine to represent something as being the case. While this capacity of a sequence of terms to "say some single thing" is standardly attributed to the distinct function of `subject' and `predicate' terms, these functional differences need explaining. Here, they are traced to the distinctive, asymmetrical causal explanation of the (...)
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  5. Martha I. Gibson (1996). Asymmetric Dependencies, Ideal Conditions, and Meaning. Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):235-59.
    Jerry Fodor has proposed a causal theory of meaning based on the notion of a certain asymmetric dependency between the causes of a symbol's tokens. This theory is held to be an improvement on Dennis Stampe's causal theory of meaning and Fred Dretske's information theoretic account, because it allegedly solves what Fodor calls the “disjunction problem”, and does so without recourse to the kind of optimal (ideal) conditions to which Stampe and Dretske appeal. A series of counterexamples is proposed to (...)
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  6. Martha I. Gibson (1995). Reference and Unity in Kant's Theory of Judgment. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):229 - 256.
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  7. Dennis W. Stampe & Martha I. Gibson (1992). Of One's Own Free Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):529 - 556.
  8. Martha I. Gibson (1990). Response to Stampe. Social Theory and Practice 16 (3):467-475.
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